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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three separate chapters that explore issues at the 
intersection of taxation and financial accounting.  The unifying theme is corporate tax 
avoidance and the consequences of increased transparency of tax practices on firm 
behaviour and financial reporting. 
Chapter 1 (co-authored with Chris Evans and Youngdeok Lim) examines the 
impact of changes to a full dividend imputation system on corporate tax avoidance.  
We exploit an exogenous shock to the Australian dividend imputation system which 
became effective on 1 July 2000 and allows shareholders to claim all imputation 
credits attached to dividends, even if it propels them into a tax refund position.  This 
enhancement to shareholder’s after-tax positions likely provides stronger incentives 
for firms to minimise tax avoidance activities to generate valuable imputation credits 
for distribution to shareholders.  We implement a difference-in-differences research 
design to examine the impact of the legislative change on tax avoidance for a variety 
of treatment and control groups after the change.  Consistent with our expectations, 
we find evidence of an increase in cash effective tax rates (decrease in tax avoidance) 
for domestic dividend-paying firms relative to domestic non-dividend-paying firms.  
This finding is even more pronounced for firms paying fully-franked dividends, and 
the decreases in tax avoidance are economically significant.  Our results are consistent 
with the notion that firms undertake less tax avoidance in the post 1 July 2000 period 
given the presence of stronger incentives for them to pay corporate tax. 
In Chapter 2 (solo-authored), I exploit the availability of new data to examine the 
impact of mandatory public country-by-country disclosures on the tax aggressiveness 
of European Union (EU) banks.  In response to growing public and political backlash 
against tax avoidance, the European Parliament introduced new rules in 2013 requiring 
the public disclosure, on a country-by-country basis, of certain tax-related information 
by credit and investment firms operating in the EU.  Enhanced transparency via public 
country-by-country-reporting (CBCR) allows greater scrutiny by stakeholders and is 
considered one way of increasing pressure on EU banks to pay corporate taxes that 
reflect their true economic presence in each country they operate in.  I conduct a range 
of empirical tests using cash and book effective tax rates to proxy for tax avoidance 
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and based on a hand-collected sample of 72 banks, I do not find any evidence of a 
reduction in tax avoidance in response to increased transparency.  A similar result is 
found when a differences-in-differences research design is employed to test for any 
change in tax avoidance of EU banks relative to a control group of 39 multinational 
EU insurers exempt from CBCR rules.  In fact, in some tests, I find that, on average, 
EU banks increased their tax avoidance relative to EU insurers despite increased 
disclosure levels.  I also find that tax haven use, calculated as the proportion of 
turnover, profit before tax, and subsidiaries/branches disclosed in tax havens, remains 
largely unchanged despite increased transparency.  The results suggest that mandatory 
public CBCR has not altered the cost-benefit equilibrium of tax avoidance sufficiently 
to encourage EU banks to curtail their tax avoidance practices. 
Chapter 3 (co-authored with Bjorn Jorgensen and Peter Pope) investigates the 
interplay between mandatory public CBCR, geographic segment reporting, and tax 
haven use.  We examine whether the availability of country-level financial information 
impacts geographic segment reporting and the extent to which firms aggregate 
geographic segments.  Based on a hand-collected sample of 70 banks operating in the 
EU, we document the location of their operations and the extent to which they operate 
in tax havens.  We find that, on average, banks with tax haven operations enjoy 
significantly higher profit margins, turnover per employee, and profit per employee, 
and lower book effective tax rates, in these jurisdictions relative to non-tax havens.  
Using a difference-in-differences research design, we find no significant change in the 
number of geographic segments, country segments, or line items per geographic 
segment, disclosed in segment reporting notes after the introduction of CBCR relative 
to a control sample of 39 multinational EU insurers exempt from CBCR.  Furthermore, 
we find a positive association between tax haven intensity and geographic segment 
aggregation consistent with the notion that EU banks may aggregate geographic 
segments to obfuscate tax haven activities.  This early empirical evidence suggests 
that mandatory public CBCR has limited impact on geographic segment reporting. 
In sum, the three chapters of this thesis contribute to the emerging literature on 
the determinants and consequences of corporate tax avoidance.  The findings should 
inform global regulators and policy makers interested in the extent of corporate tax 
avoidance and especially, EU policy makers currently considering the extension of 
public CBCR to all industries.  
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Chapter 1 
The impact of a change in a full dividend 
imputation system on corporate tax avoidance 
 
1.1 Introduction 
We examine whether the level of tax avoidance undertaken by firms operating in 
a full dividend imputation system decreases when changes made to the system enhance 
shareholders’ after-tax returns.1  We focus on Australian publicly-listed firms because 
Australia is one of a few countries who continue to operate a full dividend imputation 
system, thereby providing a high-power setting for studying the impacts of dividend 
imputation.2  Prior studies suggest that dividend imputation is associated with lower 
levels of tax avoidance (Wilkinson et al. 2001; Ikin and Tran 2013; McClure et al. 
2018).  The objective of this chapter is to extend these findings by exploiting a change 
to Australia’s full dividend imputation system to provide cleaner identification of the 
relation between dividend imputation and tax avoidance.3  Specifically, we exploit an 
exogenous shock where new rules allow shareholders to claim all imputation credits 
attached to dividends.  We argue that this enhancement to shareholder’s after-tax 
positions provides stronger incentives for some firms to pay corporate taxes (minimise 
tax avoidance) to generate additional valuable imputation credits for distribution to 
shareholders.  Employing a difference-in-differences research design, we test our 
hypothesis by examining the impact on tax avoidance for different groups of firms 
before and after this new legislation became effective on 1 July 2000. 
                                                          
1 Importantly, from a legal perspective tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax minimisation are clearly 
distinct as they involve varying degrees of intent.  Tax avoidance, sometimes referred to as ‘aggressive 
tax planning’, involves activities that are within the ‘letter of the law’ but contrary to the ‘spirit of the 
law’ and usually involves the aggressive exploitation of tax law loopholes.  However, to avoid the 
complexity of determining the legality or appropriateness of the particular mechanism used to reduce 
the firm’s tax liability, we follow the literature (e.g., Frank et al. 2009; Cheng et al. 2012) and define 
tax avoidance as per Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) as all activities specifically undertaken that have the 
effect of reducing a firm’s overall cash taxes. 
2 Chile, Malta, Mexico, and New Zealand operate full dividend imputation systems (Ainsworth 2016). 
3 Tax avoidance and dividend policy decisions are jointly determined in equilibrium.  Therefore, to 
mitigate concerns regarding endogeneity, we exploit the quasi-experimental setting offered by the 
change in Australia’s dividend imputation system. 
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Accusations of tax avoidance have thrust many publicly-listed companies into the 
spotlight in recent years.  Downwards management of tax liabilities by multinational 
corporations (MNCs) such as Apple, Starbucks and Google, has met with 
condemnation from the press, public interest groups, politicians and global 
organisations such as the G20 and OECD, who express concern that these firms do not 
pay their ‘fair share’ of tax.  The Tax Justice Network and United Voice (2014) 
accuses Australian listed companies of tax avoidance on an industrial scale claiming 
that the federal government is short-changed by A$8.4 billion annually in corporate 
tax revenue.  The heightened interest from policy makers in recent years is due to the 
perceived inequities surrounding questionable tax practices coupled with 
governments’ desire to preserve tax system integrity and safeguard revenue against 
the global economic backdrop of unprecedented fiscal imbalances. 
Over the past decade, a rapidly evolving academic literature has emerged on tax 
avoidance in an attempt to understand the practices used by companies to minimise 
their tax liabilities and the consequences thereof.  These studies document a variety of 
determinants of corporate tax avoidance and an assortment of financial reporting, 
capital market, and contracting outcomes associated with such activities.4  Although 
considered by many as morally questionable, tax avoidance practices can lead to 
increases in both accounting earnings and cash flows.  Furthermore, some managers 
believe that their fiduciary duty to shareholders compels them to act aggressively with 
respect to tax strategy if it leads to significant cost savings and increased firm value.  
However, frictions such as tax planning costs, management rent extraction, 
reputational effects, and post-audit penalties, may provide a counterweight to such 
incentives.5  Indeed, Chen et al. (2010) and Chyz et al. (2013) provide evidence that 
company stakeholders view tax avoidance negatively and seek to limit these activities.  
Thus, managers face a delicate risk-reward trade-off between personal incentives, 
prospective shareholder benefits, stakeholder expectations, and risk.6 
                                                          
4 See Graham et al. (2012) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) for reviews of the extant tax research in 
accounting and economics. 
5 Corporate tax avoidance may increase information risk (Balakrishnan et al. 2018), agency risk (Desai 
and Dharmapala 2006), the risk of being audited by tax authorities (Mills 1998), and overall firm risk 
(Guenther et al. 2017). 
6 A new interpretation of tax avoidance emerges from Blouin (2014) and Armstrong et al. (2015) who 
consider it to be a form of investment similar to other investment opportunities available to the firm.  
Accordingly, before the firm chooses to invest, it evaluates the net present value of the ‘project’ which 
is a function of both the expected cash flows and the inherent risk (i.e., the dispersion of the potential 
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We argue that in Australia, the full dividend imputation system provides a strong 
countervailing influence on the incentives managers of certain firms may have to 
engage in tax avoidance.  This system eliminates the double taxation on distributed 
profits between companies and shareholders.  It achieves this by allowing the tax paid 
by a company to be credited, or imputed, to the shareholders by way of a franking 
credit attached to dividends to reduce the final income tax payable by the shareholder.7  
Consequently, the imputation system likely leads to heterogeneity in tax avoidance 
incentives across Australian publicly-listed firms due to differences in dividend pay-
out policy.  Australian firms that pay dividends with attached franking credits are more 
likely to face stronger incentives to pay corporate tax relative to foreign firms publicly-
listed in Australia, Australian firms that do not pay dividends, or Australian firms that 
pay unfranked dividends.8  Importantly, this heterogeneity facilitates comparisons 
between these different groups operating with the same system. 
We exploit a plausibly exogenous shock that occurred in late 1999 whereby 
legislation (‘rebate provision’) was passed allowing Australian resident shareholders 
to claim all franking credits attached to dividends they receive.  That is, contrary to 
the prior rules which only allowed shareholders to utilise the credits up to the point 
where they offset their tax liability, the new rules allow taxpayers to claim all franking 
credits, even if it puts them into a tax refund position.  Effective 1 July 2000, this rule 
change increased the value and demand for franking credits by shareholders.  We test 
our hypotheses by examining tax avoidance, measured using cash effective tax rates 
(ETRs), before and after this exogenous shock.9  Exploiting a change in shareholder 
dividend tax rules that does not affect financial reporting helps us to isolate the impact 
of the change on tax avoidance. 
Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that over the sample period (1997-2004), 
cash ETRs are significantly higher for (i) Australian (domestic) dividend-paying firms 
                                                          
cash flows).  Therefore, they argue that tax aggressiveness and tax risk are not separable concepts.  
Guenther et al. (2017) find that tax risk, measured as the volatility of the cash effective tax rate (ETR), 
is positively related to future total firm risk. 
7 The terms ‘franking credit’ and ‘imputation credit’ are equivalent and used interchangeably 
throughout the chapter to describe the tax credit attached to dividends. 
8 Details of the mechanics of the dividend imputation system including discussion of franked and 
unfranked dividends are discussed in more detail in Section 1.2 below. 
9 As a note of caution, we do not infer or imply that firms in our sample with low cash ETRs have 
achieved those low rates through illegal or improper means, but rather that they are able to report and 
pay a lower percentage of their earnings through cash taxes. 
14 
relative to foreign firms publicly-listed in Australia; (ii) domestic dividend-paying 
firms relative to domestic non-dividend-paying firms, and (iii) domestic firms paying 
fully-franked dividends relative to domestic dividend-paying firms that do not pay 
fully-franked dividends.  Next, we find evidence of a reduction in tax avoidance after 
the introduction of the rebate provision on 1 July 2000.  Specifically, univariate tests 
reveal that cash ETRs for domestic dividend-paying firms are significantly higher in 
the period after the rule change.  Then, utilising a difference-in-differences research 
design, we find that dividend-paying domestic firms report significantly higher cash 
ETRs following the change, indicating a decrease in tax avoidance relative to non-
dividend-paying domestic firms.  A similar result is found when comparing fully-
franked dividend-paying domestic firms to non-fully-franked dividend-paying 
domestic firms.  Our estimates suggest the decreases in tax avoidance are 
economically significant with additional cash taxes paid ranging from approximately 
A$7.89m to A$23.27m.  Surprisingly, although domestic firms have significantly 
higher cash ETRs after the change while foreign firms publicly-listed in Australia do 
not, we fail to find a significant decrease in tax avoidance for domestic firms relative 
to foreign firms after the change.  However, this is likely due to the small number of 
foreign firms in the control sample reducing the statistical power in empirical tests. 
Our findings have academic contribution and policy implications.  From an 
academic standpoint, this study contributes to the extant literature in several ways.  
First, we extend the findings in recent studies (e.g., Ikin and Tran 2013; Amiram et al. 
2017; and McClure et al. 2018) by exploiting an important exogenous shock to 
Australia’s full dividend imputation system to better identify the relation between this 
system and the level of tax avoidance undertaken by Australian publicly-listed firms.  
Second, corporate tax avoidance in Australia has only become a topic of academic 
study in recent years.10  Thus, this study adds to this emerging literature, in particular, 
the incentives Australian managers face to engage in tax avoidance and the role that 
dividend imputation plays in curtailing such activities. 
                                                          
10 Recent studies investigate the relationship between tax aggressiveness and: board composition (Lanis 
and Richardson 2011; Richardson et al. 2013a); corporate social responsibility (Lanis and Richardson 
2012, 2013, 2015); incentives for corporate tax planning and reporting (Taylor and Richardson 2014); 
the determinants of transfer pricing aggressiveness (Richardson et al. 2013b) and thinly capitalised tax 
avoidance structures (Taylor and Richardson 2013); the international tax avoidance practices of 
publicly-listed Australian firms (Taylor and Richardson 2012); and the determinants of the variability 
in corporate effective tax rates and tax reform (Richardson and Lanis 2007). 
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From a policy perspective, our findings advance the understanding of corporate 
tax avoidance in Australia and may assist in designing future policy.  Australia’s 
budget is more dependent on corporate tax than all other OECD countries except 
Norway (OECD 2014a);11 and after personal income tax, corporate tax is the second 
largest source of federal government revenue (Australian Department of Treasury 
2014).  Hence, understanding the underlying motives for tax avoidance can help 
legislators design a more efficient corporate tax system.  Finally, this study also has a 
particular significance and relevance since Australia recently considered a move away 
from its full dividend imputation system.  This was discussed in the Commonwealth 
Government Tax Discussion Paper released in March 2015 which formally started the 
process for developing the White Paper on the ‘Reform of Australia’s Tax System’.12  
Although the development of the White Paper has ceased, the debate about the efficacy 
of the full dividend imputation system will likely re-emerge in the near future.13  
Therefore, our findings provide empirical evidence of the extent to which the current 
full dividend imputation system helps mitigate corporate tax avoidance activity. 
1.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
Upon receipt, shareholders pay tax on a dividend at their marginal tax rate with 
any final liability dependent on whether the payer’s resident country employs a 
‘dividend imputation’ or ‘classical’ system.  In a dividend imputation system, the tax 
paid by a company may be imputed to the shareholders by way of a tax credit (franking 
credit) to reduce the subsequent tax payable on the dividend received.  A full dividend 
imputation system allows shareholders a credit for the entire tax paid by the company 
whereas a partial imputation system does not.14  In contrast, a ‘classical’ system 
                                                          
11 In 2013, Australia’s company tax revenue as a proportion of GDP was 4.9% compared to the OECD 
average of 2.9% (OECD 2014a). 
12 The Tax Discussion Paper provides a broad overview of the need to respond to challenges such as 
globalisation, declining productivity, and an ageing population.  It mentions several tax-related 
challenges that may need to be addressed including drawbacks of the full dividend imputation system 
(Australian Commonwealth Government 2015).  Unlike the extensive 2009 Henry Review (Australian 
Commonwealth Treasury - AFTS Secretariat 2009) which provided detailed recommendations, the Tax 
Discussion Paper provides few pointers as to the breadth of any future reform package. 
13 In February 2016 the Prime Minister, Malcom Turnbull, stated that the 2016-2017 Federal Budget 
released in May 2016 was ‘for all practical purposes, the White Paper’. 
14 Australia replaced its classical system with a full dividend imputation system from 1 July 1987.  
Finland, France, Germany, Italy and Norway eliminated their full imputation systems between 1999 
and 2007 in response to a European Court of Justice ruling that the imputation systems of several 
European countries were discriminatory and in violation of EU law.  The US operates a ‘modified 
16 
effectively results in double taxation of corporate income (i.e., income is taxed first at 
the company level and again at the shareholder level).  Panel A of Appendix A 
provides an illustrative example of the after-tax cash flows available to shareholders 
under both regimes. 
Essentially, under an imputation system, corporate tax paid by a company is a 
prepayment of shareholders’ personal tax and is not a real cost as in a classical system.  
Managers therefore have reduced incentives to undertake aggressive tax planning.15  
Indeed, Ikin and Tran (2013) investigate large publicly-listed Australian firms in the 
1999-2003 period and find that firms distributing franked dividends adopt a more 
conservative tax strategy (measured using book ETRs) compared to firms that do not 
pay franked dividends.  However, the authors do not attempt to exploit any of the 
changes to the imputation system that occurred during this period.  More recently, 
McClure et al. (2018) find that the impact of dividend imputation on tax avoidance 
varies across Australian publicly-listed firms.  Specifically, they find that firms paying 
partly-franked or fully-franked dividends, are less likely to engage in tax avoidance 
compared to firms that pay unfranked dividends or firms that pay no dividends at all.  
The authors deliberately chose the sample period as 2004-2015 for stability thereby 
avoiding changes to the dividend imputation system made before 2004. 
Most importantly, from 1 July 2000, franking credits in Australia became fully 
refundable meaning that not only can they reduce a shareholder’s tax liability to zero, 
but any excess is refunded to the shareholder.16  The illustrative example in Panel B 
of Appendix A demonstrates the impact of this change on shareholder-level tax 
liabilities for different types of resident shareholders with varying marginal tax rates.17  
Clearly, the change is especially attractive to resident taxpayers whose marginal tax 
rate is less than the statutory company tax rate of 30% (Investors 1 and 2 in Panel B 
                                                          
classical’ system (dividend income taxed at preferential rates (e.g., compared to interest income) at the 
shareholder level) (OECD 2014b; Ainsworth 2016). 
15 This most likely relates to domestic tax avoidance because Australia, like most countries, with the 
major exception of the US, adopts a ‘territorial approach’ to the taxation of MNC income where it only 
taxes the profits earned within its borders (i.e., source basis).  Profits earned overseas are taxed by 
foreign tax authorities which reduces the amount of Australian corporate tax paid and thus the amount 
of franking credits available.  The US adopts a ‘worldwide’ taxation system in which it taxes the 
worldwide income of its MNCs (i.e., residency basis). 
16 Under section 67-25(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act (ITAA) 1997, if the tax offset allowed for 
franking credits exceeds the tax payable by the shareholder, the excess franking credit is fully 
refundable to the taxpayer. 
17 Only Australian resident shareholders can utilise franking credits. 
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of Appendix A).  Therefore, key beneficiaries of the change include Australian 
superannuation funds in pension mode (post-retirement phase) whose earnings are 
taxed at 0%, and superannuation funds in accumulation mode (pre-retirement phase) 
who are taxed at 15%.  Indeed, Mackenzie and McKerchar (2014) interviewed Chief 
Investment Officers of 22 Australian superannuation funds and found that 71% claim 
to actively manage franking credits as part of their overall investment strategy.  
Notably, superannuation funds are major investors in Australian listed companies 
representing approximately 21% of total market capitalisation.18  
Several additional changes were made to the Australian dividend imputation 
system in the years surrounding the introduction of the rebate provision potentially 
creating confounding effects.  For example, from 1 July 1997, the 45-day holding rule 
requires resident taxpayers to continuously hold shares at risk for at least 45 days to 
be eligible to receive franking credits.  Other enhancements effective 1 July 2002 
provided greater flexibility in the availability of franking credits and simplified the 
interaction of the imputation system with tax loss regulations.  However, the rebate 
provision effective 1 July 2000 arguably had a much greater impact for shareholders.  
Supporting this contention is the finding of Beggs and Skeels (2006) who show that 
franking credits had no value until 1 July 2000, after which franking credits were 
estimated to be worth 57% of their face value.  Similarly, Cummings and Frino (2008) 
find that franking credits are worth at least 50% of their face value during the period 
2002-2005.  Jun et al. (2011) propose that in combination, the results of these two 
studies suggest that the year 2000 tax change significantly increased the value of 
franking credits to the marginal investor in the Australian market.  Accordingly, we 
employ this change as the treatment effect in our empirical analysis. 
In their review of the financial implications of dividend imputation, Ainsworth et 
al. (2015) acknowledge that, at the margin, the imputation system creates a bias to 
Australian equities amongst domestic investors.19  Therefore, from a shareholder 
                                                          
18 As at 30 June 2013, public superannuation funds have direct holdings in Australian listed companies 
worth AU$123,462m (APRA 2015), while self-managed (private) superannuation funds own 
AU$156,363m (ATO 2015).  The total of AU$279,825m equates to 20.8% of the total market 
capitalisation of the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) of AU$1,347,186 at that date (ASX 2015). 
19 Figure 11 in Ainsworth et al. (2015) reveals a stark divergence in dividend pay-out ratios of Australian 
firms (60-75%) compared to the world equity markets (35-40%) since the introduction of dividend 
imputation, providing evidence that imputation has encouraged higher pay-out ratios in Australia.  
Pattenden and Twite (2008) find that dividend initiations, pay-outs, and reinvestment plans increased 
following the introduction of dividend imputation in Australia and the increases were greater for firms 
18 
perspective, we argue that because many investors are further tax-advantaged by 
franking credits post July 2000, demand for fully-franked dividends likely increased 
more.  Using Australian Taxation Office (ATO) data, Handley and Maheswaran 
(2008) find that, on average, 67% of distributed imputation credits were used to reduce 
personal taxes during 1990-2000.  However, this increased to 81% over 2001-2004 
following the 2001 change consistent with an increase in demand from domestic 
investors.  Jun et al.’s (2011) study of institutional tax clienteles shows that Australian 
institutional funds have a higher ownership of stocks which carry full franking credits 
compared to stocks which have partial, or zero franking credits.20 
We contend that post-July 2000, shareholder-friendly managers of Australian 
firms have enhanced incentives to pay company tax (reduce tax avoidance) to generate 
valuable franking credits to satisfy shareholders’ increased demand for fully-franked 
dividend income.  Underlying this argument is the findings of several studies 
regarding pay-out responses of management.  First, Desai and Jin (2011) find that 
managers alter pay-out policies in response to the tax preferences of their institutional 
investors.  Second, Hanlon and Hoopes (2014) present evidence suggesting that 
management is conscious of, and forms pay-out policy based on, shareholder-level 
taxes, and that they act in a manner that maximises shareholder value.  Third, Amiram 
et al. (2017) show that tax avoidance significantly decreases after an exogenous 
enhancement of an imputation system consistent with managers acting for the benefit 
shareholders, not themselves.  The authors reason that tax avoidance within an 
imputation system merely shifts the burden of tax payments from the company to its 
shareholders and thus does not increase the shareholders’ after-tax cash flows.  They 
conclude that a country that eliminates its imputation system in favour of a classical 
system creates the incentive for managers to engage in tax avoidance to meet 
shareholders’ compensating demand for higher after-tax cash flows. 
Only Australian resident shareholders can utilise franking credits.  Consequently, 
low marginal rate resident shareholders (e.g., superannuation funds) will prefer 
                                                          
with more franking credits.  Recently, Balachandran et al. (2017) exploit the Australian setting and find 
that firms are more likely to pay dividends with higher pay-out ratios in an imputation environment 
compared to a traditional tax system. 
20 Bellamy (1994) finds support for the existence of dividend clienteles and increased franked dividend 
pay-outs relative to unfranked dividend pay-outs for the 1985-1992 period.  In contrast, Grinstein and 
Michaely (2005) do not find tax-based preferences by institutional investors. 
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franked dividends whilst foreign resident shareholders will prefer capital gains or 
unfranked dividends.  Balachandran et al. (2017) demonstrate that Australian publicly-
listed firms with higher foreign institutional ownership are less likely to pay dividends 
and have lower pay-out ratios.  Unfortunately, ownership data is not available for our 
sample firms during the sample period.  Nevertheless, numerous foreign firms are 
listed on the ASX and a reasonable assumption can be made that a higher fraction of 
their shareholders are non-tax residents.  Generally, foreign firms are excluded from 
samples because most of their profits will likely be subject to tax laws that diverge 
substantially from Australian tax laws.21  However, given that foreign firms are likely 
less impacted by the enhancement to the imputation system, we employ these firms as 
our first control group in our difference-in-differences research design. 
Considering the evidence from prior studies and based on our intuition that 
incentives to pay corporate tax intensified after the introduction of the rebate provision 
from 1 July 2000, we test the following hypothesis: 
H1: Corporate tax avoidance decreased after 1 July 2000 for domestic firms 
relative to foreign firms. 
Currently, the treated firms are a mix of non-dividend paying and dividend-paying 
domestic firms.  The enhancement to the dividend imputation system is likely to have 
a greater impact on those firms that pay dividends compared to non-dividend paying 
firms who cannot pass on franking credits to shareholders.  Therefore, we exclude 
non-dividend paying firms from the treatment group and test the following hypothesis: 
H2: Corporate tax avoidance decreased after 1 July 2000 for dividend-paying 
domestic firms relative to foreign firms. 
Dividend-paying domestic firms comprise three different groups depending on 
dividend type.  First, firms without franking credits may still pay dividends provided 
they have sufficient accumulated profits (absence of franking credits might result from 
the firm incurring tax losses in prior years).  In this case, the dividend will be an 
‘unfranked dividend’.  Second, firms with some level of franking credits available 
                                                          
21 Australia’s territorial approach to the taxation of MNC profits means that only the Australian sourced 
profits of foreign firms will be taxed in Australia.  Withholding tax on franked dividends paid to a non-
resident shareholder of a treaty country is 0% i.e., franking (company tax paid) represents a final tax to 
non-resident shareholders. 
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from prior company tax paid, but not enough to fully-frank the dividend, may still 
impute these credits through a ‘partly-franked dividend’.  Third, firms that have paid 
sufficient corporate tax to generate enough franking credits to fully-frank their 
dividend, may distribute these credits to shareholders via a ‘fully-franked dividend’.  
It follows that the rebate provision differentially impacts these three groups with fully-
franked dividend-paying firms (unfranked dividend-paying firms) likely facing the 
largest increase (smallest or no increase) in incentives to increase corporate tax paid 
(reduce tax avoidance).  We take advantage of the heterogeneity of tax avoidance 
incentives across these three groups to develop alternative treatment and control 
groups to test the following hypotheses:22 
H3: Corporate tax avoidance decreased more after 1 July 2000 for dividend-
paying domestic firms relative to non-dividend-paying domestic firms. 
H4: Corporate tax avoidance decreased more after 1 July 2000 for domestic firms 
paying fully-franked dividends relative to dividend-paying domestic firms 
that do not pay fully-franked dividends. 
1.3 Research design 
1.3.1 Sample selection and data sources 
Our sample initially consists of all companies publicly-listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX) during 1997-2004.  To implement our identification strategy, 
we restrict the sample period to this relatively narrow period (4 years either side of the 
legislative change) to help mitigate the influence of any confounding factors (Allen et 
al. 2016).23  Several data filters and then applied.  First, we exclude property 
partnership or trust entities due to their unique capital structures and the fact that trusts 
are not taxpayers.24  Second, we exclude firms with missing data (e.g., ticker, GICS 
codes) and only include those firms that report in all eight financial years.  We then 
                                                          
22 McClure et al. (2018) use dummy variables to distinguish between two groups of dividend-paying 
firms; firms paying franked dividends (partly- or fully-franked) and firms paying unfranked dividends. 
23 We believe that the choice of this time window is a reasonable compromise to the trade-off between 
relevance and precision.  The window needs to be long enough to detect meaningful changes in tax 
avoidance given that corporate tax strategies are usually long-term strategies that may take some time 
to alter.  In addition, it allows us to retain a large enough sample size.  However, the time window must 
be short enough so as not to incorporate too much noise into the analysis. 
24 Trust income is taxed in the hands of trust beneficiaries or unit holders. 
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retain firm-year observations for which we have data available to calculate the model 
variables.  After imposing these requirements, our final sample is a panel of 1,901 
firm-year observations for 246 firms.25  The panel comprises the main sample of 212 
domestic firms (1,655 firm-year observations) and the control sample of 34 foreign 
firms (246 firm-year observations).  Finally, we attempt to minimise the undue 
influence of outliers by winsorizing all continuous variables at the 2nd and 98th 
percentiles of their respective distributions.  Panel A of Table 1.1 summarises the 
sample selection procedure. 
To construct the variables in our empirical models, we collect financial statement 
information from Datastream.  Data relating to dividends and share prices are obtained 
from SIRCA.26  All variables are defined in Appendix B.  Panel B of Table 1.1 presents 
the industry distribution of the sample according to 2-digit GICS classification codes.  
The sample includes a greater proportion of firms in the materials (24.8%), consumer 
discretionary (17.5%), and industrials (17.1%) sectors, though there appears to be no 
significant industry bias. 
1.3.2 Dependent variable 
Tax avoidance activities are usually veiled in a cloak of secrecy and hence 
unobservable to the researcher.  This makes such activities difficult to measure leading 
to claims that the degree of tax aggressiveness is ‘in the eye of the beholder’ (Hanlon 
and Heitzman 2010).  Following prior research, (e.g., Chen et al. 2010; Rego and 
Wilson 2012; Lennox et al. 2013; Bird and Karolyi 2017; McClure et al. 2018), we 
employ the annual cash ETR (CETR) as the proxy for tax avoidance.27  CETR is 
computed as income tax paid from the cash flow statement in year t divided by pre-
tax income in the same period, and it captures a firm’s ability to pay a low amount of 
cash taxes relative to earnings.28  Like book ETRs, this measure only reflects non-
                                                          
25 To preserve sample size and because accounting losses due not necessarily articulate to tax losses, 
we retain firm-years with negative pre-tax income.  In robustness checks, we exclude firm-years with 
negative pre-tax income following recent studies (Dyreng et al. 2017b; McClure et al. 2018).  This 
reduces the sample to 1,411 observations. 
26 SIRCA is an Australian database providing financial statement, share price and corporate governance 
information on ASX-listed companies. 
27 The ETR is a commonly used proxy in the literature and the ATO (2006) considers a low ETR a key 
indicator of corporate tax avoidance. 
28 In robustness tests, we employ an alternative measure (CETR_M) which modifies CETR by replacing 
pre-tax net income in the denominator with cash flows from operating activities. 
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conforming tax avoidance, that is, tax avoidance transactions accounted for differently 
for book and tax purposes (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  CETR reflects both 
temporary and permanent BTDs and a very low level of CETR likely captures extreme 
cases of tax avoidance.  However, unlike book ETRs, CETR is unaffected by opaque 
income tax accruals and represents a more accurate estimate of the cash taxes paid 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2004).29  Given payment of cash corporate taxes underpins the 
franking credit generation process, CETR is the most appropriate ETR measure to use 
in our analysis. 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008; McClure et al. 2018) we 
constrain CETR to fall within the [0, 1] interval to ensure a valid interpretation of tax 
avoidance.  Finally, firms generally have stronger incentives for tax avoidance when 
the statutory corporate tax rate is higher, so tax avoidance likely varies with statutory 
tax rate changes.  During our sample period, the statutory corporate tax rate changed 
several times.  For fiscal years ending 30 June 1997 through 30 June 2000 it was 36% 
and then decreased to 34% for the 2001 financial year.  It then decreased again to 30% 
for the 2002 and subsequent financial years.  We follow Ikin and Tran (2013) and take 
these changes into account by dividing CETR by the statutory corporate tax rate 
prevailing at the time.  Tax avoidance activities are minimal when the ratios are close 
to unity and the smaller the ratios, the more aggressive is the tax strategy. 
1.3.3 Regression model 
We employ a difference-in-differences specification to analyse the effect of the 
change in the dividend imputation system on tax avoidance (Dyreng et al. 2016).  We 
construct several treatment and control groups to test the four hypotheses.  This 
research design allows us to control for time invariant differences between treatment 
and control groups in addition to general economic trends common to both groups.  
We estimate different variations of the following baseline specification: 
                                                          
29 A firm’s book ETR is total income tax expense divided by pre-tax accounting income and measures 
the taxes on the current period’s pre-tax income reported in the financial statements.  However, the 
concern with this proxy is that both the numerator and denominator are recorded on an accruals basis, 
thus differences between the timing of income and expenses for financial reporting and tax reporting 
are reflected in the measure.  It reflects aggressive tax planning through permanent book-tax differences 
(BTDs), that is, a tax strategy that defers tax (e.g., accelerated depreciation for tax purposes) will not 
alter the book ETR.  In contrast, cash ETRs are computed using cash taxes paid in the numerator so that 
tax avoidance activities that decrease a firm’s cash tax burden will directly impact the firm’s cash ETR. 
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CETRi,t =  α0 + α1TREATEDi,t + α2TREATED*POSTi,t + α3SIZEi,t + α4ROAi,t 
+α5LEVi,t +α6INTANGi,t + α7CAPINTi,t+ α8MKTBKi,t + α9RNDi,t  + εi,t (1) 
TREATED is a dummy variable equal to 1 for each of the treatment groups used 
in the analysis, and 0 otherwise.  Treatment groups include domestic firms, domestic 
dividend-paying firms, domestic firms where all dividends paid are fully-franked, and 
domestic firms where at least one dividend paid is fully-franked.  The legislative 
change became effective 1 July 2000, so we include an indicator variable denoted 
POST which takes the value of 1 for financial years ending 30 June 2001 onward and 
0 otherwise.  α1 reflects the average difference in CETR between treatment and control 
firms in the pre-1 July 2000 period.  Our variable of interest is the interaction between 
TREATED and POST.  To test all hypotheses, we examine α2, the coefficient on 
TREATED*POST which is the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of the 
change in the dividend imputation system on tax avoidance in the post-period.  A 
positive (negative) coefficient on this interaction variable indicates an increase 
(decrease) in CETR corresponding to a decrease (increase) in tax avoidance of 
treatment firms relative to control firms.  In all four hypotheses, we predict a positive 
coefficient for α2. 
We include an array of controls identified in prior research as influencing tax 
avoidance to help alleviate concerns that correlated omitted variables are confounding 
inferences.  We control for general tax planning determinants with firm size (SIZE) 
because larger firms may have higher political costs (Zimmerman 1983), or greater 
tax planning opportunities via economies of scale and greater sophistication (Mills et 
al. 1998; Rego 2003).  We control for firm performance because some studies 
document a negative association between firm profitability (ROA) and tax avoidance 
(Gupta and Newberry 1997; Plesko 2003), while others find a positive association 
(Rego 2003; Armstrong et al. 2012).  We also control for leverage (LEV) because firms 
may reduce tax liabilities through the tax-deductibility of interest expenses (Plesko 
2003; Markle and Shackleford 2012b).30,31 
                                                          
30 Interest expenses are fully tax-deductible in Australia (subject to thin-capitalisation rules). 
31 Some studies find a negative association between leverage and tax avoidance (Chen et al. 2010) 
possibly due to the debt substitution effect (Graham and Tucker 2006).  Interest payments reduce 
taxable profits and pre-tax earnings, thus attenuating the effect of leverage on ETRs. 
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Firms may use intangible assets (e.g., patents, trademarks) to shift income to low-
tax jurisdictions thereby lowering tax liabilities.  So, we use INTANG, measured as 
intangible assets scaled by total assets, to control for intangible assets (Chen et al. 
2010).  Higher levels of property, plant and equipment usually result in higher tax-
deductible depreciation expenses leading to a positive association between capital 
intensity (CAPINT) and tax avoidance (Gupta and Newberry 1997).  Firms with more 
growth or investment opportunities likely face different tax planning incentives than 
mature firms, so we use the market-to-book ratio (MKTBK) to proxy for growth 
opportunities (Chen et al. 2010).  Lastly, we control for research and development 
(R&D) intensity (RND) because Australian firms receive generous R&D incentives 
which may lower taxable income (McClure et al. 2018).32 
Finally, we present the results for two versions of the specification.  The first 
version includes industry and year fixed effects to control for industry characteristics 
and to capture general changes in tax planning over time.33  The second version 
replaces the industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects to capture unobservable time-
invariant firm characteristics.  Note, that these latter models preclude the inclusion of 
TREATED, a time-invariant firm variable. 
1.4 Empirical results 
1.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
We begin by scrutinising the time trend of CETR for each of the treatment and 
control group pairings used in the empirical analysis.  Figure 1.1 illustrates that in each 
pairing, the trend in CETR before the change in the dividend imputation system is 
similar.  For example, in Panels A and B, the pre-change trend in CETR for domestic 
and foreign firms is similar.  Although, this trend appears to continue after the 
introduction of the rebate provision in 2000.  In Panels C and D, despite level 
differences, the pre-change trend in CETR between both pairings is similar but 
noticeable increases for both treatment groups after the year 2000.  Overall, the similar 
pre-change trends in CETR in each panel provides comfort that the treatment and 
                                                          
32 Following prior literature (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2016), we replace missing values of RND with zero.  
This is reasonable in our sample as most of the missing values are for financial and insurance firms.   
33 The inclusion of year fixed effects precludes the use of POST as a stand-alone variable in the model. 
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control group combinations selected for analysis satisfy the parallel trends assumption 
underlying the difference-in-differences methodology (Roberts and Whited 2013). 
Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
analysis.  Panel A (Panel B) presents statistics for the full sample (reduced sample 
where the treatment firms are domestic dividend-paying firms).34  In both panels, the 
results for CETR and the modified CETR used in robustness tests (CETR_M) are 
shown along with their values prior to dividing by the statutory corporate tax rate 
(denoted with _A).  In Panel A, the mean (median) of CETR_A is 0.194 (0.135).  
Foreign firms have significantly higher ETRs than domestic firms (mean CETR_A of 
0.226 compared to 0.189).  Using mean pre-tax income of A$267.51m for these firms 
over the sample period, this difference represents approximately A$9.90m more in 
cash taxes paid by the average foreign firm compared to the average domestic firm.35  
However, in Panel B, the mean (median) of CETR_A is 0.254 (0.241) and foreign 
firms have significantly lower values of CETR relative to domestic dividend-paying 
firms.  This difference represents about A$9.36m more in cash taxes paid by the 
average domestic dividend-paying firm compared to the average foreign firm.36  In 
both panels, cash ETRs are substantially lower than the statutory corporate tax rate for 
all groups similar to findings in prior studies (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008).  Over the 
sample period, the statutory company tax rate in Australia varied between 0.30 and 
0.36 with a mean (median) of 0.335 (0.340). 
Table 1.3 reports the means and difference in means of cash ETRs across sample 
groups.  In Panel A, we find that domestic dividend-paying firms have a significantly 
higher CETR (0.782) and CETR_A (0.261) than domestic non-dividend-paying firms 
(0.130 and 0.043 respectively).  Likewise, in Panel B, domestic firms who fully-frank 
all dividends have a significantly higher CETR (0.908) and CETR_A (0.302) than 
domestic dividend-paying firms who do not fully-frank all their dividends (0.483 and 
0.163 respectively).  Similarly, the results in Panel C show that domestic firms who 
pay at least one fully-franked dividend have significantly higher cash ETRs than 
domestic dividend-paying firms who do not pay any fully-franked dividends.  The 
                                                          
34 We present descriptive statistics for both group pairings because the majority of domestic non-
dividend-paying firms excluded in Panel B are loss firms which impacts the values of the ETRs. 
35 $267.51m x (0.226 - 0.189) 
36 Mean pre-tax income for this group of firms over the sample period is A$373.67m, giving $373.67m 
x (0.261 – 0.226). 
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difference in cash taxes paid ranges from about A$35.70m to A$40.97m.37  Overall, 
these results are in line with our expectations that tax avoidance incentives differ 
across these groups depending upon firm pay-out policy.  Domestic firms paying fully-
franked dividends have the highest cash ETRs, while domestic non-dividend-paying 
firms have the lowest cash ETRs.  These results suggest that dividend-paying firms, 
especially fully-franked dividend-paying firms, engage in less tax avoidance. 
1.4.2 Correlation results 
The Pearson (below the diagonal) and Spearman (above the diagonal) correlations 
are presented in Table 1.4.  In both panels, we find that the two CETR proxies are 
positively correlated with one another, suggesting both capture the same underlying 
construct.  In 3 out of 4 cases, we find a positive and significant correlation between 
CETR and POST.  While only suggestive of the underlying relation between these 
variables, these correlations provide preliminary support for the assertion that tax 
avoidance decreases after the change in the imputation system.  Correlations among 
the control variables appear reasonable.  The highest correlation coefficient, 0.489, is 
observed between SIZE and LEV, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern. 
1.4.3 Univariate tests of changes in tax avoidance 
Table 1.5 reports the means and the difference in means for CETR before and after 
1 July 2000 for all sample groups.  The mean of CETR in the post-period is 
significantly higher than the pre-period in all cases except for foreign firms (c) and 
domestic non-dividend paying firms (e).  As expected, the largest increase is found in 
(d), (f) and (g) for domestic dividend-paying firms.  For example, the difference in the 
mean CETR for domestic dividend paying firms is 0.147 (0.855 – 0.708) significant at 
the 1% level (t-stat = 3.65).  Using mean pre-tax income of A$254.45m for these firms 
over the sample period, this difference represents about A$12.53m more in cash taxes 
paid in the post-period relative to the pre-period.38  Although CETR for foreign firms 
increased by 0.087 from 0.635 in the pre-period to 0.722 in the post-period, the 
                                                          
37 Mean pre-tax income for the domestic firms is A$171.83m, giving a difference of A$37.46m 
($171.83m x (0.261 – 0.043)).  Mean pre-tax income for the domestic dividend-paying firms is 
A$254.45m, giving a difference of A$35.70m ($254.45m x (0.302 – 0.163)) for firms in Panel B and 
A$40.97m ($254.45m x (0.299 – 0.138)) for firms in Panel C. 
38 The mean statutory corporate tax rate over the sample period is 0.335.  Therefore, the difference is 
(($254.45m x (0.855 – 0.708)) x 0.335). 
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increase is not significant (t-stat = 0.94).  This preliminary evidence is consistent with 
our argument that the enhancement to the dividend imputation system increased the 
incentives for certain firms to take a less aggressive approach to tax avoidance. 
1.4.4 Multivariate tests of changes in tax avoidance 
Table 1.6 presents the results from estimating Equation (1) for the full sample.  
The p-values are provided in parentheses and are based on heteroscedasticity-robust 
standard errors (White 1980) and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
(Petersen 2009).  Model (1) presents the results when industry and time fixed effects 
are included while Model (2) shows the results inclusive of firm and time fixed effects.  
In both models, we find that the coefficient on TREATED*POST (0.034 and 0.042 
respectively) is not statistically significant.  Therefore, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis and find no support for H1. 
Next, following the logic outlined in Section 1.2, we modify the treatment and 
control groups.  First, we only include domestic dividend-paying firms in the treatment 
group as these firms are more likely impacted by the change to the dividend imputation 
system than domestic non-dividend paying firms.  This procedure decreases the 
sample size from 1,901 observations to 1,355 observations.  We re-estimate Equation 
(1) for this sample and Table 1.7 presents the results.  Similar to the results in Table 
1.6, the coefficient on our variable of interest (TREATED*POST), 0.067 and 0.074 in 
Models (1) and (2) respectively, is statistically insignificant.  Again, we are unable to 
reject the null hypothesis and find no support for H2.  The inability to reject the null 
hypothesis in Tables 1.6 and 1.7 could be due to the relatively small number of foreign 
firms (246 observations) thus we may lack statistical power to detect some effects. 
We then replace foreign firms in the control sample with domestic non-dividend-
paying firms.  We expect the treatment group comprising domestic dividend-paying 
firms will decrease tax avoidance (increase CETR) more in response to the enhanced 
imputation system relative to domestic non-dividend-paying firms.  Table 1.8 presents 
the results from re-estimating Equation (1).  The coefficient on TREATED*POST in 
Model (1) is 0.101 (p-value = 0.146) and in Model (2) is 0.137 (p-value = 0.040).  The 
direction of these coefficients is in line with our prediction and the coefficients are 
significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively, using one-tailed tests of statistical 
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significance.  Therefore, the results support H3.  The coefficient estimate in Model (2) 
suggests that the change to the dividend imputation system is associated with an 
increase in CETR of 13.7% ($7.89m in cash taxes paid) for domestic dividend-paying 
firms relative to domestic non-dividend-paying firms.39 
Finally, we test H4 by adjusting the treatment and control groups again.  We 
expect that corporate tax avoidance decreased more after 1 July 2000 for domestic 
firms paying fully-franked dividends relative to dividend-paying domestic firms that 
do not pay fully-franked dividends.  However, many domestic dividend-paying firms 
pay multiple dividends during the year and depending upon their franking credit 
account balance, may pay a mix of fully-franked, partially-franked and unfranked 
dividends.  Therefore, we re-estimate Equation (1) using two different sub-groups and 
present the results in Table 1.9.  In Model (1), the treatment group comprises domestic 
firms that pay at least one fully-franked dividend while the control group comprises 
domestic dividend-paying firms that do not pay at least one fully-franked dividend.  
That is, the control group comprises domestic firms that pay either unfranked 
dividends, partially-franked dividends, or a combination of the two.  In Model (2), the 
treatment group (control group) comprises domestic dividend-paying firms that fully-
frank all dividends (do not fully-frank all dividends). 
The results in Table 1.9 support H4.  The coefficient on TREATED*POST is 0.118 
(p-value = 0.20) in Model (1) and 0.261 (p-value = 0.035) in Model (2).  These 
coefficients are significant at the 10% and 5% level respectively using one-tailed tests 
of statistical significance.  In Models (3) and (4), the coefficient on TREATED*POST 
increases in magnitude and significance consistent with expectations.  Specifically, in 
Model (3) the coefficient is 0.176 (p-value = 0.058) and in Model (4) is 0.273 (p-value 
= 0.011).  This suggests that the introduction of the rebate provision is associated with 
an increase in CETR of between 17.6% ($15.00m in cash taxes paid) and 27.3% 
($23.27m in cash taxes paid) for domestic dividend-paying firms that fully-frank all 
dividends compared to those that do not fully-frank all dividends).40 
                                                          
39 Mean pre-tax income for the domestic firms over the sample period is $171.83m and the mean 
statutory corporate tax rate over the sample period is 0.335.  Therefore, additional cash taxes paid = 
($171.83m x 0.137) x 0.335 = $7.89m. 
40 Mean pre-tax income for the domestic dividend-paying firms over the sample period is $254.45m 
and the mean corporate tax rate over the sample period is 0.335.  Therefore, additional cash taxes paid 
ranges from $15.00m (($254.45m x 0.176) x 0.335) and $23.27m (($254.45m x 0.273) x 0.335). 
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Overall, the results are consistent with our intuition that the change to the dividend 
imputation system effective 1 July 2000 provided stronger incentives for firms paying 
franked-dividends to minimise tax avoidance to generate further imputation credits 
demanded by tax-advantaged shareholders.  In particular, the incentives appear to have 
increased more for those firms paying fully-franked dividends.  This finding suggests 
that managers of domestic dividend-paying firms are acting in the best interests of 
their resident shareholders who can utilise these tax credits to reduce their own tax 
liabilities.  Notably, our findings are consistent with those of McClure et al. (2018) 
who find that domestic firms paying dividends with franking credits undertake less tax 
avoidance than those firms who pay unfranked dividends. 
1.5 Robustness tests 
1.5.1 Alternative proxy for tax avoidance 
Given the challenge in measuring tax avoidance precisely and because each 
measure has its own limitations (Blouin 2014), we employ an additional proxy.  Since 
the denominator in CETR is pre-tax net income, low CETRs may be driven by upwards 
earnings management.  Moreover, if tax-avoiding firms simultaneously report lower 
accounting earnings and lower taxable income (i.e., conforming tax avoidance), then 
any change in CETR may be mechanical and we might be inadvertently capturing a 
denominator effect only (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  Consequently, the second 
measure (CETR_M) modifies CETR by substituting net cash flows from operating 
activities for pre-tax net income in the denominator (Dyreng et al. 2008).  Equation 
(1) is then re-estimated for all treatment and control group combinations.  Overall, the 
results using CETR_M (untabulated) are qualitatively similar to those in the main 
findings.  For example, the coefficient on TREATED*POST corresponding to Model 
(2) in Table 1.8 is 0.104 (p-value = 0.054) and corresponding to Models (2) and (4) in 
Table 1.9 is 0.144 (p-value = 0.025) and 0.101 (p-value = 0.081), respectively.  Thus, 
our inferences remain unchanged. 
1.5.2  Exclusion of financial and insurance firms 
Some studies of tax avoidance exclude financial and insurance firms from their 
samples (e.g., Beuselinck et al. 2015; Richardson and Taylor 2015; McClure et al. 
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2018).41  These firms are excluded because of special regulatory constraints imposed 
on them that potentially affect their tax avoidance activities coupled with differences 
in their application of accounting policies and derivation of accounting estimates 
compared to firms in other industries (Rego 2003).  In our setting, we are concerned 
that these firms may unduly influence the results when CETR_M is the dependent 
variable because of the types of cash flows they include within net cash flow from 
operating activities.  Therefore, we drop firms with GICS sector code 40 (184 firm-
year observations) and re-run all analyses.  The results (untabulated) mirror those in 
the primary analysis although some coefficients on the variable of interest increase in 
magnitude and significance.  For example, the coefficient on TREATED*POST 
pertaining to Model (3) in Table 1.9 is 0.204 (p-value = 0.041) and for Model (4) is 
0.280 (p-value = 0.005).  When CETR_M is the dependent variable, the results are 
similar to those found in Section 1.5.1 above alleviating any concerns. 
1.5.3 Exclusion of firm-years with negative pre-tax income 
Recent studies of tax avoidance (e.g., Ikin and Tran 2013; Dyreng et al. 2016; 
McClure et al. 2018) exclude firm-year observations with negative pre-tax income on 
the basis that ETRs are difficult to interpret when the denominator is negative, and 
these firms may be in a different tax planning position relative to profitable firms.42  
In our main analysis, we retain firm-year observations with negative pre-tax income 
(490 firm-year observations) to preserve sample size and because accounting losses 
do not necessarily translate to tax losses.  Numerous adjustments for permanent and 
temporary differences are made to accounting net income to arrive at taxable income.  
Nevertheless, we follow prior literature and exclude these firm-year observations and 
re-estimate all models.  The results (untabulated) are qualitatively similar to those in 
the main findings but the magnitude and statistical significance decreases for some of 
the coefficients on our variable of interest.  For example, the coefficients on 
TREATED*POST relating to Table 1.8 roughly half in magnitude and lose statistical 
significance.  Furthermore, the coefficient on TREATED*POST corresponding to 
Models (2) and (4) in Table 1.9 is 0.241 (p-value = 0.024) and 0.226 (p-value = 0.012), 
                                                          
41 We note that other papers retain financial and insurance firms in their samples (e.g., Ikin and Tran 
2013; Dyreng et al. 2016). 
42 CETR is constrained to the [0,1] interval so any negative values of cash taxes paid or pre-tax income 
result in the value of CETR being 0. 
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respectively.  Overall, the results of this robustness test do not alter the inferences we 
draw from our main findings. 
1.5.4 Alternative proxy for POST 
While the majority of our sample (163 firms or 66%) have a 30 June fiscal year-
end, some do not, meaning their 2000 financial year will include a mix of pre-1 July 
2000 and post-1 July 2 000 data.43  To account for this timing issue and the possibility 
that some firms alter tax avoidance behaviour in anticipation of the impending change 
in legislation, we modify the POST variable to take the value of 1 for financial years 
ending after the 1999 financial year, and 0 otherwise (denoted POST_1999).44  In 
untabulated results, we find evidence of changes in behaviour prior to 1 July 2000 or 
that some firms with a non-30 June year end are influencing the results.  For example, 
the coefficient on TREATED*POST relating to Model (2) in Table 1.8 is 0.129 (p-
value = 0.033) and the coefficient on TREATED*POST relating to Models (2) and (4) 
in Table 1.9 is 0.225 (p-value = 0.052) and 0.200 (p-value = 0.051), respectively.  
Notably, the magnitude of these coefficients is smaller than those in the main analysis 
suggesting that the significant change in tax avoidance occurred after 1 July 2000. 
1.6 Conclusion 
Corporate tax avoidance is a major concern for governments, exacerbated in 
recent years by the global financial crisis and its aftermath.  We exploit an exogenous 
shock to Australia’s full dividend imputation system which enhanced the value of 
franking credits for tax-advantaged resident shareholders.  This identification strategy 
arguably allows for cleaner identification of the relation between dividend imputation 
and tax avoidance.  Overall, we find evidence to suggest that the rule change altered 
the incentives of management to engage in tax avoidance.  Specifically, we initially 
find that cash ETRs of domestic firms increased significantly after 1 July 2000, 
especially for franked-dividend paying firms.  Then, implementing a differences-in-
differences design, we find an increase in cash ETRs for domestic dividend-paying 
                                                          
43 The year to which Datastream assigns financial data is the year in which the company’s fiscal year 
ended, so fiscal years ending 28 February 2000 (1 firm), 31 March 2000 (7 firms), 30 April 2000 (1 
firm), 31 May 2000 (1 firm), 31 July 2000 (10 firms), 31 August 2000 (1 firm) 30 September 2000 (12 
firms), and 31 December 2000 (50 firms), are all treated as 2000 in Datastream (Thomson 2007). 
44 The possibility of tax reform was announced by the Commonwealth Treasurer in August 1998. 
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firms relative to non-dividend-paying domestic firms.  In line with our expectations, 
this finding is even more pronounced for firms paying fully-franked dividends and the 
decreases in tax avoidance are economically significant.  The findings are consistent 
with the notion that tax avoidance decreased for domestic firms who can take 
advantage of the rule change for the benefits of shareholders.  
This study has several limitations.  First, tax return data is private and hence our 
tax avoidance proxies are constructed based on publicly available financial statement 
data.  The efficacy of such measures has been questioned (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; 
Blouin 2014), so our results should be interpreted with caution.  Second, the empirical 
specifications are potentially complicated by reverse causality and omitted correlated 
variables.  We have attempted to address potential endogeneity by exploiting an 
exogenous shock and by employing a differences-in-differences research design, and 
we have included an array of control variables in the empirical models that have been 
shown in prior literature to be associated with tax avoidance.  However, although we 
include time fixed effects in our models, we acknowledge the possibility that our 
results may be driven by increases in tax authority enforcement over the sample 
period.  However, this would likely affect all firms equally so would not fully explain 
the results found.  Another caveat relates to the results utilising foreign firms as the 
control group.  We have a relatively small sample of foreign firms, so our null result 
could be due to lack of statistical power.  Finally, we note one-tailed tests of statistical 
significance in some models where we have signed predications and the coefficient is 
consistent with the prediction.  However, we note that two-tailed tests are sometimes 
not significant at conventional levels. 
Nonetheless, this study can inform ongoing policy debates in Australia.  Recent 
tax reform reports have recommended the abolition of dividend imputation and the 
introduction of an Allowance for Corporate Equity and/or cash flow tax.  However, 
the evidence provided in this study highlights the benefits of maintaining a full divided 
imputation system due to the incentives it provides to Australian dividend-paying 
firms to minimise tax avoidance activity.  Hence, our results speak to the potential of 
full dividend imputation to help protect corporate tax system integrity. 
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1.7 Tables and figures 
Figure 1.1: Mean annual CETR over the sample period 
Panels A–D plot the annual mean CETR over 1997-2004 for different treatment and control groups. 
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Figure 1.1: Mean annual CETR over the sample period (continued) 
Panels A–D plot the annual mean CETR over 1997-2004 for different treatment and control groups. 
 
Panel C: Domestic dividend-paying firms and domestic non-dividend-paying firms 
 
 
Panel D: Domestic firms where all dividends paid are fully-franked and domestic firms where 
all dividends are not fully-franked 
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Table 1.1: Sample details 
This table reports an overview of the sample.  Panel A outlines the sample selection procedure.  Panel 
B presents the industry distribution of the sample according to 2-digit GICS classification codes.  
Panel A: Sample selection procedure 
 
 
Criteria Firms Firm-years 
   
All firms on the ASX from 1997-2004 1,839 8,359 
Less: real estate investment trusts and property firms (116) (528) 
Less: firms with missing identifiers (e.g., ticker, GICS code) (76) (269) 
Less: firms that do not report across all years 1997-2004 (1,400) (5,587) 
Less: firm-years with missing data to calculate variables (1) (74) 
 246 1,901 
   
1997-2000 246 938 
2001-2004 246 963 
 246 1,901 
   
Main sample (domestic firms) 212 1,655 
Control sample (foreign firms) 34 246 
 246 1,901 
   
   
 
Panel B: Industry distribution 
 
GICS Industry description Firms Firm-years 
Frequency 
(% of total) 
     
10 Energy 18 141 7.4% 
15 Materials 64 471 24.8% 
20 Industrials 41 325 17.1% 
25 Consumer discretionary 42 333 17.5% 
30 Consumer staples 24 190 10.0% 
35 Health care 14 111 5.8% 
40 Financials 24 184 9.7% 
45 Information technology 10 77 4.0% 
50 Telecommunications services 3 24 1.3% 
55 Utilities 6 45 2.4% 
     
 Total 246 1,901 100.0% 
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis.  Panel A (Panel B) presents summary statistics for the full sample (reduced sample).  The 
sample period is 1997-2004.  Effective tax rates are constrained to lie on the [0,1] interval and are presented prior to (CETR_A and CETR_M_A) and after (CETR and 
CETR_M) dividing by the statutory corporate tax rate.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% level.  All variables are defined in Appendix B.  ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics (Full sample: treatment group = domestic firms; control group = foreign firms) 
  Full sample 
Treatment group 
 (n=1,655) 
Control group 
(n=246) 
Variable n Mean SD P25 P50 P75 Mean Median Mean Median 
           
CETR_A 1,901 0.194 0.230 0.000 0.135 0.318 0.189 0.121 0.226*** 0.174*** 
CETR_M_A 1,901 0.149 0.187 0.000 0.099 0.232 0.144 0.093 0.184*** 0.134*** 
CETR 1,901 0.581 0.691 0.000 0.406 0.952 0.567 0.371 0.678*** 0.506*** 
CETR_M 1,901 0.445 0.552 0.000 0.299 0.686 0.430 0.278 0.549*** 0.411*** 
SIZE 1,901 12.832 2.423 11.227 12.824 14.451 12.637 12.633 14.146*** 14.015*** 
ROA 1,901 -0.012 0.265 -0.002 0.048 0.097 -1.016 0.048 0.016*** 0.044*** 
LEV 1,901 0.477 0.243 0.324 0.482 0.615 0.476 0.482 0.483*** 0.490*** 
INTANG 1,901 0.106 0.176 0.000 0.018 0.131 0.107 0.017 0.098*** 0.019*** 
CAPINT 1,901 0.352 0.268 0.114 0.322 0.556 0.340 0.308 0.430*** 0.423*** 
MKTBK 1,901 2.856 4.147 0.709 1.582 2.920 2.747 1.611 3.587*** 1.156*** 
RND 1,901 0.017 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.012*** 0.000*** 
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics (continued) 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis.  Panel A (Panel B) presents summary statistics for the full sample (reduced sample).  The 
sample period is 1997-2004.  Effective tax rates are constrained to lie on the [0,1] interval and are presented prior to (CETR_A and CETR_M_A) and after (CETR and 
CETR_M) dividing by the statutory corporate tax rate.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% level.  All variables are defined in Appendix B.  ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics (Reduced sample: treatment group = domestic dividend-paying firms; control group = foreign firms) 
  Reduced sample 
Treatment group 
 (n=1,109) 
Control group 
(n=246) 
Variable n Mean SD P25 P50 P75 Mean Median Mean Median 
           
CETR_A 1,355 0.254 0.228 0.055 0.241 0.362 0.261 0.250 0.226*** 0.174*** 
CETR_M_A 1,355 0.194 0.188 0.061 0.172 0.261 0.197 0.178 0.184*** 0.134*** 
CETR 1,355 0.763 0.684 0.161 0.719 1.080 0.782 0.750 0.678*** 0.506*** 
CETR_M 1,355 0.581 0.555 0.183 0.516 0.787 0.588 0.537 0.549*** 0.411*** 
SIZE 1,355 13.661 2.070 12.254 13.466 15.058 13.552 13.414 14.146*** 14.015*** 
ROA 1,355 0.063 0.127 0.025 0.064 0.109 0.074 0.068 0.016*** 0.044*** 
LEV 1,355 0.510 0.202 0.399 0.505 0.619 0.517 0.508 0.483*** 0.490*** 
INTANG 1,355 0.115 0.175 0.001 0.028 0.158 0.119 0.031 0.098*** 0.019*** 
CAPINT 1,355 0.354 0.249 0.142 0.329 0.539 0.337 0.314 0.430*** 0.423*** 
MKTBK 1,355 3.207 4.363 0.978 1.776 3.265 3.123 1.845 3.587*** 1.156*** 
RND 1,355 0.006 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.012*** 0.000*** 
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Table 1.3: Effective tax rates across sample groups 
This table reports the means and the difference in means for CETR.  The sample period is 1997-2004.  
Effective tax rates are constrained to lie on the [0,1] interval and are presented prior to (CETR_A) and 
after (CETR) dividing by the statutory corporate tax rate.  All variables are defined in Appendix B.  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-
tailed tests. 
 
Panel A: Domestic dividend-paying firms (DIV) vs. domestic non-dividend-paying firms 
(NODIV) 
Variable Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value 
      
 (DIV) (NODIV)    
n=1,655  n=1,109 n=546    
      
CETR_A 0.261 0.043 0.218*** 20.50 0.000 
      
CETR 0.782 0.130 0.652*** 20.38 0.000 
      
 
 
Panel B: Domestic firms where all dividends paid are fully-franked (FF) vs. domestic firms 
where all dividends paid are not fully-franked (NO_FF) 
Variable Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value 
 
 (FF) (NO_FF)    
n=1,109 n=779 n=330    
      
CETR_A 0.302 0.163 0.139*** 9.82 0.000 
      
CETR 0.908 0.483 0.425*** 10.04 0.000 
      
 
 
Panel C: Domestic firms where at least one dividend paid is fully-franked (FF_1) vs. domestic 
firms where no dividends paid are fully-franked (NO_FF_1) 
Variable Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value 
 
 (FF_1) (NO_FF_1)    
n=1,109 n=846 n=263    
      
CETR_A 0.299 0.138 0.161*** 10.75 0.000 
      
CETR 0.898 0.407 0.491*** 10.86 0.000 
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Table 1.4: Correlations matrix 
This table presents the correlations between the variables.  Panel A (Panel B) presents summary statistics for the full sample (reduced sample).  Pearson correlation coefficients 
are shown below the diagonal while Spearman correlation coefficients are shown above the diagonal.  Significant (p-value < 0.05) coefficients are reported in bold.  All variables 
are defined in Appendix B. 
Panel A: Full sample: treatment group = domestic firms; control group = foreign firms (n=1,901) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
             
(1) CETR  0.786 -0.066 0.033 0.440 0.486 0.264 0.274 0.040 0.267 0.051 
             
(2) CETR_M 0.544  -0.076 0.034 0.405 0.493 0.229 0.284 -0.017 0.310 0.043 
             
(3) TREATED -0.054 -0.072  0.015 -0.211 -0.023 -0.017 0.010 -0.106 0.054 -0.015 
             
(4) POST 0.063 0.028 0.015  0.055 -0.047 -0.018 0.066 -0.018 0.008 -0.031 
             
(5) SIZE 0.325 0.231 -0.209 0.048  0.222 0.440 0.271 0.068 0.185 0.078 
             
(6) ROA 0.288 0.259 -0.041 -0.069 0.379  0.008 0.169 0.093 0.376 0.040 
             
(7) LEV 0.200 0.148 -0.009 -0.004 0.466 -0.000  0.141 -0.027 0.130 -0.019 
             
(8) INTANG 0.124 0.117 0.017 0.076 0.102 0.009 -0.016  -0.174 0.126 0.101 
             
(9) CAPINT  0.005 -0.088 -0.113 -0.016 0.025 0.048 -0.058 -0.281  -0.042 0.031 
             
(10) MKTBK 0.067 0.156 -0.068 -0.061 0.039 0.138 0.045 0.036 -0.060  0.117 
             
(11) RND -0.139 -0.121 0.024 0.024 -0.205 -0.267 -0.151 0.021 -0.155 0.103  
             
             
40 
Table 1.4: Correlations matrix (continued) 
This table presents the correlations between the variables.  Panel A (Panel B) presents summary statistics for the full sample (reduced sample).  Pearson correlation coefficients 
are shown below the diagonal while Spearman correlation coefficients are shown above the diagonal.  Significant (p-value < 0.05) coefficients are reported in bold.  All variables 
are defined in Appendix B. 
Panel B: Reduced sample: treatment group = domestic dividend-paying firms; control group = foreign firms (n=1,355) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
             
(1) CETR  0.674 0.090 0.089 0.102 0.214 0.174 0.138 0.021 0.157 0.044 
             
(2) CETR_M 0.457  0.084 0.074 0.009 0.314 0.079 0.147 -0.090 0.267 0.019 
             
(3) TREATED 0.059 0.027  0.011 -0.120 0.122 0.049 0.089 -0.122 0.128 -0.019 
             
(4) POST 0.100 0.051 0.011  0.111 -0.024 -0.042 0.108 -0.042 0.046 -0.021 
             
(5) SIZE 0.092 -0.041 -0.111 0.109  -0.225 0.395 0.110 0.020 0.086 0.070 
             
(6) ROA 0.144 0.179 0.174 -0.010 0.023  -0.181 0.098 0.115 0.384 0.094 
             
(7) LEV 0.153 0.048 0.065 -0.029 0.489 -0.088  0.074 -0.110 0.171 -0.030 
             
(8) INTANG 0.100 0.094 0.044 0.093 0.040 0.022 -0.068  -0.192 0.052 0.087 
             
(9) CAPINT  0.008 -0.134 -0.145 -0.037 -0.022 0.029 -0.153 -0.269  -0.073 0.112 
             
(10) MKTBK 0.013 0.145 -0.041 -0.055 -0.036 0.175 0.028 0.035 -0.076  0.091 
             
(11) RND -0.061 -0.014 -0.092 0.051 -0.156 -0.273 -0.117 0.027 -0.093 0.226  
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Table 1.5: Effective tax rates for sample groups before and after 1 July 2000 
This table reports the means and the difference in means for CETR.  The sample period is 1997-2004.  The pre-period is defined as the years prior to the new rule being 
implemented effective 1 July 2000 (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000) while the post-period is defined as the years after the new rule was implemented (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004).   ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Tax avoidance proxy = CETR 
Group Mean Mean Difference t-stat p-value 
 (Pre) (Post)    
      
      
(a)  Full sample 0.537 0.624 0.087*** 2.77 0.006 
      n=1,901 n=938 n=963    
      
(b)  Domestic firms 0.522 0.610 0.088*** 2.64 0.008 
      n=1,655 n=812 n=843    
      
(c)  Foreign firms 0.635 0.722 0.087*** 0.94 0.349 
      n=246 n=126 n=120    
      
(d)  Domestic dividend-paying firms 0.708 0.855 0.147*** 3.65 0.000 
      n=1,109 n=552 n=557    
   *   
(e)  Domestic non-dividend-paying firms 0.125 0.134 0.009*** 0.23 0.820 
      n=546 n=260 n=286    
      
(f)  Domestic firms where all dividends paid are fully-franked 0.812 0.999 0.187*** 4.15 0.000 
      n=779 n=377 n=402    
      
(g)  Domestic firms where at least one dividend paid is fully-franked 0.814 0.979 0.165*** 3.77 0.000 
      n=846 n=414 n=432    
      
(a) = (b) + (c)      
(b) = (d) + (e)      
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Table 1.6: Corporate tax avoidance following changes to the imputation system  
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (1) from 1997 to 2004 using OLS.  The sample 
consists of domestic firms (treatment group) and foreign firms (control group).  All variables are defined 
in Appendix B.  Coefficient estimates are presented with p-values reported in parentheses.  The p-values 
are based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-
tailed tests. 
 
Domestic firms (treated) and foreign firms (control) 
Dep. Var.  CETRt 
Variables Pred. (1) (2) 
    
TREATEDt  -0.018 - 
  (0.81) - 
TREATEDt*POSTt + 0.034 0.042 
  (0.689) (0.627) 
SIZEt  0.047*** 0.098*** 
  (0.000) (0.006) 
ROAt  0.482*** 0.140** 
  (0.000) (0.035) 
LEVt  0.309*** 0.022 
  (0.009) (0.854) 
INTANGt  0.325** 0.062 
  (0.013) (0.699) 
CAPINTt  0.086 0.069 
  (0.366) (0.484) 
MKTBKt  0.004 -0.002 
  (0.353) (0.715) 
RNDt  -0.405* -0.215 
  (0.061) (0.128) 
    
Intercept  -0.270 -0.960*** 
  (0.440) (0.008) 
    
Industry FE  Y N 
Firm FE  N Y 
Year FE  Y Y 
    
Observations  1,901 1,901 
Adj. R2  0.169 0.366 
    
 
 
43 
Table 1.7: Corporate tax avoidance following changes to the imputation system 
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (1) from 1997 to 2004 using OLS.  The sample 
consists of domestic dividend-paying firms (treatment group) and foreign firms (control group).  All 
variables are defined in Appendix B.  Coefficient estimates are presented with p-value reported in 
parentheses.  The p-value are based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and standard errors are 
clustered at the firm-level.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
Domestic dividend-paying firms (treated) and foreign firms (control) 
Dep. Var.  CETRt 
Variables Pred. (1) (2) 
    
TREATEDt  -0.004 - 
  (0.962) - 
TREATEDt*POSTt + 0.067 0.074 
  (0.464) (0.447) 
SIZEt  -0.005 0.126* 
  (0.739) (0.064) 
ROAt  0.810*** 0.146 
  (0.000) (0.526) 
LEVt  0.662*** -0.159 
  (0.000) (0.553) 
INTANGt  0.375** -0.097 
  (0.014) (0.707) 
CAPINTt  0.212* -0.012 
  (0.089) (0.952) 
MKTBKt  -0.002 0.001 
  (0.644) (0.875) 
RNDt  0.009 -0.0356 
  (0.982) (0.373) 
    
Intercept  0.252 -0.563 
  (0.265) (0.525) 
    
Industry FE  Y N 
Firm FE  N Y 
Year FE  Y Y 
    
Observations  1,355 1,355 
Adj. R2  0.071 0.243 
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Table 1.8: Corporate tax avoidance following changes to the imputation system 
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (1) from 1997 to 2004 using OLS.  The sample 
consists of domestic dividend-paying firms (treatment group) and domestic non-dividend-paying firms 
(control group).  All variables are defined in Appendix B.  Coefficient estimates are presented with p-
values reported in parentheses.  The p-values are based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and 
standard errors are clustered at the firm-level.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests.  †††, ††, and † denotes statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a one-tailed test when we have a prediction and the 
sign of the coefficient is consistent with the prediction. 
 
Domestic dividend-paying firms (treated) and domestic non-dividend-paying firms (control) 
Dep. Var.  CETRt 
Variables Pred. (1) (2) 
    
TREATEDt  0.403*** - 
  (0.000)  
TREATEDt*POSTt + 0.101† 0.137†† 
  (0.146) (0.040) 
SIZEt  0.016 0.070* 
  (0.218) (0.059) 
ROAt  0.277*** 0.163** 
  (0.000) (0.014) 
LEVt  0.308*** 0.0616 
  (0.005) (0.606) 
INTANGt  0.381*** 0.085 
  (0.004) (0.635) 
CAPINTt  0.020 0.177* 
  (0.838) (0.090) 
MKTBKt  0.004 -0.003 
  (0.400) (0.711) 
RNDt  -0.163 -0.216 
  (0.371) (0.134) 
    
Intercept  -0.117 -0.643* 
  (0.493) (0.091) 
    
Industry FE  Y N 
Firm FE  N Y 
Year FE  Y Y 
    
Observations  1,655 1,655 
Adj. R2  0.242 0.387 
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Table 1.9: Corporate tax avoidance following changes to the imputation system 
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (1) from 1997 to 2004 using OLS.  In Models 
(1) and (2), the sample consists of domestic firms where at least one dividend paid is fully-franked 
(treatment group) and domestic firms where no dividends paid are fully-franked (control group).  In 
Models (3) and (4), the sample consists of domestic firms where all dividends paid are fully-franked 
(treatment group) and domestic firms where all dividends are not fully-franked (control group).  All 
variables are defined in Appendix B.  Coefficient estimates are presented with p-values reported in 
parentheses.  The p-values are based on heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and standard errors 
are clustered at the firm-level.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests.  †††, ††, and † denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a one-tailed test when we have a prediction and the sign of the 
coefficient is consistent with the prediction. 
 
Dep. Var.   CETRt   
Variables Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
TREATEDt  0.400*** - 0.306*** - 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  
TREATEDt*POSTt + 0.118† 0.261†† 0.176†† 0.273††† 
  (0.20) (0.035) (0.058) (0.011) 
SIZEt  0.011 0.125 0.014 0.128 
  (0.529) (0.151) (0.430) (0.141) 
ROAt  0.837*** 0.466 0.889*** 0.464 
  (0.000) (0.140) (0.000) (0.143) 
LEVt  0.527*** -0.246 0.544*** -0.253 
  (0.005) (0.495) (0.004) (0.497) 
INTANGt  0.316* -0.166 0.313* -0.197 
  (0.053) (0.608) (0.055) (0.545) 
CAPINTt  0.094 0.304 0.093 0.295 
  (0.521) (0.300) (0.534) (0.320) 
MKTBKt  -0.005 0.005 -0.005 0.005 
  (0.419) (0.688) (0.439) (0.652) 
RNDt  -1.889** -0.290 -1.510* -0.298 
  (0.031) (0.883) (0.095) (0.879) 
Intercept  -0.102 -0.537 -0.059 -0.590 
  (0.663) (0.634) (0.800) (0.602) 
      
Industry FE  Y N Y N 
Firm FE  N Y N Y 
Year FE  Y Y Y Y 
      
Observations  1,109 1,109 1,109 1,109 
Adj. R2  0.140 0.252 0.132 0.254 
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1.8 Appendix A: Illustrative example 
Two identical debt-free firms exist in two countries that differ only in their shareholder dividend tax policies.  
Taxable income is assumed to equal book income.  The company tax rate is 30%.  All profits after tax are paid out 
as dividends.  Panel A compares the after-tax outcomes for shareholders (shareholder level tax rate = 40%) and the 
total tax paid on the income of each company operating under an imputation versus classical dividend system.  
Panel B reports the effect that a dividend imputation system has on different types of resident shareholders with 
different marginal tax rates (0% - 47%).  The effect is shown before and after the change effective 1 July 2000. 
Panel A: Comparison of imputation and classical systems 
 Imputation Classical 
Corporate financial reporting level   
Net profit before tax $100 $100 
Less: company tax (30%) ($30) ($30) 
Net profit after tax (available to shareholders) $70 $70 
   
Corporate tax return level   
Taxable income $100 $100 
Company tax (30%) $30 $30 
   
Shareholder level   
Dividend received by shareholder $70 $70 
Gross-up for franking credit (*) $30 $0 
Taxable income $100 $70 
Tax on taxable income (40%) $40 $28 
Less: franking credit (*) ($30) ($0) 
Net shareholder level tax payable $10 $28 
Shareholder after-tax income $60 $42 
   
Total tax paid   
Tax paid by company $30 $30 
Tax paid by shareholder $10 $28 
Total $40 $58 
(*) Under Section 207-20 of the ITAA 1997, the assessable income of a shareholder includes the amount of the franking credit 
and then the shareholder is entitled to a tax offset equal to the franking credit. 
Panel B: Impact on shareholder-level tax liabilities under an imputation system 
     
 Investor 1 Investor 2 Investor 3 Investor 4 
Pre-1 July 2000 
 
    
Shareholder level     
Cash dividend received $70 $70 $70 $70 
Gross-up for franking credit $30 $30 $30 $30 
Taxable income $100 $100 $100 $100 
Tax rate 0% 15% 30% 47% 
Tax payable $0 $15 $30 $47 
Less: franking credit ($0) ($15) ($30) ($30) 
Net tax payable/(receivable) $0 $0 $0 $17 
Post-tax dividend income $70 $70 $70 $53 
     
Post-1 July 2000 
 
    
Shareholder level     
Cash dividend received $70 $70 $70 $70 
Gross-up for franking credit $30 $30 $30 $30 
Taxable income $100 $100 $100 $100 
Tax rate 0% 15% 30% 47% 
Tax payable $0 $15 $30 $47 
Less: franking credit $30 $30 $30 $30 
Net tax payable/(receivable) ($30) ($15) $0 $17 
Post-tax dividend income $100 $85 $70 $53 
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1.9 Appendix B: Variable definitions 
Variable name Mnemonic Definition 
   
Cash effective tax rate CETR Income tax paid from the cash flow statement in year t 
divided pre-tax net income in year t.  The ratio is then 
divided by the statutory corporate tax rate prevailing in 
year t 
 
Cash effective tax rate - 
modified 
CETR_M Income tax paid from the cash flow statement in year t 
divided by net cash flows from operating activities plus 
income tax paid from the cash flow statement in year t.  
The ratio is then divided by the statutory corporate tax 
rate prevailing in year t 
 
Treatment firms TREATED Dummy variable that equals 1 for firms receiving 
treatment, and 0 otherwise.  Treatment firms include 
domestic firms, domestic dividend-paying firms, 
domestic firms where all dividends paid are fully-
franked, and domestic firms where at least one dividend 
paid is fully-franked 
   
Year of change of 
franking credit 
legislation 
POST Dummy variable for the year of change in legislation; 
equals 1 for financial years ending 30 June 2001 and 
onward, and 0 otherwise 
 
Year prior to change in 
franking credit 
legislation 
POST_1999 Dummy variable for the year prior to change in 
legislation; equals 1 for financial years ending 30 June 
2000 and onward, and 0 otherwise 
 
Firm size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
 
Profitability ROA Pre-tax net income divided by total assets 
   
Leverage LEV Total liabilities divided by total assets 
   
Intangible assets INTANG Net intangible assets divided by total assets 
   
Capital intensity CAPINT Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets 
 
Market-to-book ratio 
 
MKTBK Market value of equity divided by common equity 
 
Research & 
development intensity 
RND Research and development expenditure divided by 
revenues 
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Chapter 2 
The impact of mandatory public country-by-
country tax disclosures on the tax aggressiveness 
of European Union financial institutions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
International tax issues have been thrust towards the top of the political agenda in 
recent years as governments battle to protect their tax revenue base and preserve tax 
system integrity in the aftermath of the financial crisis.1  Recent scandals such as the 
‘Panama Papers’ and ‘Lux Leaks’ has attracted censure from the press, public interest 
groups, politicians and global organisations such as the G20 and OECD.2  These 
scandals occurred during a period in which initiatives were being introduced globally 
to combat aggressive tax avoidance including the OECD’s wide-ranging Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) reforms (OECD 2015).  However, despite a rapidly 
evolving academic literature on the determinants and consequences of corporate tax 
avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010), relatively little is known about how firms 
respond to an increase in transparency from mandatory disclosure of their tax affairs.  
In this study, an exogenous shock to the disclosure requirements of European Union 
(EU) banks is used to investigate whether mandatory public country-by-country tax 
disclosures induce changes in firms’ corporate tax avoidance.3 
                                                          
1 Corporate income tax revenue for the EU Member States averaged 2.5% of GDP in 2013 (Eurostat 
2015).  The EU loses €50-70bn in annual revenues due to corporate tax avoidance (Dover et al. 2015). 
2 In 2016, an unprecedented leak of more than 11 million documents from Panama law firm Mossack 
Fonseca revealed large scale tax avoidance.  See, for example, ‘Panama Papers: How assets are hidden 
and taxes dodged’, available at: http://bbc.co.uk/news/business-35943740.  In 2014, a cache of leaked 
tax documents uncovered preferential tax deals struck by around 400 multinational corporations and 
Luxembourg’s tax authority.  See, for example, ‘Luxembourg tax files: how tiny state rubber-stamped 
tax avoidance on an industrial scale’, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/nov/05/-
sp-luxembourg-tax-files-tax-avoidance-industrial-scale. 
3 The new disclosure requirements apply to ‘credit institutions and investment firms’ operating in the 
EU.  For brevity, I use the terms ‘EU banks’ or ‘EU financial firms’ throughout the chapter to describe 
these firms. 
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Firms seek to maximise after-tax profits and thus tax minimisation, although 
considered by some as morally questionable, is a common strategy and permissible if 
conducted within the boundaries of the law.  However, firms face a delicate risk-
reward trade-off between the costs and benefits of tax planning.4,5  On the one hand, 
the management of costs, including taxes, is an essential element of a firm’s business 
strategy, the disclosure of which may be viewed positively by investors if the firm is 
compliant with tax laws meaning risk is low (Dyreng et al. 2017a).  On the other hand, 
increased transparency of tax activities may be viewed negatively if public disclosure 
is expected to increase proprietary costs or lead to allegations of illegal tax evasion 
resulting in reputational damage and audit penalties (Graham et al. 2014; EY 2015). 
Large multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Apple, Google, and Amazon, 
have been accused of exploiting grey areas of international tax law (Bradshaw et al. 
2014; Garside 2014; Houlder 2016).  The tax justice debate has shifted to a new level 
with many expressing concerns that MNCs do not pay their ‘fair share’ of tax and 
enjoy societal benefits without adequately paying for them.  Two key concerns are tax 
haven involvement and the misalignment between the economic substance of 
transactions and the country in which they are reported for tax purposes.  Furthermore, 
many financial firms who received large taxpayer-funded government handouts 
during the financial crisis have been criticised for not paying an equitable amount of 
tax by recouping tax losses largely generated during the crisis (Bowers 2015).6  
In response to the public outcry, and with the stated objective of restoring public 
trust in the financial services sector, the European Commission (EC) introduced a 
requirement in 2013 that banks operating in the EU must annually publish certain tax-
related financial information on a country-by-country basis.  This country-by-country-
reporting (CBCR) requirement was a late and unanticipated inclusion within the broad 
                                                          
4 To avoid the complexity of determining the legality or appropriateness of a particular tax minimisation 
strategy, I define tax avoidance per Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) as a broad range of strategies 
undertaken by a firm to reduce its cash tax obligations.  Difficulties arise when delineating between 
activities regarded as legal tax planning and those outside the bounds of the law (e.g., tax evasion).  
Between legal tax planning and tax evasion, a vast grey area exists which often requires lengthy court 
cases to adjudicate which side of the law an aggressive tax strategy lies.  The terms ‘tax aggressiveness’, 
‘tax avoidance’ and ‘aggressive tax planning’ are used interchangeably throughout the chapter. 
5 I do not infer or imply that the sample firms are engaging in any illegal or improper behaviour. 
6 Merz and Overesch (2016) find that the magnitude of the tax sensitivity of reported profits of MNC 
banks’ subsidiaries is significantly larger than the effects found in prior studies for non-financial firms 
and conclude that banks have enhanced tax planning opportunities. 
50 
Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) adopted by the EU to implement the 
Basel III banking reforms. 
Generally, EU firms must prepare their consolidated financial statements in 
accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  Per 
International Accounting Standard 12 Income Taxes, firms must disclose information 
regarding current and future tax payments and tax-related assets and liabilities in the 
primary financial statements and the footnotes thereto.  However, due to the 
requirements of IFRS 8 Operating Segments, this information is usually only available 
at the consolidated level, not at the country level.  Under the management approach in 
IFRS 8, managers have discretion in determining what is disclosed in segment reports 
and whether operating segments are based on product or service lines, geography, 
legal entity, customer type, or any combination of these.  In contrast, CBCR stipulates 
the public disclosure of turnover, profits, taxes, and employee numbers, for each 
country the firm operates in, along with information concerning individual 
subsidiaries and branches (entities).7  Therefore, the CBCR obligations for EU banks 
exceed the requirements of the accounting standards.8 
Motivated by the heightened scrutiny of EU banks’ tax arrangements, I exploit 
the unanticipated introduction of mandatory public CBCR to examine whether 
improved transparency induces changes in the cost-benefit equilibrium of tax 
avoidance.  If additional transparency increases the costs to such an extent that they 
outweigh the benefits, then a reduction in tax avoidance is expected, and vice versa.  
Alternatively, if the tax strategies already implemented are perfectly legal, then 
increased transparency may not affect behaviour at all.  Indeed, many accused MNCs 
maintain that their tax strategies, albeit complex, are fully compliant with existing tax 
law.  Understanding any impact of CBCR is important because it provides policy 
makers with important empirical evidence on the consequences of mandatory public 
dissemination of tax information and may assist with the setting of future reporting 
requirements.  Furthermore, it provides additional insights into potential real effects 
of mandatory disclosure that exceeds accounting standards (Leuz and Wysocki 2016). 
                                                          
7 To be clear, the information disclosed is financial accounting information, not tax return information. 
8 Bushman (2014) notes the tension created by the differing objectives of accounting standard setting 
versus bank regulation. 
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I begin by examining whether EU banks change the amount of tax avoidance they 
undertake in response to the new CBCR requirements.9  I conduct a range of empirical 
tests using cash and book ETRs to proxy for tax avoidance and based on a hand-
collected sample of 72 firms, I do not find any evidence of a reduction in tax avoidance 
in response to increased transparency.  Cross-sectional tests reveal that unlisted EU 
banks increase their tax avoidance after CBCR.  A similar result is found when a 
difference-in-differences research design is employed to test for any change in tax 
avoidance of EU banks relative to a control group of EU insurers.  In fact, in some 
tests, I find that on average, EU banks increased their tax avoidance relative to EU 
insurers despite increased disclosure levels.  Next, I exploit the unique CBCR data to 
develop new measures of tax haven involvement and examine any changes in the 
intensity of tax haven use by EU banks in the years after CBCR.  I find no statistically 
significant change in the proportion of turnover or profit before tax recognised in tax 
havens during the post-CBCR period, but I do find a significant decrease in the 
proportion of tax haven entities for listed EU banks. 
In support of arguments that a disconnect exists between the location of profits 
recognised for tax purposes and the location of real operations, additional tests show 
that while turnover is a key determinant of pre-tax profits recognised in tax havens, 
the proportion of employees in tax havens is not.10  I also show that the reduction in 
the number of tax haven entities observed since 2013 is driven by the decrease in the 
total number of entities, consistent with EU banks eliminating tax haven entities in 
line with real changes to their corporate structure.  An examination of short-window 
market-adjusted returns around several key CBCR-related events lends support to the 
claim that equity market participants anticipate negative consequences for EU banks, 
however the negative abnormal returns are temporary.  Finally, I perform a battery of 
robustness tests including the use of alternative tax avoidance and tax haven proxies 
and the results are qualitatively similar.  Overall, the findings are consistent with the 
benefits of tax avoidance in the post-CBCR period remaining greater than, or equal to, 
the potential costs, for EU banks. 
                                                          
9 The main goal of this study is to examine any changes in tax avoidance after CBCR was introduced 
not to quantify the amount of tax avoidance (if any) undertaken by EU financial firms. 
10 Unfortunately, the CBCR requirements do not include an obligation to disclose assets by country.  
This would provide another key indicator of the extent of real operations located in tax havens.  
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This study contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, to the best of my 
knowledge, this study is the first to empirically investigate the association between 
mandatory public CBCR and corporate tax avoidance.  Thus, it extends the emerging 
literature examining how firms respond to public scrutiny of their tax practices 
(Gallemore et al. 2014; Dyreng et al. 2016).  Second, by examining the effects of 
mandatory CBCR on the behaviour of EU banks, this study adds to the literature 
suggesting that changes in disclosure policies may have real consequences (Kanodia 
and Sapra 2016).  Third, this study extends prior research investigating the relation 
between geographic financial disclosures and tax avoidance (Hope et al. 2013; 
Akamah et al. 2018).  Fourth, I add to the literature examining tax avoidance behaviour 
of non-US firms (Atwood et al. 2012; Markle and Shackelford 2012a, 2012b; Dyreng 
et al. 2016).  Finally, the paucity of evidence on the taxation of financial firms stems 
from concerns about regulatory differences and their extensive use of off-balance sheet 
debt and complex financial instruments (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).11  
Consequently, I address this void in the literature.  The findings should also inform 
bank regulators and global policy makers as they continue to develop initiatives 
designed to curb corporate tax avoidance.  Moreover, the results are timely given the 
EC’s current intention to extend public CBCR to firms in all industries. 
2.2 Background and hypothesis development 
2.2.1 Corporate tax avoidance and MNCs 
A growing literature documents determinants of corporate tax avoidance along 
with a variety of financial reporting, capital market, and contracting outcomes 
associated with such activities (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Graham et al. 2012).  Prior 
studies show that MNCs shift profits into low-tax jurisdictions (Huizinga and Laeven 
2008), strategically set transfer prices for intra-firm sales (Clausing 2003), develop 
cost-sharing agreements between subsidiaries (Martin 2013), and structure internal 
debt to exploit tax rate differentials across countries (Huizinga et al. 2008).  They also 
                                                          
11 Furthermore, financial firms are inherently more opaque than non-financial firms because their 
leverage and risk are imperfectly observable (Beatty and Liao 2014; Bushman 2014; and Acharya and 
Ryan 2016).  The exclusion of these firms from many samples is unfortunate given the crucial role they 
play in a country’s financial infrastructure.  Through the provision of financial intermediation between 
depositors and borrowers and as the primary backstop providers of liquidity, banks are critical to the 
efficient functioning of the economy. 
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transfer hard-to-value intangible assets (e.g., trademarks, brand names) to low-tax 
subsidiaries to facilitate high intra-firm royalties and licence fees (Collins and 
Shackelford 1997; Grubert 2003; Karkinsky and Riedel 2012; Griffith et al. 2014), 
and engage in tax ‘treaty shopping’ to take advantage of differences in tax residence 
definitions across countries resulting in very low or no taxation (Ting 2014). 
Another strategy employed by MNCs is the utilisation of tax havens, commonly 
associated with very low or zero taxes, corporate anonymity, light regulatory touch, 
favourable legal environments, and secrecy.12  Zucman (2014) estimates that by 2013 
approximately 20% of US corporations’ profits were booked in tax havens, a tenfold 
increase since the 1980s.  The use of tax havens is well documented in the literature.13  
Both Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) and Markle and Shackelford (2012b) find lower 
ETRs for MNCs with tax haven operations.  However, despite widespread public 
concern about tax havens (Shaxson 2012; Zucman 2015), some proponents claim they 
are beneficial.  Tax havens may improve the efficiency of global markets by 
smoothing investment flows, drive taxes lower, ensure that MNCs are not taxed twice 
on the same income, and promote investment and economic activity (Desai et al. 2006; 
Dharmapala 2008; Hong and Smart 2010; Hines 2010a). 
While banks are often associated with the aforementioned tax minimisation 
methods, they rely on additional strategies to shift profits, as outlined by Merz and 
Overesch (2016).  Specifically, profit margins of bank subsidiaries are influenced by 
the functions performed and risks assumed by them.  For example, profit 
apportionment of a multinational bank depends on the allocation of functions like 
credit management, investment analysis, and underwriting.  Other activities such as 
trading or asset management are potentially highly mobile enabling profits to be easily 
shifted to low-tax jurisdictions.  Furthermore, distribution of taxable profits across 
subsidiaries is affected by the allocation of interest and liquidity risks, intrafirm 
guarantees that transfer credit risks, as well as the hedging of exchange rate risks and 
                                                          
12 The definition of what constitutes a tax haven is unclear and no universally agreed upon definition 
exists.  However, the OECD defined the features of tax havens as low or no taxes, lack of effective 
information exchange and transparency, and no requirement for substantial real operating activity 
(OECD 1998).  In my primary analysis, I follow Dyreng et al. (2015) who use the list of tax havens in 
Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) but add Hong Kong and the Netherlands because these jurisdictions are 
widely viewed as tax havens.  Appendix B provides a list of the jurisdictions deemed tax havens.  Some 
tax havens are not countries (e.g., Jersey is a British Crown Dependency).  The terms ‘country’ and 
‘jurisdiction’ are used interchangeably throughout the chapter. 
13 See for example, Hines and Rice (1994); Dharmapala and Hines (2009); Gravelle (2009). 
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market risks.  Finally, banks can manipulate transfer prices for intra-firm financial 
transactions including interest margins or service fees. 
Moreover, globalisation and the growing importance of intangible assets as a 
value-driver combine with an outdated international tax framework, to generate gaps 
and anomalies that can be exploited via dexterous tax planning.  The OECD (2013a) 
highlights that the very nature of intangible assets allows them to be shifted easily.  It 
also acknowledges the upsurge in globalisation as an underlying factor fostering 
corporate tax avoidance because transactions that previously relied on physical 
proximity to a market can now be undertaken anywhere (OECD 2013a).14  Enforcing 
arms-length principles for intangibles is problematic due to difficulties in establishing 
whether transfer prices accurately reflect the underlying economic reality of 
transactions.  Finally, while MNCs are complex global businesses, taxation is levied 
and enforced at the national level.  The international tax architecture is built upon an 
intricate network of tax principles including source and residence, worldwide and 
territorial approaches to international taxation, arm’s length pricing, and the division 
of taxing rights between countries via bilateral tax treaties.15  The concern is that this 
complex framework, designed in the early twentieth century, has not kept pace with 
changes in global business practices in the digital economy era. 
2.2.2 Regulatory response to corporate tax avoidance 
A key constraint inhibiting stakeholders from accurately assessing a firm’s tax 
position is the lack of granular disclosure of relevant information.  In recent years, tax 
reform proposals include the idea that MNCs should publish in their annual financial 
statements, a profit and loss account, and limited balance sheet and cash flow 
information for every jurisdiction in which they operate.16  CBCR was first proposed 
                                                          
14 Trade barrier removal, rapid developments in information and communication technology, and 
increased mobility of capital and labour, has had an important impact on the way MNCs are structured 
and managed.  In fact, a firm may be heavily involved in the economic life of another country by doing 
business with their citizens via the internet, without having a taxable presence there. 
15 Tax treaties are the primary mechanism by which transfer pricing is addressed to ensure that 
appropriate valuations apply to cross-border transactions between related parties. 
16 Other proposals include: (i) taxation by the MNCs residence country of its consolidated worldwide 
profits, with a credit given for foreign taxes paid (Kleinbard 2011); (ii) a Destination Based Corporate 
Tax (Devereux and de la Feria 2014); (iii) the EU’s proposed Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base; and (iv) unitary taxation with formulary apportionment (Avi-Yonah et al. 2009; Picciotto 2016).  
The latter approach treats MNCs as single entities for taxation purposes (unitary taxation) and allocates 
profits to each entity within the group using economic factors such as physical assets, sales, employees 
(formulary apportionment).  The basic premise is to treat MNCs according to the economic reality that 
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by Murphy (2003) who argued that general purpose financial statements prepared in 
accordance with accounting standards were not suitable for tax authority use.  This 
proposal, and another from the Publish-What-You-Pay (PWYP) coalition (PWYP 
2005), were submitted to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) during 
its public consultation on standards for the extractive industries and segment reporting, 
respectively, but were largely disregarded (Wojcik 2015).17  Subsequently, a more 
detailed submission was made by Murphy and the Tax Justice Network (TJN) to the 
EC during its consultation on CBCR in 2010 (Murphy and TJN 2010).18,19  This 
proposal and a follow-up version (Murphy and TJN 2012), essentially treated CBCR 
as an extension of corporate financial reporting.  The intention was to create more 
comprehensive and comparable accounting data to help investors better assess risks, 
improve tax governance, and increase MNC accountability.20 
2.2.2.1 OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative 
Historically, most governments unilaterally rely upon countermeasures such as 
thin capitalisation rules, transfer pricing rules, and broad general anti-avoidance rules 
to restrain aggressive tax planning.  However, the global financial crisis led to calls 
for an internationally coordinated response to address the abusive exploitation of tax 
law loopholes and ensure that profits are taxed where economic activity takes place.  
So, at the request of the G20, the OECD developed the BEPS project in 2013 (OECD 
2013a, 2013b) with the final recommendations delivered in 2015 (OECD 2015).21  
Action Item 13 contains rules regarding transfer pricing documentation which among 
                                                          
they are highly integrated and centrally directed firms and their profits should be attributed across the 
group according to each entity’s contribution to value creation through its functions performed, assets 
used, and risks assumed (Picciotto 2016).  This method is used for state taxes in Canada, Switzerland 
and the US (Clausing 2016).  However, Hines (2010b) provides evidence from European firms that 
apportionment formulas significantly misattribute income, since factors (property, employment, sales) 
on which they are based, do a poor job of explaining profits. 
17 Publish-What-You-Pay is an international coalition of civil society organisations that advocates for 
financial transparency in the extractive industry. 
18 This submission called for ‘full CBCR’, that is, the reporting of third-party and intra-group sales, 
purchases, assets, liabilities, employee numbers, names of related entities, tax payments and other 
payments to governments, on a country-by-country basis (Murphy and TJN 2010). 
19 The Tax Justice Network is an international non-profit organisation dedicated to promoting tax reform 
concerning tax avoidance, especially in poorer countries.  
20 In a December 2012 report, the IASB postponed CBCR deliberations to a future unspecified date 
(http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3133003/IASB-rejects-new-accounting-standard-for-
income-taxes-and-country-by-country-reporting.html). 
21 The final report was adopted by the OECD Council on 1 October 2015, endorsed by G20 Finance 
Ministers on 8 October 2015, and endorsed by G20 Leaders at the summit on 15-16 November 2015. 
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other things requires MNCs to submit a CBCR to tax authorities.  It must include 
information on the allocation of income, business activities and taxes paid, by tax 
jurisdiction.  Importantly, the OECD endorsed-CBCR is designed as a risk 
management tool for tax authorities and not a public disclosure regime.22  CBCR data 
will be shared between tax administrations through treaty provisions. 
2.2.2.2 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
Created in 2002, the EITI is a global standard to improve transparency and 
accountability of revenues from natural resources and is overseen by the EITI Board 
comprising members from governments, companies, and civil society.23  Governments 
adopt the EITI voluntarily, but most implementing countries enacted this commitment 
into law thereby making EITI reporting mandatory.  All extractive companies 
operating in an EITI implementing country are required to disclose payments made to 
that country’s government (e.g., taxes, licences, royalties), and the government 
discloses how much they receive from extractive companies operating in their country.  
Payments are matched and reconciled by an independent administrator and then 
disclosed publicly in an annual ‘EITI Report’.  In July 2012, the US Congress passed 
Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act implementing the EITI requirements for US listed 
extractive companies.24  Similarly, amendments to the EU Accounting and 
Transparency Directive 2013/34/EU in July 2013, force all EU (listed and large non-
listed) extractive companies to publish their payments on a country and project basis.25 
                                                          
22 Several countries have already implemented this non-public CBCR including the UK (Taxes (Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting) (Country-by-Country Reporting) Regulations 2016). 
23 The EITI is a non-profit association established under Norwegian law.  Over 90 of the world’s largest 
oil, gas and mining companies have elected to become ‘EITI Supporting Companies’ and over 80 global 
investment institutions, that collectively manage over US$19 trillion, have signed the ‘Investors’ 
Statement on Transparency in the Extractive Sector’ in support of the EITI.  See http://eiti.org. 
24 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2008 (‘Cardin-Lugar 
Amendment’) requires US listed companies who engage in the commercial development of oil, gas and 
other minerals (defined as exploration, extraction, processing, and export), to disclose data on payments 
over US$100,000 to the US and foreign governments in all countries where they operate.  This 
information is to be disclosed annually by filing a new form (Form SD) with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).  These companies must report the type and total amount of payments 
made for each project and to each government including taxes, royalties, fees (including license fees), 
production entitlements and bonuses.  However, the rules were successfully challenged in the US 
District Court for the District of Columbia on 2 July 2013 by a coalition of industry groups and are 
currently suspended until the SEC introduces revised rules. 
25 EU countries completed transposition of the Directives in 2015 and rules are applicable for financial 
years commencing on or after 1 January 2016.  Public disclosure is required for any single payment or 
series of related payments if it exceeds €100,000 within a financial year. 
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2.2.2.3 Country-by-Country Reporting for EU financial firms 
In July 2013, CRD IV26 was adopted by the EU Parliament and Council.  Article 
89 of CRD IV contains the CBCR requirements for EU financial institutions. 27, 28  It 
applies to all EU headquartered financial institutions, their subsidiaries established 
outside the EU, and EU subsidiaries of institutions headquartered outside the EU.  
Firms subject to these requirements must disclose the following data on a country-by-
country basis: (i) name(s), nature of activities and geographical location; (ii) turnover; 
(iii) number of employees on a full-time equivalent basis; (iv) profit or loss before tax; 
(v) corporation tax paid; and (vi) public subsidies received.  Global Systemically 
Important Banks (GSIBs)29 were required to report items (i) to (vi) for 2013 by 1 July 
2014.  Items (i) to (iii) were required to be publicly disclosed and items (iv) to (vi) 
privately disclosed to the EC.  All other EU financial firms were required to publicly 
disclose all six items for 2014 in 2015 but had to publicly disclose items (i) to (iii) for 
2013 by 1 July 2014.  CBCR disclosures may be prepared on a consolidated basis and 
can be published in firms’ annual financial statements or on their website, provided 
the data is easily accessible.  Disclosures are required to be audited from 2015 (i.e., 
based on 2014 data).  An example CBCR is provided in Appendix A. 
                                                          
26 The new regulatory framework is the EU implementation of Basel III, a global agreement by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in response to the financial crisis.  Basel III contains a 
package of proposals to increase the prudential soundness of banks.  It consists of a Directive (CRD 
IV) and a Regulation (CRR): (i) CRD IV (Directive 2013/36/EU) of the EU Parliament and Council of 
26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and investment firms, and (ii) CRR (Regulation (EU) No 575/2013) on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms.  The Directive was to be transposed into 
domestic law by the 28 EU Member States by 31 December 2013, while the Regulation applies 
automatically in all Member States from the date of entry into force (17 July 2013). 
27 ‘Institutions’ are defined as ‘credit institutions’ and ‘investment firms’.  Credit institutions are ‘an 
undertaking the business of which is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and 
to grant credits on their own account’ (CRR Title I Article 4.1(1)).  Essentially, retail and commercial 
banking entities with deposit taking permission will fall into scope.  Investment firms are ‘any legal 
person whose regular occupation or business is the provision of one or more investment services to 
third parties and/or performance of one or more investment activities on a professional basis’ as defined 
in Article 4(1)(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC (MiFID) (CRR Title I Article 4.1(2)).  Such activities include 
order execution for clients, dealing on own account, portfolio management and investment advice. 
28 As at 30 June 2014, only 13 Member States had fully implemented Article 89 and 4 had implemented 
it for either credit institutions or investment firms (PwC, 2014).  Christensen et al. (2016) discuss the 
legislative and administrative process in the EU and the advantages of using the EU setting including 
the fact that variation in the Directives entry-into-force dates across EU Member States can be viewed 
as plausibly exogenous.  However, despite differences in implementation dates across EU countries, 70 
of the 72 sample firms provided full CBCR disclosures for the 2014 year. 
29 EU GSIBs are: Barclays, BNP Paribas, BBVA, Deutsche Bank, Groupe BPCE, Group Credit 
Agricole, HSBC, ING Bank, Nordea, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, Societe Generale, Standard 
Chartered, Unicredit.  BBVA was not classified as a GSIB in 2016. 
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Recital 52 to CRD IV states the objective of mandatory public CBCR as ‘restoring 
the trust of EU citizens in the financial services sector in the wake of the global 
financial crisis’.  This implies that trust was broken by EU financial firms not paying 
corporate taxes that reflect their true economic presence in each country they operate 
in.  Public CBCR ensures that all stakeholders including institutional and retail 
investors, financial analysts, tax-watchdog groups, and the public, receive richer 
information concerning the tax arrangements of MNCs beyond that previously 
provided in public financial statements.30  In response to concerns, Paragraph 3 of 
Article 89 required the EC to conduct a general assessment regarding the potential 
negative economic consequences of public CBCR by 31 December 2014.  The 
assessment concluded that CBCR was unlikely to have a significant negative 
economic impact and could have a small positive economic impact (PwC 2014).  A 
survey of 156 stakeholders including civil society organisations, regulators, and banks, 
revealed they expect the new rules to increase the transparency of, and public 
confidence in, the financial sector (PwC 2014). 
2.2.2.4 Recent tax transparency initiatives 
On 12 April 2016, the EC presented a proposal for a directive which would require 
annual public CBCR by companies in all industries with consolidated turnover 
exceeding €750 million operating in the EU.31  The proposal’s objective posits that 
greater transparency is needed and public scrutiny can help ensure that tax is paid 
where profits are produced.  The required disclosures are identical to those currently 
required of EU banks under Article 89 of CRD IV.  The EC anticipates that around 
6,000 businesses will be affected, only a third of which are headquartered in the EU.32  
If passed into legislation, this proposal will amend Accounting Directive 
2013/34/EU.33 
The EC published another draft EU Directive on 25 October 2016 called the 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).34  The CCCTB proposes to 
                                                          
30 At a practical level, tax practices, liabilities and risks need to be assessed on a country-by-country 
basis because taxes are assessed and levied at the national level. 
31 Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52016SC0117. 
32 If a group has no EU holding company, each EU subsidiary will be required to publish a CBCR. 
33 Only a qualified majority (16 Member States with a 65% of the EU population) is required for the 
amendment to be introduced. 
34 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/com_2016_683_en.pdf. 
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consolidate the results of entities in a EU corporate group under a single filing and 
apportion the aggregate profits to individual Member States according to a formula 
based on labour, assets and sales.  The CCCTB would become mandatory for large 
MNCs with turnover in excess of €750 million and apply from 1 January 2021.  This 
Directive would automatically offset profits and losses within the group rendering 
transfer pricing unnecessary for transactions between group entities.  Sadiq (2011, 
2012) suggests that such formulary apportionment is an optimal way to tax 
multinational banks because it has greater parity with the location of their economic 
activity.  Other benefits of this approach include greater certainty, improvements in 
tax compliance from increased simplicity, and a reduction in opportunities for income 
shifting by reducing the need to determine transfer prices (Sadiq 2011, 2012). 
2.2.3 Hypothesis development 
On the one hand, public CBCR lifts the veil of opacity regarding firms’ tax 
arrangements which may intensify public scrutiny and negatively impact EU banks in 
three different ways.  First, MNCs may suffer political and reputational costs including 
consumer boycotts, shareholder backlash, brand erosion, and damaged relationships 
with governments (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Mills et al. 2013; Gallemore et al. 2014; 
Dyreng et al. 2016; Austin and Wilson 2017).  Second, public CBCR may impact the 
firm’s interaction and relationship with tax authorities (Dyreng et al. 2016).  Third, 
EU banks may incur increased proprietary costs through competitors obtaining 
commercially sensitive information about their country-level tax-related activities.  On 
the other hand, tax avoidance can lead to increases in both accounting earnings and 
cash flows and new information concerning a firm’s commitment to tax minimisation 
may be rewarded by the capital market (Huesecken et al. 2017; Nesbitt et al. 2017). 
Anecdotal evidence highlights managers’ concerns about reputational risks.  For 
example, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) cite General Electric’s application of a test to 
evaluate the reputational risk of tax strategies, where they forgo a strategy if they 
believe it would be discussed negatively on the Wall Street Journal’s front page.  
Dyreng et al. (2016) discuss two recent episodes in the UK involving Starbucks and 
Amazon.  Importantly, each firm responded to the increased public pressure in a 
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manner consistent with them attempting to limit reputational damage.35  Davis et al. 
(2016) provide anecdotes suggesting firms pursue corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) activities so the public perceives them as ‘good corporate citizens’ that pay 
their fair share of tax.36 
Institutional investors may also be concerned that tax planning strategies make 
unsustainable contributions to earnings (EY 2015).  If a MNC has been exploiting a 
loophole which is subsequently closed, then ceteris paribus, future earnings may be 
negatively impacted.  In 2016, the EC ordered the Irish government to claw back 
€13bn in taxes from Apple which raised investor concern (Beesley and Barker 2016).  
For example, UK fund managers Legal & General Investment Management, the Local 
Authority Pension Fund Forum, Royal London Asset Management, and Sarasin 
Partners, wrote a letter to Alphabet raising concerns about its tax arrangements (Ram 
2016a).37  In late 2016, MSCI announced that it will significantly reduce the ESG 
(Environmental, Social, Governance) ratings of firms embroiled in legal tax disputes, 
who have low ETRs compared to predicted rates based on revenues, or who have 
opaque tax structures (Ram 2016c). 
Despite concerns about potential reputational damage associated with tax 
avoidance, empirical evidence of this association is relatively scarce, and results are 
mixed.  Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find that, on average, a company’s stock price 
declines following public revelation that it engaged in tax sheltering.38  Lenders may 
perceive aggressive tax planning as risky and respond via increased debt pricing or the 
imposition of more restrictive covenants (Hasan et al. 2014).  A survey of 600 US 
corporate tax executives by Graham et al. (2014) finds that reputational concerns rank 
as the second most important factor explaining why firms do not adopt a particular tax 
                                                          
35 Both firms received negative publicity concerning the amount of tax they pay in the UK resulting in 
verbal attacks from members of Parliament, customer boycotts, decreases in reputation ratings, and 
store closures.  Starbucks voluntarily paid future taxes and relocated physical offices to the UK, while 
Amazon pledged to abandon certain tax-minimising corporate structures. 
36 Interestingly, Davis et al. (2016) find that, on average, socially responsible firms do not pay more 
corporate taxes than other firms and provide evidence that firms who are rated highly for their CSR 
activities, avoid more taxes which suggests that CSR and taxes act as substitutes.  The authors conclude 
that their results are consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that using legal means to reduce 
taxes is not considered to be a socially undesirable activity. 
37 Similarly, Nordic fund manager Nordea Asset Management wrote to several companies, including 
Alphabet and Apple, to warn that mounting pressure from regulators and government concerning 
aggressive tax planning has increased overall risk for investors (Ram 2016b). 
38 Similar results (Choy et al. 2017; Dyreng et al. 2016; Brooks et al. 2016) are discussed in Section 
2.6.5. 
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planning strategy.39  Recently, Dyreng et al. (2016), find that public scrutiny can 
impose significant political and reputational costs on large publicly-listed firms.  UK 
firms are required to disclose the name and location of all subsidiaries, regardless of 
size and materiality.40  An ActionAid International (AAI)41 investigation found that 
half of FTSE 100 firms were non-compliant leading them to petition Companies 
House to enforce the disclosure rule.  After a concerted campaign of public pressure 
led by AAI, nearly 100% compliance was achieved.  Dyreng et al. (2016) find that 
scrutinised firms decrease tax avoidance (measured using ETRs) and reduce the 
number of tax haven subsidiaries relative to firms unaffected by public pressure. 
In contrast, Gallemore et al. (2014) analyse a sample of 188 firms that were 
subject to public scrutiny for having engaged in tax shelters during 1995 to 2005.  They 
conduct a multitude of tests examining the reputational effects of tax sheltering on 
shareholders, managers, auditors, customers, public media and tax authorities, and 
find no evidence that firms or their top executives face significant reputational costs 
from tax shelter involvement.  Chen et al. (2015) find no evidence that firms reduce 
their level of tax avoidance following negative media attention.  Huesecken et al. 
(2017) analyse the capital market reaction to the Lux Leaks scandal which was not 
associated with any penalties or back taxes thus allowing the potential reputational 
loss to be isolated.  The authors find significant positive cumulated abnormal returns 
for involved firms casting doubt on reputational effects.  Similarly, Nesbitt et al. 
(2017) find that, on average, investors reacted positively to news of US firms’ 
inclusion in the Lux Leaks revelations. 
Furthermore, shareholders may prefer managers to be ‘optimally tax aggressive’ 
to maximise firm value and so tax avoidance may enhance a firm’s reputation (Hanlon 
                                                          
39 The most important factor is the concern that a tax strategy might not pass the judicial standard of 
‘business purpose/economic substance’.  Similarly, EY’s 2014 Tax risk and controversy survey 
revealed that 89% of the largest MNCs surveyed said they were somewhat or significantly concerned 
about news media coverage of how much tax they pay or their seemingly low ETR (EY 2014). 
40 Section 409 of the Companies Act 2006 requires companies to include information on their related 
undertakings (subsidiaries, joint ventures, associated undertakings and undertakings in which they have 
a significant influence) in the financial statement footnotes.  However, if the directors deem this to be 
excessively lengthy, Section 410 permits them to limit the disclosures to ‘principal subsidiaries’ and 
annex the full list to the annual return filed with Companies House.  Section 410 was repealed in 2015 
by the Companies, Partnerships and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/980) 
and from 1 July 2015 UK companies must disclose details of all related undertakings in the financial 
statement footnotes. 
41 ActionAid International is a global non-profit activist group dedicated to ending worldwide poverty. 
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and Slemrod 2009).  Bird and Karolyi (2017) find that positive shocks to institutional 
ownership lead, on average, to significant decreases in ETRs and greater use of tax 
haven subsidiaries.42  Bryant-Kutcher et al. (2012) find that firm value, as measured 
by Tobin's q, is negatively related to foreign ETRs.  Gallemore et al. (2014) propose 
two reasons why some stakeholders react positively to news of tax avoidance thereby 
minimising any reputational impact to the firm.  First, such activity is usually legal 
and, in most cases, does not amount to fraud, thereby making it more palatable.  
Second, other risks affecting the firm such as liquidity risk, competition, and going 
concern may rank much higher than risks associated with tax avoidance.  Indeed, 
financial institutions are subject to regular internal and external assessment of capital 
adequacy, market liquidity, and value-at-risk, and these issues may supersede any 
reputational risk associated with tax avoidance. 
CBCR may provide new information to tax authorities investigating the tax 
behaviour of MNCs and trigger increased audit activity and subsequent enforcement 
actions.43  Tax-related disclosures can be valuable to tax authorities who must direct 
scarce enforcement resources to best effect (Mills 1998).  Thus, if they utilise the 
additional information to more efficiently audit firm’s tax positions, disclosure of 
CBCR information may result in tax authorities disallowing certain tax positions and 
imposing penalties.  Prior research on US firms suggests that the IRS finds public 
disclosures relating to firms’ uncertain tax positions (FIN 48 disclosures) useful for 
tax enforcement (Bozanic et al. 2017).  However, tax authorities usually possess 
substantial powers to request proprietary information about MNCs tax arrangements 
over and above that provided in tax returns to enable detailed assessment of complex 
tax positions.  Therefore, whether public CBCR provides information incremental to 
that already provided directly to tax authorities is questionable. 
The academic literature examining CBCR is sparse likely because of its recent 
development.  In reviewing CBCR’s suitability for combating profit shifting, Fuest et 
al. (2013) and Evers et al. (2014) argue that financial statements prepared for financial 
                                                          
42 Bird and Karolyi (2017) implement a regression discontinuity design and examine shocks to 
institutional ownership around Russell 1000/2000 index reconstitutions.  The increase in tax avoidance 
is largest for firms with poor ex-ante governance and high initial ETRs, suggesting that increases in 
institutional ownership push listed firms toward a common ETR, and implicate poor governance as an 
explanation for the under sheltering puzzle (Weisbach 2002). 
43 As tax enforcement actions are usually a lengthy process, any change in ETRs I observe is unlikely 
the direct result of tax authority action against sample firms (Dyreng et al. 2016). 
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reporting purposes are not an appropriate platform to provide CBCR, since avoidance 
strategies are based on the legal exploitation of tax law loopholes.44  Instead, they 
argue that legislators should focus on enforcing national and international tax rules 
and closing gaps in tax law.  In contrast, Wojcik (2015) suggests that MNCs may 
reduce their tax avoidance behaviour in response to CBCR in financial statements 
because of reduced information asymmetries between MNCs and tax authorities and 
deterrence effects created by reputational concerns.45  From a stakeholder theory 
perspective, Longhorn et al. (2016) contend that CBCR provides information capable 
of influencing the decision-making process of all the MNC’s stakeholders while 
concurrently ensuring the firm’s accountability to them. 
Three recent studies document an association between geographical reporting and 
tax avoidance.  First, Hope et al. (2013) find that most US firms voluntarily choose 
not to disclose their geographic earnings following the adoption of SFAS 131 in 1998 
which is associated with significantly lower ETRs.46  Second, Krapat et al. (2016) find 
that in the 2007-2012 period, many US MNCs significantly reduced the number of 
foreign subsidiaries publicly disclosed in their Exhibit 21 in the Form 10-K.  They find 
that tax aggressiveness increases for these firms compared to firms with little or no 
reduction in the reported number of foreign subsidiaries.  Third, Akamah et al. (2018) 
find that firms operating more extensively in tax havens tend to disclose their foreign 
operations at a higher level of aggregation in the segment reporting note and conclude 
that public CBCR would likely highlight tax avoidance. 
Finally, EY’s 2014 Tax risk and controversy survey47 reveals that only 21% of 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: ‘We believe that voluntary 
publishing to the public the amount of taxes we pay where we operate is a prudent step 
to take’.  In contrast, 46% disagreed or strongly disagreed.  EY (2014) conclude that 
many firms believe the need for greater transparency is about constructive taxpayer-
to-tax authority dialogue and not something that should be played out on the public 
                                                          
44 This aligns with the BEPS project recommendation to provide CBCRs directly to tax authorities. 
45 Wojcik (2015) notes this is more likely in response to ‘full CBCR’ as advocated by Murphy and TJN 
(2010, 2012) than to ‘partial CBCR’ adopted by CRD IV. 
46 However, the effects diminished with the introduction of Schedule M-3 in December 2004 which 
requires MNCs to provide a detailed reconciliation of book-tax differences in their tax return to the IRS 
including detailed information on each foreign entity (Hope et al. 2013). 
47 Between November 2013 and January 2014 (before the first CBCRs were required), EY surveyed 
962 tax and finance executives representing more than 20 industries in 27 jurisdictions. 
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stage.  However, three GSIBs voluntarily chose to publicly disclose all disclosure 
items for 2013 suggesting that the benefits from providing an enlarged information set 
outweighed the costs of disclosure.48  These firms provided an ex-ante signal that the 
potential detrimental effects of public CBCR are minor.49 
Moreover, Bushman (2014) emphasizes that while information disclosure is a 
necessary condition for bank transparency, transparency also relies on the active effort 
of information recipients driven by their incentives to gather, interpret and impound 
available information into decision-making.50  CBCR is reliant upon the ability of 
information receivers, including critics and news media, to accurately decipher the 
disclosures.51  International tax law is complex and interested parties lacking specific 
tax knowledge may misunderstand, misuse, or misinterpret the information leading to 
misplaced accusations of corporate tax avoidance (Devereux 2011; Evers et al. 
2014).52  For instance, low (or zero) tax payments do not necessarily mean that a MNC 
is engaging in tax avoidance or undertaking any form of illegal activity.  Rather, it 
may simply reflect current year tax losses, the recoupment of prior year tax losses 
against current taxable income, or credits and deductions available to encourage 
certain expenditure such as research and development. 
In summary, whether and by how much EU banks modify their tax aggressiveness 
in response to increased transparency facilitated by mandatory public CBCR is ex-
ante unclear.  To examine this question empirically, I use a difference-in-differences 
research design to measure changes in tax avoidance undertaken by EU banks relative 
to a control group of comparable firms exempt from CBCR disclosure requirements.  
The difficulty in finding an appropriate control group is exacerbated by the fact that 
CBCR requirements apply to all banks operating in the EU (Beatty and Liao 2014).  
Nevertheless, multinational EU insurance firms are selected as the control group for 
                                                          
48 The three firms are Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays, and Standard Chartered.  Leuz and Wysocki 
(2016) suggest that examining firms’ responses to new regulation is an alternative way of estimating 
whether a regulatory act has been net costly or beneficial. 
49 Although this may be partially due to the fact these UK domiciled firms have been disclosing details 
about their subsidiaries since 2006 in accordance with the Companies Act 2006. 
50 Bushman (2014) defines bank transparency as the availability to outside stakeholders (depositors, 
investors, borrowers, counterparties, regulators, policy makers) of relevant, reliable information about 
the periodic performance, financial position, business model, governance, value and risks of banks. 
51 Leuz and Wysocki (2016) note that the responses of the information receiver are generally the reason 
the disclosure feeds back to the real actions of the sender. 
52 Murphy (2016) discounts this argument on the basis that public CBCR is merely an extension of 
corporate financial reporting and thus comprehensible to users. 
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several reasons.  First, they operate in a similar industry providing financial services 
to retail and business customers.  Second, they are headquartered in the EU and 
therefore subject to the same institutional setting as EU banks.  They face the same 
legal frameworks, political landscape, operating environments, and tax enforcement 
regimes common to all EU firms.  Third, like EU banks, EU insurers are subject to 
additional (albeit different) regulation and supervision over and above that placed on 
firms in non-financial services industries.53  Fourth, multinational insurers operate in 
more than one country so likely face similar financial reporting incentives as EU banks 
and will also enjoy tax minimisation opportunities only available to firms operating in 
multiple jurisdictions.  Finally, they are exposed to the same general economic trends 
as EU banks.  This leads to the first hypothesis, stated in null form: 
H1: EU banks do not change their level of tax avoidance relative to EU 
insurers after the introduction of mandatory public CBCR. 
CBCR disclosures are only available for EU banks from 2013 precluding the use 
of a difference-in-differences design.  This leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: EU banks do not change their intensity of tax haven use in the years after 
the introduction of mandatory public CBCR. 
2.3 Research design 
2.3.1 Measures of tax avoidance 
I define tax avoidance as a reduction in cash taxes paid, consistent with the 
definition offered by Hanlon and Heitzman (2010).54  Importantly, the main goal of 
this study is not to quantify the amount of tax avoidance (if any) undertaken by EU 
banks.  Rather, the objective is to examine any changes in tax avoidance after the 
implementation of CBCR.  Given tax avoidance is inherently difficult to detect let 
                                                          
53 EU insurers are impacted by a reform called Solvency II which came into force in January 2016 and 
stipulates minimum amounts of financial resources that insurers must have to cover the risks they are 
exposed to.  However, the new solvency requirements have no impact on tax transparency. 
54 I focus on measures designed to capture the total amount of taxes avoided rather than on specific tax 
minimisation strategies because such activities are unobservable to researchers.  In their review paper, 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) discuss the difficulty in defining tax avoidance and suggest that the degree 
of tax aggressiveness is ‘in the eye of the beholder’.  Furthermore, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) 
highlight the importance of selecting tax avoidance measures appropriate to the research question rather 
than simply employing a battery of different measures. 
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alone measure, and because each measure has its own limitations (Blouin 2014), I 
employ two accounting-based proxies.55  This approach increases the likelihood that I 
capture the full range of tax avoidance strategies used and increases confidence in the 
robustness of the measures should the results across the proxies be consistent. 
The first proxy the firm’s annual cash ETR (CETR) calculated as cash taxes paid 
per the cash flow statement divided by pre-tax income (Chen et al. 2010; Rego and 
Wilson 2012; Lennox et al. 2013; Bird and Karolyi 2017).  Because cash taxes paid is 
used in the numerator, tax avoidance activities that decrease a firm’s cash tax burden 
will directly impact the firm’s cash ETR making it the most direct measure of a firm’s 
cash tax burden.56  Traditional book ETRs use total income tax expense in the 
numerator which may be affected by opaque income tax accruals and hence observing 
a lower book ETR is not sufficient to conclude that a firm lowered its level of tax 
avoidance after an event of interest took place.57  Furthermore, book ETRs that use 
total income tax expense in the numerator only reflect aggressive tax planning through 
permanent book-tax differences, whereas CETR captures both permanent and 
temporary book-tax differences.  Given public scrutiny centres on the payment of cash 
corporate taxes by MNCs, CETR is the most appropriate proxy to use in the analysis. 
In addition, I follow recent studies (Gallemore et al. 2014; Brooks et al. 2016) and 
employ the annual current book ETR (BETR) as the second proxy.  BETR is calculated 
as current income tax expense from the income statement divided by pre-tax income.  
BETR captures tax strategies that give rise to both permanent and temporary book tax 
differences.  Both ETRs are constrained to fall within the [0,1] interval to mitigate the 
impact of influential negative values of ETR and to allow for meaningful ETR 
interpretation (Gallemore et al. 2014; Dyreng et al. 2017b).58  Generally, lower 
(higher) ETRs suggest higher (lower) levels of tax avoidance. 
                                                          
55 Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) stress that accounting-based measures of tax avoidance are not ideal 
for international studies because differences in tax avoidance proxies can be due to differences in 
accounting rules.  However, all sample firms in this study prepare their financial statements in 
accordance with IFRS for the entire sample period thereby eliminating such problems. 
56 Bird and Karolyi (2017) contend that shareholders should be more concerned with cash flows rather 
than the timing of income streams based on generally accepted accounting principles.  They find that 
institutional investors appear to be more concerned with CETRs in contrast to managers and analysts. 
57 Dhaliwal et al. (2004), among others, find that income tax expense can be used as an earnings 
management device. 
58 In robustness tests, I follow Edwards et al. (2016) and bound CETR and BETR at [-1,1] since some 
firms have negative pre-tax income in some years during the sample period (i.e., firms with negative 
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2.3.2 Measures of tax haven use 
In the tests relating to the use of tax havens by EU banks, the dependent variable 
(HAVEN) is designed to capture the extent to which firms use tax havens to reduce 
their tax burden.59  Again, the objective is to investigate changes in the use of tax 
havens since the enactment of CBCR.  Due to data unavailability, prior studies (e.g., 
Markle and Shackelford 2012b) rely upon proxies for tax haven intensity based on the 
disclosure of ‘material’ subsidiaries in tax havens.  This hand-collected data from 
Exhibit 21 of US firms only includes the name of the subsidiary and its country of 
location.  Unfortunately, this data does not provide financial information to determine 
the degree of income shifting nor does it delineate between those entities used for 
operating or financing activities versus those used solely for tax-related reasons.  
Akamah et al. (2018) emphasise that researchers cannot observe transactions used to 
shift income to tax havens and must therefore rely upon such proxies.60 
However, an advantage of CBCR is that it facilitates the development of new, 
more refined, measures of tax haven activity not previously used in the literature.  
Recall that EU banks must disclose, among other information, the turnover and profit 
or loss before tax for every country they operate in.61  Therefore, I use turnover and 
profit or loss before tax to capture the activity undertaken in and through tax havens.  
The first (second) measure is THAV_TO (THAV_PBT) calculated as the ratio of 
turnover (profit or loss before tax) disclosed in tax havens to total turnover (profit or 
                                                          
pre-tax income in the denominator), and to allow for refunds (i.e., negative cash taxes paid in the 
numerator).  I also drop firm observations with negative pre-tax income. 
59 Appendix B provides a list of the jurisdictions deemed tax havens. 
60 Akamah et al. (2018) argue that reliance on proxies based on the number of tax haven entities is 
justified on two additional grounds.  First, firms unlikely locate operations in tax havens solely for 
economic reasons since tax havens are typically small jurisdictions with small populations and 
economic sectors.  Thus, the ability to shift income to these low-tax jurisdictions is more likely the 
primary motive.  Second, the media, non-government organisations, and tax authorities focus on the 
use of tax haven entities in income shifting schemes.  Furthermore, Dyreng et al. (2016) outline reasons 
for multiple tax haven entity use.  First, complex tax minimisation strategies such as the ‘Double Irish-
Dutch Sandwich’ may require multiple tax haven entities due to the interaction of corporate tax and 
withholding tax laws between countries.  The ‘Double Irish-Dutch Sandwich’ uses dual-resident 
subsidiaries in Ireland (‘Double-Irish’), and conduit companies in the Netherlands (‘Dutch Sandwich’).  
Second, subsidiaries may simply be artefacts of acquisitions.  Third, holding assets in separate legal 
entities may reduce risk.  Finally, if firms wish to conceal activities from stakeholders then complicated 
structures involving numerous tax haven entities may be beneficial.  Therefore, while imprecise, proxies 
such as tax haven subsidiary intensity addresses concerns that tax havens offer tax rates so low that 
MNCs are incentivised to engage in tax avoidance (Dharmapala and Hines 2009). 
61 EU banks must also disclose the name(s), nature of activities and geographical location of all 
subsidiaries and branches (entities).  However, they are not required to disclose financial information 
for individual entities and therefore information on the relative size of entities is unavailable. 
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loss before tax).  To improve the robustness of the results, I follow prior studies and 
employ a third measure, (THAV_ENT) that captures firms’ concentration of entities in 
tax havens, calculated as the number of entities located in a tax haven scaled by the 
total number of entities. 
Several important issues arise when calculating the tax haven intensity variables.  
First, some EU banks are headquartered in tax havens (Cyprus, Ireland, Netherlands) 
making the classification of their home activities problematic.  To avoid over-
estimating tax haven involvement, I treat the home activities of these firms as non-tax 
haven activities.  Nevertheless, these firms likely have incentives to shift profits back 
into their home country but the degree to which they undertake such profit shifting is 
unobservable.  Second, the results of some tax havens have been aggregated with the 
results of non-tax havens in the CBCR (e.g., in 2013 HSBC combined the results of 
the Channel Islands with the UK).  Third, CBCR does not require disclosure beyond 
the country level, so activity in jurisdictions commonly regarded as tax havens (e.g., 
the State of Delaware in the US, the City of London in the UK) is not separately 
available.  Finally, some firms mask tax haven activity by including the results of these 
jurisdictions in a ‘Other’ category in the CBCR.  Therefore, the tax haven intensity 
measures likely understate the extent to which firms recognise activity in tax havens. 
2.3.3 Multivariate tests 
2.3.3.1 Tax avoidance and the introduction of mandatory CBCR 
First, I examine whether EU banks change their level of tax avoidance after 
CBCR is implemented.  Based on prior corporate tax avoidance research (Atwood et 
al. 2012; Davis et al. 2016; Dyreng et al. 2016) the following model is estimated: 
TAXi,t =  β0 + β1POSTi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3ROAi,t + β4LEVi,t + β5INTANGi,t     + 
β6CAPINTi,t + β7REVGRTHi,t + β8∆TLCFi,t + β9TLCF_DUMi,t     + 
β10TAX_RATEi,t + β11TAX_ENFi,t + εi,t (1) 
The dependent variable (TAX) is one of the two tax avoidance proxies (CETR and 
BETR) discussed previously.  POST is an indicator variable for the period after CBCR 
requirements are implemented (i.e., 2014 onwards).62  Thus, the coefficient of interest 
                                                          
62 In robustness tests, I replace POST with POST_2012. 
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is β1, which reflects the average difference in TAX between the pre- and post-CBCR 
periods for EU banks.  The remaining coefficients capture the effects of control 
variables included to help alleviate concerns that correlated omitted variables are 
confounding inferences.  The first group (SIZE, ROA, LEV, INTANG, CAPINT, 
REVGRTH, ∆TLCF, and TLCF_DUM) are firm-level characteristics shown in prior 
literature to be determinants of tax avoidance (Dyreng et al. 2008), whereas the second 
group (TAX_RATE and TAX_ENF) are country-level factors affecting international tax 
planning (Atwood et al. 2012).63 
Firm size (SIZE) controls for general tax planning determinants.  Larger firms 
potentially have higher political costs (Zimmerman 1983) but may have greater tax 
planning opportunities via economies of scale (Rego 2003) or more sophisticated 
internal resources (Mills et al. 1998).  Some studies document a negative association 
between profitability (ROA) and tax avoidance (Gupta and Newberry 1997; Plesko 
2003; Chen et al. 2010), while others find a positive association (Rego 2003; 
Armstrong et al. 2012).  Kim and Li (2014) suggest that more profitable firms can rely 
on their availability of resources to establish tax haven entities.  Firms with more 
growth opportunities likely face different tax planning incentives than mature firms.  
The market-to-book ratio is usually used to proxy for growth opportunities but because 
the sample includes unlisted firms, the change in revenues (REVGRTH) is used. 
Higher levels of property, plant and equipment typically result in higher tax-
deductible depreciation expenses leading to a positive association between capital 
intensity (CAPINT) and tax avoidance (Gupta and Newberry 1997).  However, 
tangible assets (e.g., branch premises, computer systems) may be less important than 
intangible assets to financial firms.  Intangible assets such as intellectual property (e.g., 
proprietary trading algorithms, costs to acquire and maintain a banking licence), 
trademarks, and brand names, are relatively mobile and difficult to value due to the 
absence of well-established markets.64  INTANG, measured as intangible assets scaled 
by total assets, is used to control for intangible assets but, as noted by Markle and 
Shackelford (2012b), this measure has drawbacks.  Accounting standards generally 
                                                          
63 All variables are defined in Appendix D. 
64 An OECD report in 2010 on the attribution of profits to permanent establishments suggests that a key 
intangible in the banking area is proprietary systems for maximising efficient use of regulatory capital 
and for risk monitoring.  Available at: www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/45689524.pdf. 
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mandate that only purchased intangible assets be recognised as assets.  Expenditures 
creating internally generated intangible assets are usually expensed as incurred. 
Leveraged firms reduce taxes through the tax-deductibility of interest expenses.65  
Income can be stripped out of high-tax jurisdictions through the strategic relocation of 
debt leading to thinly capitalised structures (Slemrod and Wilson 2009).  Some studies 
find a positive association between leverage (LEV) and tax avoidance (Plesko 2003; 
Markle and Shackleford 2012b), yet others find a negative association (Chen et al. 
2010) possibly due to the debt substitution effect (Graham and Tucker 2006).66  Firms 
can usually carry forward tax losses to offset future taxable income and reduce future 
cash tax payments.67  I follow Chen et al. (2010) and include the change in a firm’s 
tax loss carry forwards (∆TLCF), and TLCF_DUM, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
firm had a positive TLCF recorded in its financial statements at the beginning of the 
fiscal year.68  Ceteris paribus, a decrease in ∆TLCF implies that firms are utilising 
TLCFs to lower their current taxable income which reduces the current period ETR.  
An increase in ∆TLCF due to the current period’s tax loss, will not alter current taxable 
income since the tax reduction benefits will be carried forward to future periods. 
Identification is important in studies analysing the effects of mandatory 
disclosure.  Changes in tax avoidance could be attributed to the newly enacted CBCR 
rules or other concurrent changes such as changes in enforcement.  Therefore, to 
increase confidence in the results, I follow Atwood et al. (2012) and Li et al. (2016) 
and include a control for tax enforcement because higher levels of enforcement are 
expected to restrain tax avoidance activities.  TAX_ENF is the annual tax evasion 
scores from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook.69  These scores are derived 
                                                          
65 Interest expenses are generally tax-deductible in EU countries.  Full deductibility in some countries 
is subject to meeting certain requirements such as thin capitalisation and arm’s length rules (PwC 
Worldwide Tax Summaries Online.  Available at: http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/tax/corporate-
tax/worldwide-tax-summaries.html). 
66 Interest costs reduce taxable profits and pre-tax earnings, attenuating the effect of leverage on ETRs. 
67 Tax losses can be carried forward in most EU countries.  Restrictions regarding time limits and 
utilisation apply in some countries.  For example, in Greece, tax losses can only be carried forward for 
5 years, and in Austria losses can only be offset against taxable income up to a maximum of 75% of the 
taxable income for any given year (PwC Worldwide Tax Summaries Online.  Available at: 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/tax/corporate-tax/worldwide-tax-summaries.html). 
68 A small number of missing values of TLCF were replaced with zero as these firms are not expected 
to have any tax loss carry forwards in the respective period.  Including this indicator variable allows me 
to control for the effect of the presence of TLCFs on ETRs, regardless of any changes in the TLCF. 
69 The IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook is a leading annual report on the competitiveness of 
nations.  It benchmarks the performance of 61 countries based on more than 340 criteria measuring 
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from a survey of over 5,000 business executives from 61 countries report their 
agreement with the statement ‘Tax evasion is not a threat to your economy’ on a 1–6 
scale (1 indicates strongly disagree and 6 indicates strongly agree).  The data are then 
converted to a 0–10 scale with higher numbers indicating tax enforcement (tax 
evasion) is perceived to be higher (lower).  Using this measure, Li et al. (2016) find a 
negative association between tax avoidance and enforcement. 
The statutory corporate tax rate of the firm’s country of domicile (TAX_RATE) is 
included to control for the impact of residence country tax system characteristics 
(Atwood et al. 2012).70  The residence country tax system plays an important role 
because it determines the final layer of tax that the parent pays on all repatriated 
income prior to the payment of any dividends (Markle and Shackelford 2012a).  The 
expected benefits of engaging in tax avoidance are predicted to increase in the 
statutory corporate tax rate (Atwood et al. 2012).  Although, Markle and Shackleford 
(2012a) find that the ETRs for MNCs domiciled in high-tax countries are roughly 
double those in low-tax countries suggesting a negative relation between tax rate and 
tax avoidance.  Nonetheless, a survey of 500 corporate tax executives by Graham et 
al. (2017) finds that many of them incorporate statutory corporate tax rates into their 
decision making highlighting the importance of these rates. 
Overall, given that prior research finds inconsistent results on the association 
between tax avoidance and many of the controls, coupled with the lack of research on 
financial firms’ tax avoidance activities, no sign prediction is made on the controls.  
Finally, I am concerned that standard errors might be understated because asymptotic 
inference may be unreliable in small samples leading to imprecise standard errors.  
One remedy is to bootstrap standard errors to adjust for the downward bias (Imbens 
and Kolesar 2016).  Therefore, I follow Dyreng et al. (2016) and use bootstrapped 
standard errors which are arbitrarily robust to different structures in the data.  
Bootstrapped standard errors are estimated (with replacement) using 1,000 iterations 
for each model. 
                                                          
different facets of competitiveness and uses hard statistical data and survey data.  Results are not 
available for Cyprus so the mean score for the remaining countries in the sample is used for this country. 
70 The domicile of a MNC’s ultimate parent company is the ‘residence country’.  A country other than 
the residence country in which a MNC derives income is a ‘source’ country. 
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Next, to test H1, Equation (1) is augmented by including the indicator variable 
EU_BANK, which takes the value of 1 if a sample firm is an EU bank, and 0 if it is an 
EU insurer.  EU_BANK is interacted with POST to give Equation (2): 
TAXi,t =  β0 + β1EU_BANKi,t + β2EU_BANKi,t*POSTi,t 
+ ∑βkCONTROLSi,t + εi,t (2) 
In Equation (2), the inclusion of year fixed effects precludes POST being included 
in the model as a stand-alone variable.  β1 reflects the average difference in TAX 
between EU banks and EU insurers in the pre-CBCR period.  To test H1, I examine 
β2, the coefficient on EU_BANK*POST which is the difference-in-differences estimate 
of the effect of CBCR on tax avoidance in the period after CBCR is implemented.  A 
positive (negative) coefficient on this interaction term indicates an increase (decrease) 
in TAX corresponding to a decrease (increase) in tax avoidance of EU banks relative 
to EU insurers in the post-period.  I initially present the results for two specifications.  
The first includes year fixed effects to capture general changes in tax planning over 
time, while the second also includes country fixed effects to control for differences 
across countries.  I then replace the country fixed effects with firm fixed effects to 
capture differences across firms.  This latter model precludes the inclusion of 
EU_BANK, a time-invariant firm variable. 
However, unobservable time-invariant firm characteristics not controlled for in 
the models may still be present.  One remedy to deal with this problem is to estimate 
the models in first differences (Stock and Watson 2012).  Employing a changes 
specification helps to isolate any changes in tax avoidance after CBCR and improves 
identification by reducing concerns related to correlated omitted variables.  Equations 
(1) and (2) are re-estimated in first differences to give Equations (3) and (4) below:  
∆TAXi,t =  β 0 + β1POSTi,t + ∑βk∆CONTROLSi,t + εi,t (3) 
∆TAXi,t =  β 0 + β1EU_BANKi,t + β2EU_BANKi,t*POSTi,t + 
∑βk∆CONTROLSi,t + εi,t (4) 
2.3.3.2 Tax haven use and the introduction of mandatory CBCR 
In this section, I explore changes in tax haven use (if any) by EU banks in the 
post-CBCR period (H2).  Given that 2013 is the first year CBCR data becomes 
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available and because it is only available for EU banks, a difference-in-differences 
research design cannot be used.  Nonetheless, I employ two empirical specifications 
to test for any changes in tax haven intensity during 2013-2016.  The initial 
specification relies on the assumption that 2015 and 2016 represent the period after 
the CBCR requirements were fully implemented.  Underlying this assumption is the 
fact that 2015 is the first year all EU banks in the sample provide full CBCRs that 
include all disclosure items.  In 2013 (2014), 5 (68) EU banks provide full CBCRs.  
Based on this assumption, the following model is estimated for EU banks: 
HAVENi,t =  β0 + β1POST_2014i,t + ∑βkCONTROLSi,t + εi,t (5) 
The dependent variable (HAVEN) is one of the three tax haven intensity proxies 
(THAV_TO, THAV_PBT, THAV_ENT) discussed previously.  POST_2014 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the year is 2015 or 2016, and 0 if the year is 2013 
or 2014.  Therefore, the coefficient of interest (β1) captures any change in HAVEN in 
the period 2015-2016 relative to 2013-2014. 
The second specification modifies Equation (5) by replacing POST_2014 with 
separate year indicators resulting in Equation (6) below: 
HAVENi,t =  β0 + β1YEAR_2014i,t + β2YEAR_2015i,t + β3YEAR_2016i,t                                  
+ ∑βkCONTROLSi,t + εi,t (6) 
In this model, the coefficients of interest are β1, β2, and β3, which will be 
statistically significant if there is an increase or decrease in HAVEN in any given year 
relative to the base year of 2013. 
2.4 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
2.4.1 Sample selection 
The full sample consists of 111 firms for the period 2010 to 2016 (777 firm-year 
observations) corresponding to 72 EU banks affected by CBCR requirements (504 
firm-year observations) and 39 EU insurers unaffected by CBCR rules (273 firm-year 
observations).  The population for the main sample comprises all EU banks because 
the new CBCR disclosure rules apply to all EU banks regardless of their size or the 
number of countries they operate in.  Sample selection commences with the European 
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Banking Authority’s List of Institutions for Supervisory Reporting as at January 2016 
(198 firms).71  Due to the extensive hand-collection required, I then impose several 
filters as outlined in Panel A of Table 2.1.  For example, only firms that operate in 
more than one country are selected as they are more likely impacted by the new CBCR 
requirements.72  Furthermore, I only include EU banks for which English language 
financial statements could be obtained.  Panel A of Table 2.2 reveals that the final 
sample of 72 EU banks have combined total assets of €31,062bn as at 31 December 
2016 which represents 93.0% of the €33,410bn in total assets of all EU credit 
institutions (ECB 2017a).73 
The selection of control group firms is challenging because the starting number 
of EU insurers is roughly half that of EU banks and the number of very large insurers 
is much smaller relative to banks making matching difficult.  Nevertheless, these firms 
are considered the most appropriate control group as discussed in Section 2.2.3.  
Sample selection begins with the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIPOA) List of Identified Insurance Groups for Supervision as at 
November 2015 (102 firms).  Then, several restrictions are imposed as outlined in 
Panel B of Table 2.1.  For example, to minimise institutional differences between 
treatment and control groups, I only include insurers who are headquartered in one of 
the same 14 countries the EU banks emanate from.  Furthermore, only multinational 
insurers are retained to reduce differences in financial reporting incentives and tax 
planning opportunities between the two groups.  Panel A of Table 2.3 reveals that the 
39 contol firms have combined total assets of €6,485bn as at 31 December 2016 
representing 83.4% of the €7,775bn in total assets of all EU insurers (ECB 2017b). 
Data for the empirical models was collected from a variety of sources.  For the 
publicly-listed firms, data for the tax avoidance proxies and firm-level controls was 
collected from Datastream, whereas for the unlisted entities, this data was hand-
                                                          
71 Consolidated Banking Data published by the European Central Bank (ECB) as at 31 December 2016 
reveals 349 banking groups but does not include a list of the individual firms (ECB 2017a). 
72 For example, Metro Bank and Virgin Money are excluded as they are purely domestic UK firms. 
73 Credit Agricole SA, Natixis, and CIC are included as stand-alone firms in the sample despite being 
partially owned by Credit Agricole Group (57%), Groupe BPCE (71%) and Credit Mutuel Group 
(87%), respectively.  All three are listed on the Paris stock exchange and accordingly, their corporate 
structures are different from their unlisted parents plus their managers likely have different incentives.  
They also publish separate CBCRs.  If these three firms are excluded, then total assets of the sample 
amount to €28,741bn or 86.0% of the total assets of all EU banks as at 31 December 2016.  Inferences 
made from the results of the primary empirical tests remain unchanged if these firms are excluded.  
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collected from annual reports.  CBCR disclosure items (turnover, profit before tax, 
etc.) were hand-collected from the annual CBCR of each EU bank.74  However, some 
banks do not disclose their list of entities in the CBCR but refer to such a list in the 
financial statement notes.  In these cases, data was hand-collected from the relevant 
notes to the financial statements.75  Information on carried forward tax losses was 
hand-collected from the financial statement footnotes for all sample firms as this data 
item is not available on Datastream.  To calculate the tax enforcement variable, the 
annual tax evasion scores were hand-collected from the IMD World Competitiveness 
Yearbook, and the statutory corporate tax rates were hand-collected from online 
sources (OECD Tax Database, PwC’s worldwide tax summaries, and KPMG’s 
corporate tax rates table).  Finally, the consolidated financial statements of all sample 
firms are prepared in accordance with IFRS standards and are audited by Big 4 
accounting firms, removing any differences in the basis of preparation and 
presentation of their financial statements.  Finally, the relatively small sample size 
means that the empirical tests could easily be influenced by a small number of 
influential observations.  To mitigate this risk, all continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  All variables are defined in Appendix D. 
Panel A of Table 2.2 lists the EU banks, their country of residence, GSIB and 
listing status, and total assets measured in Euros as at 31 December 2016.  The table 
reveals considerable variation in the size of the EU banks.  HSBC is the largest with 
€2,257,345m in total assets while BKS Bank is the smallest with only €7,581m in total 
assets.  Panel B shows the sample composition by country with 14 countries covered 
although a greater proportion comes from the major European countries France, 
                                                          
74 Given that the first CBCRs were published for the 2013 fiscal year, this data is only available for 
2013-2016 thus reducing the sample for tests involving tax havens. 
75 In the UK, Section 409 of the Companies Act 2006 only requires UK-listed firms to provide a full list 
of subsidiaries for the 2015 financial year onwards.  In prior years, if the firm did not voluntarily 
disclose this list in their annual report they were obliged to submit the list as an annexure to the annual 
return lodged with Companies House.  HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, and Barclays exercised this 
option so the full lists of subsidiary undertakings were obtained directly from Companies House.  
Similarly, local regulations in Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands permit Danish, Irish and Dutch 
firms to only disclose principal undertakings in their annual reports and include the full list of subsidiary 
undertakings with its annual return to the Danish Business Authority (DBA), Companies Registration 
Office (CRO), and the Netherlands Business Register (NBR), respectively.  Online inquiries revealed 
that the DBA and NBR only have current listings of subsidiaries.  However, I managed to obtain a full 
list of subsidiaries directly from Danske Bank.  The full list of subsidiaries for Allied Irish Banks was 
obtained from the CRO but not for the Bank of Ireland.  The Investor Relations Department of the Bank 
of Ireland advised that the company is an unregistered company and hence the CRO does not have filed 
documents available on the online platform.  However, the documents filed for this company are 
available in person at the company’s registered office in Dublin. 
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Germany, and the UK.  Panel C reveals the asset size by firm-type.  The mean (median) 
total assets of the entire sample is €431,510m (€210,189m) split between GSIBs with 
€1,258,985m (€1,287,183m) and non-GSIBs with €231,775m (€150,552m).  This 
highlights the industry domination by a relatively small number of very large firms. 
Details on the composition of the control sample are presented in Table 2.2.  
Similar to EU banks, Panel A reveals that the top 10 insurers by asset size collectively 
account for approximately 79% of total assets.  As shown in Panel B, the insurers are 
headquartered in 9 of the 14 EU countries the banks are from with firms from France, 
Germany and the UK dominating the sample.  Panel C shows that the mean (median) 
total assets of the EU insurers is €166,279 (€63,612). 
2.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
The annual mean and median of CETR and BETR for EU banks and EU insurers 
is plotted across the sample period in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.  Both panels in Figure 1.1 
illustrate that despite differences in levels, the pre-CBCR trend in CETR is broadly 
similar for both groups of EU firms.  However, after the introduction of CBCR in 
2013, the CETR for EU insurers begins a more upward trend relative to EU banks and 
the difference in levels increases.  A similar pattern is presented in both panels of 
Figure 2.2 for the BETR although the difference in levels is less stark in the pre-CBCR 
period.  However, similar to the results in Figure 2.1, after the introduction of CBCR 
in 2013, the BETR for EU insurers continues an upward trend whereas the BETR for 
EU banks commences a downward trend.  Overall, the similar pre-CBCR trends in 
CETR and BETR provides comfort that the parallel trends assumption underlying the 
difference-in-differences methodology is satisfied (Roberts and Whited 2013).76 
Table 2.4 reports the summary statistics.  The mean of CETR (BETR) for all firms 
is 22.8% (24.2%), which is substantially lower than the mean statutory corporate tax 
rate of 27.8%, but similar to differences found in prior research on US firms (Dyreng 
                                                          
76 Nevertheless, to formally examine whether the parallel trends assumption is reasonable, I estimate 
Equation (2) but replace the interaction variable EU_BANK*POST with separate interactions between 
EU_BANK and each year indicator for the years 2011 to 2016.  In untabulated results, the estimated 
coefficients on the interaction between EU_BANK and the separate indicators for the years in the pre-
CBCR period (i.e., YR2011, YR2012, and YR2013) are insignificant when both CETR and BETR are the 
dependent variable.  These results suggest that the treatment and control groups exhibit parallel trends 
in the outcome variable (TAX) in the period prior to treatment (CBCR). 
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et al. 2008).77  EU banks have significantly lower ETRs than EU insurers.  The mean 
CETR (BETR) for EU banks is 20.2% (22.2%) compared to 27.5% (27.8%) for EU 
insurers.  The means of the tax haven intensity proxies THAV_TO, THAV_PBT, and 
THAV_ENT, are 5.1%. 7.3%, and 17.5% respectively.  The latter is similar to prior 
research on UK firms (Dyreng et al. 2016) and US firms (Krapat et al. 2016).78  This 
suggests that EU banks have a non-trivial proportion of turnover, pre-tax profits, and 
entities (subsidiaries and branches) located in tax havens.  The results in Table 2.4 also 
reveal that EU banks are significantly larger, less profitable, use more leverage, have 
less intangible and tangible assets, and have lower revenue growth relative to EU 
insurers.  Most firms (83.7%) have carried-forward tax losses (TLCF_DUM) which 
can be used to offset future tax liabilities.  The mean value of the tax enforcement 
proxy for (TAX_ENF) is 4.496 on a scale of 1 to 10, with larger values representing 
greater tax enforcement (less tax evasion).79 
Table 2.5 presents the Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) 
correlations with significant (p-value < 0.05) coefficients reported in bold.  In Panel 
A, CETR and BETR are significantly positively correlated suggesting each captures 
the same underlying construct.  Likewise, in Panel B, all three tax haven intensity 
proxies are significantly positively correlated.  Interestingly, in both panels, none of 
the correlations between the tax avoidance or tax haven intensity proxies and POST 
are significant.  Collinearity between the controls is generally low to moderate with 
the highest correlation coefficient being -0.671 (p-value < 0.05) between INTANG and 
LEV.  Tests of collinearity are conducted (untabulated) by regressing the primary 
dependent variables CETR and BETR on all independent variables and calculating the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each variable.  The mean VIF is 1.6 and the 
highest VIF across both regressions is 3.0, well below the generally accepted threshold 
of 10.  This provides comfort that multicollinearity is a not a problem in the models. 
Table 2.6 summarises the location of key CBCR disclosure items.  Panel A reveals 
that, on average, firms have over 224 entities (Column 5) located in approximately 20 
                                                          
77 I do not attempt to interpret the magnitude of any difference in computed ETRs compared to statutory 
corporate tax rates but rather focus on the relative change in ETRs to determine the extent of any change 
in the level of tax avoidance. 
78 THAV_TO and THAV_PBT are new variables thus no comparisons can be made to prior research. 
79 This measure varies widely among countries and across time.  Over the sample period, Greece has 
the lowest average score of 1.37 compared to the highest of 6.29 for The Netherlands.  In 2010, the 
score averaged 3.28 relative to the high of 5.01 in 2012 and 2013 (4.74 in 2016). 
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countries (Column 2).  The reduction of 22.3% (Column 9) in the mean number of tax 
haven entities between 2013 and 2016, is greater than the decrease of 14.1% in the 
mean number of total entities (Column 6), resulting in a decrease in the percentage of 
entities in tax havens from 18.4% in 2013 to 16.7% in 2016 (Column 10).80  Panel B 
shows that, on average, tax havens accounted for 7.8% of turnover, 18.5% of profit 
before tax, and 4.5% of employees over the period 2013-2016.  Prima facie, the 
proportion of key CBCR disclosure items located in tax havens is relatively stable over 
time with the exception of profit before tax which only had to be disclosed from 2014. 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Univariate tests 
Table 2.7 reports the results of univariate tests of tax avoidance pre- and post-
CBCR implementation.81  The post period is defined as 2014-2016 being the years 
after the CBCR requirement came into effect.  Panel A reports the results for the full 
sample while Panels B and C (Panels D and E) report the results for EU banks and EU 
insurers (listed and unlisted EU banks).  The results in Panel A are statistically 
insignificant.  However, in Panel B, CETR decreases by 0.026 (p-value = 0.208) while 
BETR decreases by 0.049 (p-value = 0.016).  This suggests that, on average, EU banks 
increase their level of tax avoidance (measured using BETR) in the period after the 
new rules came into effect.  In Panel C, the mean values of CETR and BETR increase 
but are insignificant.  The results in Panels B and C align with the trends documented 
in Figures 2.1 and 2.2.  The results in Panels D and E indicate that the decrease in 
CETR and BETR for EU banks is driven primarily by unlisted EU banks. 
2.5.2 Multivariate tests 
2.5.2.1 Tax avoidance and the introduction of mandatory CBCR 
Table 2.8 reports the results of estimating Equation (1) for EU banks when the 
dependent variable is CETR (Models 1 and 2) and BETR (Models 3 and 4) with Models 
                                                          
80 The number of entities located in a tax haven varies dramatically from over 300 for Deutsche Bank 
to 0 for some firms (e.g., CaixaBank, Oberbank, BKS Bank and Nykredit Realkredit). 
81 Univariate test of the difference in means of THAV_TO, THAV_PBT, and THAV_ENT before and 
after CBCR implementation cannot be conducted because this data only becomes available from 2013. 
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(2) and (4) including country fixed effects to control for differences across countries.  
In all models, the estimated coefficient on POST is significantly negative and ranges 
from -0.039 (p-value = 0.089) in Model (2) to -0.050 (p-value = 0.019) in Model (4).82  
Interestingly, this suggests that, on average, EU banks increase tax avoidance after 
2013, consistent with the benefits of tax avoidance outweighing the potential costs and 
possibly some learning effect (discussed in Section 2.6.1).  The economic magnitude 
of these results is substantial.  During the sample period, EU banks had an average 
CETR (BETR) of 0.202 (0.222).  Using mean pre-tax income of €2,779m for the post-
CBCR period, the results represent a reduction of around €21.9m in cash taxes paid or 
€30.8m in current income tax expense.83 
Despite the preceding results, the difference-in-differences design is employed to 
empirically test H1.  The results of estimating Equation (2) are presented in Table 2.9 
and the variable of interest is EU_BANK*POST.  In Models (1) and (2) where CETR 
is the tax avoidance proxy, the estimated coefficient on EU_BANK*POST is negative 
but statistically insignificant.  For example, in Model (1), the coefficient is -0.048 (p-
value = 0.145).  However, in Models (3) and (4) that use BETR as the dependent 
variable, the negative coefficient on EU_BANK*POST is -0.074 (p-value = 0.026) and 
-0.062 (p-value = 0.056), respectively.  These results suggest that EU banks increase 
tax avoidance after CBCR relative to EU insurers despite being subject to increased 
transparency through CBCR disclosures.  Prima facie, this leads to the rejection of H1 
but only when tax avoidance is measured using BETR.84 
As a robustness test, I adopt a more conservative approach and replace the country 
fixed effects with firm fixed effects to capture differences across firms and re-estimate 
Equations (1) and (2).  Table 2.10 presents the results.  In Panel A, the coefficient on 
POST is negative but insignificant at conventional levels in both models.  The 
estimated coefficient on EU_BANK*POST in Panel B is also negative but insignificant 
in both models.  The results of estimating Equations (3) and (4) are presented in Table 
2.11 when ∆CETR and ∆BETR is the dependent variable.85  In both panels, the 
estimated coefficient on the variable of interest is not statistically significant.  The 
                                                          
82 In Models (2) and (4) the country-level variables (TAX_RATE and TAX_ENF) are subsumed by the 
country fixed effects. 
83 For Model (2) €2,779m x (0.202 x -0.039) and for Model (4) €2,779m x (0.222 x -0.050). 
84 Results are similar if I include POST as a stand-alone variable and exclude the year fixed effects. 
85 Two observations are lost as 2010 is the first year that data was available for one bank and one insurer. 
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results in Tables 2.10 and 2.11 suggest that there may be unobservable time-invariant 
firm characteristics not included in the set of controls, such as firm governance 
structures, that explain the results in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. 
Overall, the results are mixed, but I do find some evidence that supports the 
rejection of the null hypothesis (H1).  Specifically, on average, EU banks increase tax 
avoidance after mandatory public CBCR comes into force, relative to EU insurers 
exempt from CBCR.  However, the results only apply when BETR is the tax avoidance 
proxy and differences across time and countries are controlled for. 
2.5.2.2 Tax haven use and the introduction of mandatory CBCR 
Table 2.12 reports the results of estimating Equation (5) for EU banks for 2013-
2016.  Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for all EU banks (EU banks that use tax 
havens i.e., when THAV_TO, THAV_PBT, or THAV_PBT ≠ 0).  In all models of both 
panels, the estimated coefficient on POST_2014 is statistically insignificant.  The 
results of estimating Equation (6) for EU banks from 2013-2016 are presented in Table 
2.13.  None of the estimated coefficients on any of the year dummies is significant.  
The results in Tables 2.12 and 2.13 are consistent with the year-by-year summary 
provided in Table 2.6.  Therefore, I find no evidence for the rejection of H2. 
2.5.3 Discussion of results 
Overall, from the results of the tax avoidance tests and tax haven intensity tests, 
it is evident that EU banks do not decrease tax avoidance in response to public CBCR 
as the results of prior studies may suggest (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2016).  Rather, the results 
are consistent with the expected benefits of tax avoidance continuing to outweigh the 
potential costs in the more transparent post-CBCR period.  These results are similar to 
those of recent studies documenting little, if any, reputational costs associated with the 
public disclosure of tax avoidance (Gallemore et al. 2014; Huesecken et al. 2017; 
Nesbitt et al. 2017).  Alternatively, EU banks may be fully compliant with existing tax 
laws or are confident that their current tax strategies would withstand tax authority 
scrutiny.  Hence, any pressure to alter their existing tax arrangements emanating from 
the increased transparency offered by public CBCR may be unwarranted. 
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2.6 Additional analysis 
2.6.1 Cross-sectional variation in the results of EU banks 
In this section, I investigate whether the effect of public CBCR on tax avoidance 
undertaken by EU banks documented in Table 2.8 varies in line with public listing 
status.  Specifically, the sample of EU banks comprises 48 listed and 24 unlisted firms 
many of whom are large (e.g., Credit Agricole, Rabobank) and more likely impacted 
by CBCR.  Listed firms face capital market pressures regarding financial performance 
potentially driving them to undertake tax avoidance.  Graham et al.’s (2014) survey 
confirms that increasing reported earnings is an important outcome of tax planning for 
public firms.86  In contrast, unlisted firms have relatively weaker incentives to focus 
on reported earnings and are more likely driven by tax and other considerations (Beatty 
and Harris 1999; Ball and Shivakumar 2005).  However, financial analyst coverage is 
likely to increase public awareness of the underlying practices of listed firms including 
aggressive tax strategies, which may attract unwanted public scrutiny (Allen et al. 
2016).87  Jaafar and Thornton (2015) examine European firms over the period 2001-
2008 and find that the negative association between tax haven operations and ETRs is 
more pronounced for private firms than for public firms. 
To account for potential differences in financial reporting incentives, I partition 
the EU banks into 2 groups according to listing status and re-estimate Equation (1).  
Table 2.14 reports the results.  In Panel A (CETR), all estimated coefficients on POST 
for listed banks are negative but insignificant.  In contrast, the coefficient on POST for 
unlisted banks is significantly negative at -0.079 (p-value = 0.028) when country or 
firm fixed effects are excluded from the model, and -0.058 (p-value = 0.124) when 
country fixed effects are included.  The coefficient becomes statistically insignificant 
with the inclusion of firm fixed effects.  In Panel B (BETR), all negative coefficients 
on POST for listed EU banks are insignificant whereas all three coefficients are 
significantly negative for unlisted EU banks.  For example, the coefficient is -0.068 
                                                          
86 Although, Burgstahler et al. (2006) find that EU private firms exhibit higher levels of earnings 
management than listed firms, contrary to the belief that capital markets exacerbate incentives to 
manage earnings. The authors contend that because private firms are less reliant on earnings to 
communicate firm performance, making earnings less informative in the process of minimising taxes 
is less of a concern to these firms. 
87 Allen et al. (2016) find a negative relation between analyst coverage and tax aggressiveness, 
suggesting that that higher analyst coverage constrains corporate tax aggressiveness. 
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(p-value = 0.032) when country fixed effects are included and -0.076 (p-value = 0.077) 
when firm fixed effects are included.  The magnitude of the negative coefficients on 
POST for unlisted firms is greater than listed firms in all models. 
The results suggest that unlisted banks increase tax avoidance more in the post-
CBCR period relative to their listed counterparts.  The univariate results in Panels D 
and E of Table 2.7 reveal that in the pre-CBCR period, the mean CETR (BETR) of 
unlisted banks was 0.255 (0.253) compared to 0.192 (0.238) for listed banks.  
Furthermore, the significant decrease in unlisted firms’ ETRs in the post-CBCR 
period, results in both ETRs reducing to a level similar to listed banks.  Therefore, a 
possible explanation for the findings in Table 2.14 is that unlisted banks learn about 
their publicly-listed competitors’ tax avoidance activity through enhanced visibility 
via CBCR.  They may then mimic their listed peers’ behaviour to achieve a reduced 
tax liability that is more in line with the industry average. 
I also re-estimate Equations (5) and (6) for the two groups of EU banks (results 
untabulated).  First, I find no statistically significant coefficients on POST_2014 
corresponding to Table 2.12.  However, for listed EU banks, the estimated coefficient 
on YEAR_2016 when THAV_ENT is the dependent variable is -0.024 (p-value = 0.095) 
and -0.027 (p-value = 0.072) corresponding to Models (5) and (6) in Table 2.13.  This 
suggests that the 24.4% decrease in the mean number of tax haven entities from 39.3 
in 2015 to 34.2 in 2016 (documented in Panel A of Table 2.6) is driven primarily by 
listed firms.  These firms may be responding to increased public scrutiny specifically 
related to subsidiary location similar to the ActionAid International campaign in the 
UK documented by Dyreng et al. (2016).  The removal of unwanted or unused entities 
is a relatively easy and low-cost option to decrease perceived tax haven exposure. 
2.6.2 Quantile regression 
Recent studies (Brooks et al. 2016; Bird and Karolyi 2017; and Huesecken et al. 
2017) differentiate results between low- and high-ETR firms because any change in 
ETR may depend on the initial level of tax avoidance.  Hence, I suspect that the impact 
of CBCR on tax avoidance may differ at relatively low and high levels of tax 
avoidance.  Therefore, following Armstrong et al. (2015), the scope of the analysis is 
expanded by estimating Equations (1) and (2) not only at the conditional mean, but 
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across the entire tax avoidance distribution.  Quantile regression has the advantage of 
describing the relation between the independent variables and any specified quantile 
of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable (Hao and Naiman 2007). 
The results (untabulated), show that the coefficient on POST corresponding to 
Table 2.8 is significantly negative only in the higher quintiles.  Specifically, regarding 
Equation (1), when CETR is the dependent variable, the coefficient on POST is -0.033 
(p-value = 0.103) at the 60th percentile and -0.057 (p-value = 0.109) at the 80th 
percentile.  Similarly, when BETR is the dependent variable, the coefficient on POST 
is -0.036 (p-value = 0.052) at the 60th percentile and -0.063 (p-value = 0.081) at the 
80th percentile.  In both cases, the coefficient on POST at the 20th and 40th percentiles 
is statistically insignificant.  In relation to Equation (2), when CETR is the dependent 
variable, the coefficient on EU_BANK*POST is significantly negative only at the 60th 
percentile (coefficient = -0.057 and p-value = 0.092).  Similarly, when BETR is the 
dependent variable, the coefficient on EU_BANK*POST is -0.089 (p-value = 0.072) 
at the 80th percentile only.  These results suggest that only EU banks with higher ETRs 
(lower tax avoidance) reduce their ETRs after CBCR comes into effect.  However, the 
results must be interpreted with caution as the tests may be simply reflecting mean 
reversion in ETRs over the sample period. 
2.6.3 Disconnect between the location of profits and real operations 
Global value chains adopted by many MNCs may create a disconnect between the 
location of real operations and the jurisdiction in which profits generated by those 
operations are declared.  This has led to allegations that MNCs shift profits away from 
the jurisdictions where the activities creating those profits take place to low or no tax 
jurisdictions.  One purported benefit of CBCR is that more granular data permits a 
deeper analysis of the firm’s financial involvement with tax havens versus their 
economic presence in such jurisdictions (Murphy 2016).  At first glance, the results in 
Table 2.6 imply a level of incongruence between profits recognised in tax havens 
(18.5% of total profits) and ‘real’ presence in tax havens (7.8% of total turnover and 
4.5% of total employees) similar to the results documented by Aubry and Dauphin 
(2017).  The authors examine the extent to which the 20 largest EU banks use tax 
havens based only on the 2015 CBCRs of these firms.  They find that tax havens 
account for 26% of total profits despite only accounting for 12% of turnover and 7% 
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of employees, signalling a discrepancy between the profits recorded in tax havens and 
the underlying level of real economic activity. 
I exploit the availability of new CBCR data from 2013 and test for any disconnect 
between the location of profits and ‘real’ activities in tax havens.  The proportion of 
tax haven turnover and employees are used as proxies for real activities, consistent 
with proposed formulary apportionment of group-wide profits (see Footnote 16).  
Thus, the following specification is estimated using OLS: 
THAV_PBTi,t = β 0 + β1THAV_TOi,t + β2THAV_EMPi,t + ∑ βkCONTROLSi,t       
+ εi,t (7) 
Panel A of Table 2.15 reports the results.  Models (1) and (3) present the results 
for all EU banks while the results conditional on tax haven use are shown in Models 
(2) and (4).  The positive coefficient on THAV_TO in Models (1) and (2) is highly 
significant indicating that, on average, turnover recognised in tax havens is a key 
determinant of pre-tax profits located in those jurisdictions.  However, the positive 
coefficient on ∆THAV_TO in Models (3) and (4) is not significant.  The coefficient on 
THAV_EMP and ∆THAV_EMP is statistically insignificant in all models implying a 
disconnect between tax haven profits and employee numbers.  Overall, in the absence 
of data on the location of assets per country, these results cast some doubt on the notion 
of a mismatch between the location of profits and operational presence in tax havens.  
Arguably though, the number of employees better reflects physical presence in tax 
havens because any relationship between turnover and profit may be mechanical. 
2.6.4 Changes to entity locations 
The overall 22.3% decrease in the mean number of tax haven entities between 
2013 and 2016 (from 44.1 to 34.2) in Panel A of Table 2.6, prompts the question of 
what is driving this reduction.  To investigate this, I follow Dyreng et al. (2016) and 
estimate the following model: 
NUM_TH_ENTSi,t  =  β 0 + β1NUM_ENTSi,t + ∑βkCONTROLSi,t + εi,t (8) 
where NUM_TH_ENTS is the number of tax haven entities and NUM_ENTS is the 
total number of entities in the same period.  Panel B of Table 2.15 reports the results 
when estimating Equation (8).  Models (1) and (3) (Models (2) and (4)) report the 
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unconditional (conditional) results.  In all models, the coefficient on NUM_ENTS and 
∆NUM_ENTS is significantly positive, consistent with EU banks eliminating tax 
haven entities in line with real changes to their corporate structure. 
2.6.5 Returns analysis around the implementation of CBCR 
In this section, the capital market reaction to public CBCR is analysed.  Prior 
studies examining market reactions to increased public scrutiny of tax avoidance 
generally find that firms subject to widespread public attention suffer negative market 
returns (e.g., Hanlon and Slemrod 2009).  Choy et al. (2017) document significant 
negative returns for FTSE 100 firms on 11 October 2011 coinciding with the release 
of a AAI report titled ‘Addicted to Tax Havens’.88  The report generated significant 
media coverage and parliamentary action, and the authors’ findings are consistent with 
market participants anticipating negative consequences from the unwanted publicity.  
Dyreng et al. (2016) extend the analysis and show that the negative returns are 
concentrated in firms that did not disclose their full subsidiary list initially.  
Johannesen and Larsen (2016) find that the adoption of CBCR rules for EU extractive 
firms is associated with significant decreases in firm value, suggesting that financial 
transparency is a potentially powerful tool to curb tax avoidance.  Similar to the results 
in Gallemore et al. (2014) based on US firms, Brooks et al. (2016) find that UK firms 
reported in the news regarding allegations of tax avoidance experience small negative 
stock returns, but these partially reverse within one month.  In contrast, Huesecken et 
al. (2017) and Nesbitt et al. (2017) examine the capital market reaction to news of tax 
avoidance emanating from the Lux Leaks scandal and find significant positive 
cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) for the firms involved. 
The EC commenced work on CRD IV in 2009 to implement Basel III into EU law 
with legislation finalised in 2013.  In the intervening period, Basel III was agreed by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision during 2010-11.  However, it was not 
until February 2013 that the EU parliament proposed the inclusion of CBCR in CRD 
IV.  This proposal came late in the legislative process and took many by surprise.89  
Appendix C lists the key events that occurred around the adoption of the CRD IV 
                                                          
88 The report revealed the name and location of all subsidiaries of FTSE 100 firms, around half of whom 
were not disclosing such information despite being required to by the UK’s Companies Act of 2006. 
89 Neither the EC’s 2011 proposal for CRD IV, nor any public consultations or public hearings 
conducted between 2009 and 2013, contain any references to CBCR (Wojcik 2015). 
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package.  To test for a negative market reaction, the daily market-adjusted stock 
returns and the cumulative market-adjusted stock returns are calculated for the two 
key events.90  I use the market-adjusted model (MacKinlay 1997) based on a value-
weighted index (with dividends) as used in prior studies investigating market 
responses to tax avoidance (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Gallemore et al. 2014).91  The 
final sample comprises 49 publicly-listed EU banks.92 
Market-adjusted daily stock returns are calculated as follows: 
ARi,t  =   ∑ RETURNi,j,t  - MARKET RETURNj,t
n
k=1  (9) 
where AR is the daily market-adjusted return for firm i at time t, k is event k, n is the 
number of events identified in Appendix C, and j is the country of primary listing of 
the firm.  Return and market return are defined in Appendix D.  To measure the market 
return I use the leading index of firm i’s country to control for home market shocks 
that may impact daily returns around the event dates in addition to a broader European 
equity index (STOXX Europe 600).93  Cumulative market-adjusted returns over the 
event period (p, q) are calculated as: 
  CARi,t (p, q) =  ∑ ARi,t
q
t=p  (10) 
For the two events, the event window is the 4-day period from day -1 through +3. 
Panel A of Table 2.14 tabulates the significance of the abnormal daily returns 
around the event date (t = 0).  For Event 1, I find no significant market reaction on the 
                                                          
90 The EP and EC reached an agreement for the inclusion of two reforms in CRD IV late on 27 February 
2013 however these were publicly announced in the media on 28 February 2013 (Event 1).  The two 
reforms were public CBCR and a cap on bonuses for bank executives.  On 27 June 2013, the Directive 
2013/36/EU was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) (Event 2). 
91 No dividends were paid by any of the sample firms during the two event windows. 
92 Of the 72 EU banks in the sample, 48 are publicly-listed enabling stock returns to be calculated.  
However, some amendments are made to the sample.  First, ABN Amro was not publicly-listed in 2013 
so is dropped.  However, two additional firms are included (ING Group and KBC Group).  ING Bank 
and KBC Bank are not publicly-listed in their own right but their total assets constitute approximately 
99% and 87% of the total assets of their publicly-listed parents, ING Group and KBC Group, 
respectively, as at 31 December 2016.  Any market reaction to news of new mandatory disclosures 
required of their primary subsidiaries is likely reflected in their stock returns.  In sensitivity tests, these 
observations are excluded and inferences remain unchanged. 
93 Indices used are: ATX (Austria), BEL 20 (Belgium), ATHEX Composite (Cyprus), OMX 
Copenhagen 20 (Denmark), CAC 40 (France), DAX 30 (Germany), FTSE ATHEX Large Cap (Greece), 
ISEQ Overall (Ireland), FTSE MIB (Italy), AEX (Netherlands), PSI 20 (Portugal), IBEX 35 (Spain), 
OMX Stockholm 30 (Sweden), and FTSE 100 (UK).  STOXX Europe 600 comprises small, mid, and 
large firms across 17 European countries. 
87 
day the agreement to include CBCR in CRD IV is announced but significant negative 
reactions on days 1 through 3 with mean abnormal returns ranging from of -0.50% to 
-1.04%.  I find a negative and significant market reaction on the announcement date 
for Event 2, with a mean abnormal return of approximately -1.47%.  Negative 
abnormal returns persist for days +1 through to +3 however none are statistically 
significant.  Panel B reports the CARs across different windows before and after the 
announcement date (t = 0).  For Event 1 (Event 2), statistically significant negative 
abnormal CARs exist in the majority (all) of the event windows.   
Panels C and D report the results if the two related events are combined to jointly 
capture the effect of CBCR adoption (Schipper et al. 1987).  In Panel C, significant 
negative returns are found for day 0, mildly significant negative returns are found for 
day 1 (p-values = 10.03), and negative returns are found for day 2 significant at the 
1% level.  Panel D reports significant negative abnormal CARs in all event windows. 
The impact of confounding contemporaneous news is a concern.  CBCR only 
constitutes part of a reform package (bonus cap in Event 1 and the broader CRD IV 
package in Event 2) and therefore disentangling the overall market response into 
individual components of the reform package is problematic.  Accordingly, I attempt 
to isolate the market reaction to CBCR by finding media articles specifically 
discussing EU banks and CBCR and analysing the market reaction thereto.  A broad 
online search of all sources in the FACTIVA database is undertaken using the search 
terms ‘country by country reporting’, ‘CBCR’ and ‘banks’.94  I only find five articles 
pertaining to the twenty largest EU banks (27 March 2017), the five largest French 
banks (16 March 2016), Deutsche Bank (22 December 2015), and Barclays (3 March 
2015 and 30 June 2014).  In the first (second) article, four (two) of the banks discussed 
are unlisted reducing the sample to 22 observations. 
I calculate the ARs for the day -1 to +2 window and in each case, I find statistically 
significant negative ARs on the day of publication (t = 0), with an AR of -0.39% (-
0.40%) when using the local (EU) index (Panel A of Table 2.15).  However, these 
fully reverse on day +1 where I find significantly positive ARs of 0.75% (0.78%) 
respectively.  Panel B reports the CARs across several event windows including the 
                                                          
94 FACTIVA is a database of global news and information on business provided by Dow Jones & 
Company. 
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date of publication (t = 0).  Across all windows, the CARs are mixed and statistically 
insignificant.  Overall, these results are consistent with equity market participants 
anticipating negative consequences for EU banks due to higher costs of transparency 
and scrutiny, however these abnormal negative returns are short-lived consistent with 
Brooks et al. (2016) and Gallemore et al. (2014). 
2.7 Robustness tests 
In this section, the results of several robustness checks conducted to assess the 
sensitivity of the findings in the main analyses are reported. 
2.7.1 Alternative proxies of tax avoidance 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) note that most tax avoidance proxies only capture 
non-conforming tax avoidance, that is, tax strategies that reduce actual income tax 
liabilities but not book income (e.g., accelerated depreciation for tax purposes).  The 
extant literature lacks a measure which captures activities that reduce both book and 
taxable incomes (conforming tax avoidance).  Furthermore, using pre-tax income in 
the ETR denominator can be problematic for firms with negative pre-tax income or 
pre-tax income near zero (Edwards et al. 2016).  Abnormally large changes in the ETR 
may not reflect significant changes in the numerator but could be the result of a small 
or negative denominator.  Therefore, I follow Edwards et al. (2016) and Badertscher 
et al. (2017) and employ TAX_AVOID, a measure that captures ‘total tax avoidance’, 
that is, both conforming and non-confirming tax avoidance, calculated as the ratio of 
cash taxes paid to lagged total assets.95  In untabulated results, all coefficients on the 
variables of interest are insignificant when re-estimating Equations (1) - (4). 
Next, I follow Edwards et al. (2016) and re-estimate Equations (1) - (4) using 
ETRs constrained to the [-1,1] interval to better allow for loss firms (observations with 
negative pre-tax income) and cash refunds (negative cash taxes paid).96  The results 
(untabulated) show that the negative coefficients on the variables of interest are of 
                                                          
95 TAX_AVOID has several advantages.  First, like CETR, the numerator reflects actual tax payments 
and excludes potentially distortionary income tax accruals.  Second, the denominator is a lagged balance 
sheet measure that is insensitive to current period transactions that may have been manipulated (e.g., 
earnings management) and to the fact that ETRs can be distorted by negative or low pre-tax income.  
Similar to CETR and BETR, this ratio is decreasing in tax avoidance. 
96 In the full sample, 129 observations have negative pre-tax income, 70 have negative cash taxes paid, 
and 70 have negative current income tax expense. 
89 
similar magnitude as those reported in Tables 2.8 – 2.11 but statistical significance 
reduces.  For example, the coefficient on POST corresponding to Model (4) in Table 
2.8 is -0.062 (p-value = 0.052) and the coefficient on EU_BANK*POST equivalent to 
Model (4) in Table 2.9 is -0.069 (p-value = 0.127).  Finally, to ensure the results are 
not driven by loss observations and because unconstrained ETRs are more easily 
interpretable when pre-tax income is positive (Dyreng et al. 2017b), all firm-years 
with a negative pre-tax income are dropped.97  Equations (1) - (4) are re-estimated 
using ETRs constrained to [0,1] and [-1,1] and the results (untabulated) are 
qualitatively similar to those in the primary analysis. 
2.7.2 Alternative measures of the pre- and post-CBCR period 
In the primary analysis, 2014 is the first year of the post-CBCR period because 
all sample firms publicly disclose CBCRs for 2014 onwards.  However, most firms 
(53 firms or 73.6% of the sample, including all 14 GSIBs as required by Article 89) 
publicly disclose a limited CBCR of turnover, employees, and entities for the 2013 
fiscal year.98  Therefore, POST_2012 is substituted for POST to capture this along with 
any changes in tax avoidance in the second half of 2013 in anticipation of the new 
disclosure rules.  Equations (1) - (4) are re-estimated and all estimated coefficients on 
the variables of interest are statistically insignificant except two.  The coefficient on 
POST_2012 corresponding to Model (1) in Table 2.8 is -0.046 (p-value = 0.034) and 
the coefficient on EU_BANK*POST_2012 corresponding to Model (1) in Table 2.9 is 
-0.057 (p-value = 0.098).  These results suggest that EU banks did not alter their tax 
avoidance behaviour during 2013 in anticipation of impending CBCR requirements. 
2.7.3 Alternative measures of tax havens 
Following prior literature (Desai et al. 2006; Dyreng et al. 2016), I use an 
alternative list of tax havens initially developed by Hines and Rice (1994) who classify 
tax havens according to population.  Small ‘dot’ (‘Big 7’) tax havens had populations 
of less than (more than) 1 million in 1982.  The ‘Big 7’ tax havens were deemed to 
                                                          
97 In the primary analysis I retain observations with negative pre-tax income to preserve sample size 
and because accounting losses do not necessarily translate to taxable losses. 
98 Differences in timing of the implementation of Article 89 of CRD IV into national legislation of 
Member States means that not all sample firms produce a CBCR in 2013.  In addition, although required 
by national legislation, some firms do not produce a CBCR highlighting potential non-compliance. 
90 
have workforce’s large enough to provide operational benefits, whereas the primary 
offering of ‘dot’ havens was thought to be tax minimisation.  Given the passage of 
time and worldwide population growth since 1982, I follow similar logic but split the 
tax havens into the ‘Big 12’, defined as jurisdictions with populations exceeding 1.6 
million as at December 2015, and all others ‘dots’.99 
The results from re-estimating Equations (5) and (6) are qualitatively similar to 
those in Tables 2.12 and 2.13, respectively.  When re-estimating Equation (7), the 
coefficient on THAV_TO (∆THAV_TO) corresponding to Panel A of Table 2.15 
increases in magnitude and significance in all four models compared to the results 
using the extended tax haven list.  For example, the estimated coefficient on THAV_TO 
in Model (1) is 4.425 (p-value = 0.000) and on ∆THAV_TO in Model (3) is 3.237 (p-
value = 0.030).  Furthermore, in Models (1) and (2), the coefficient on THAV_EMP is 
negative and significant at the 1% level indicating a disconnect between profits located 
in dot havens and employee numbers, although the coefficient on ∆THAV_EMP is 
insignificant.  The results when re-estimating Equation (8) are qualitatively similar to 
those in Panel B of Table 2.15. 
2.8 Conclusion 
This study examines the effects of mandatory public CBCR on EU banks.  The 
unanticipated introduction of CBCR is plausibly exogenous and provides an ideal 
setting for testing whether the cost-benefit equilibrium of tax avoidance alters for EU 
banks, and whether this induces changes in their tax avoidance behaviour.  Overall, 
across a multitude of empirical tests, I find some evidence that EU banks, increased 
their tax avoidance in the post-CBCR period relative to EU insurers exempt from 
CBCR rules.  Further tests reveal that the intensity of tax haven use as measured by 
the proportion of turnover and profit before tax recognised in tax havens, remains 
unchanged.  However, I find a significant decrease in the number of tax haven entities 
used by listed firms.  Overall, this evidence suggests that despite the increased 
transparency triggered by mandatory public CBCR, the benefits of tax avoidance for 
EU banks continued to outweigh the costs.  Alternatively, it may simply be the case 
                                                          
99 World population increased by 59.8% from 4.60bn in 1982 to 7.35bn in 2015 per UN statistics 
(available at: https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/).  Appendix B identifies 
those tax havens used in the robustness tests. 
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that EU banks are largely compliant with prevailing tax law and CBCR has little 
impact on their tax avoidance behaviour.  An unintended consequence of public CBCR 
is that firms can obtain more detailed information on the tax arrangements of 
competitors which may lead to mimicking and increased tax avoidance overall. 
This study has several limitations.  First, the sample size is relatively small, so the 
empirical tests may lack statistical power to detect some effects and results may not 
be generalizable to larger populations or to firms in other industries.  Second, detailed 
tax return data are private and hence the tax avoidance proxies are constructed based 
on publicly-available financial statement data.  The efficacy of such measures has been 
questioned (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Blouin 2014) but they are used in the absence 
of superior alternatives.  Third, the empirical specifications may suffer the same 
complications as other studies of tax avoidance regarding endogeneity.  However, I 
have attempted to address potential endogeneity and omitted correlated variables by 
employing changes specifications and by exploiting an exogenous shock to the 
financial transparency of EU banks.  Finally, I have attempted to alleviate the 
methodological concern highlighted by Beatty and Liao (2014) regarding studies 
evaluating newly enacted bank regulation by comparing EU banks to a control group 
of EU insurers before and after the change.  This allows me to more cleanly attribute 
any observed changes in tax avoidance behaviour to the new rules. 
Nonetheless, this study informs the ongoing debate regarding mandatory public 
CBCR of tax data especially given EU regulator’s current deliberations concerning 
the extension of these requirements to all EU firms.  Evidently, public CBCR is not a 
panacea to improved transparency possibly because it does not directly inform 
stakeholders whether a firm adopted aggressive tax positions.  Therefore, it will be 
interesting to compare the results of this study to the future influence (if any) of the 
OECD’s more comprehensive CBCR initiative has on corporate tax avoidance.  Future 
research could build on this study by extending the sample period to allow for the fact 
that many complex tax avoidance strategies take time to unwind and therefore changes 
in firm behaviour may only manifest over longer periods. 
 
92 
2.9 Tables and figures 
Figure 2.1: Annual CETR over the sample period 
Panel A (B) plots the annual mean (median) CETR and statutory corporate tax rate over the sample period. 
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Figure 2.2: Annual BETR over the sample period 
Panel A (B) plots the annual mean (median) BETR and statutory corporate tax rate over the sample period. 
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Table 2.1: Sample selection procedure 
This table reports an overview of the sample selection process.  Panel A outlines the sample selection procedure for the main sample of EU banks.  Panel B outlines the sample selection procedure 
for the control sample of EU insurers. 
 
Panel A: EU banks 
Selection criteria Firms 
European Banking Authority (EBA) List of Institutions for Supervisory Reporting as at January 2016 198 
Less: Firms from Norway not subject to CBCR disclosure rules (3) 
Less: Subsidiaries of firms headquartered in other EU countries to avoid double-counting e.g., HSBC appears in France and Malta despite it being 
a UK headquartered firm 
(49) 
Less: Subsidiaries of firms headquartered in non-EU countries for which consolidated IFRS financial statements are not available e.g., Goldman 
Sachs Group UK Limited 
(22) 
Less: Purely domestic firms (only operate in one country) (36) 
Less: Firms for which English language financial statements could not be obtained (14) 
Less: Firms for which no CBCR could be found (4) 
Less: Firms not collected due to small size of total assets (7) 
Less: Firms who commence or ceases business during the sample period (3) 
Add: Firms for which English language consolidated IFRS financial statements and CBCRs were readily found during the data collection process 
i.e., BKS Bank, BTV, CIC, Credit Agricole SA, Credit Suisse International Limited, Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited, UBS Limited, 
Investec Bank, Natixis, Oberbank, Van Lanschot, Wustenrot & Wurttembergische 
12 
Final sample 72 
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Table 2.1: Sample selection procedure (continued) 
This table reports an overview of the sample selection process.  Panel A outlines the sample selection procedure for the main sample of EU banks.  Panel B outlines the sample selection procedure 
for the control sample of EU insurers. 
 
Panel B: EU insurers 
Selection criteria Firms 
  
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) List of Identified Insurance Groups for Supervision as at November 2015 102 
EU insurers downloaded from Datastream for the same 14 countries as the EU bank sample  106 
 208 
Less: Firms included in both lists (27) 
Less: Firms not reporting in all years due to business commencement, acquisition, or merger during the sample period (52) 
Less: Firms from EU countries not included in the primary sample of EU banks e.g., Finland, Poland (6) 
Less: Firms who are subsidiaries of EU banks (23) 
Less: Firms whose financial statements are not prepared in accordance with IFRS accounting standards (23) 
Less: Firms for which English language financial statements could not be obtained (9) 
Less: Firms from non-EU countries e.g., Norway, Switzerland, Bermuda (XL Group switched its domicile from Ireland to Bermuda during the 
sample period) 
(8) 
Less: Purely domestic firms (only operate in one country) (6) 
Less: Firms with missing data to calculate variables (15) 
Final sample 39 
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Table 2.2: Primary sample composition – EU banks 
This table presents an overview of the primary sample.  Panel A lists the firms in alphabetical order (with the 14 
GSIBs listed first).  Total assets are measured as at the end of the 2016 fiscal year (31 December 2016 for all firms 
except Investec Bank and Nationwide Building Society which have 31 March and 4 April year-ends respectively).  
Total assets reported in local currency are converted to Euros using the foreign exchange rate at fiscal year end.  
Panel B presents the sample composition by country.  Panel C presents the split of total assets for the 2016 fiscal 
year by firm type. 
Panel A: Primary sample composition by firm - EU banks 
 Firm Country GSIB Listed Total Assets (€m) 
1 Barclays UK Yes Yes 1,421,746 
2 BBVA  Spain Yes* Yes 731,856 
3 BNP Paribas France Yes Yes 2,076,959 
4 Credit Agricole Group France Yes No 1,722,849 
5 Deutsche Bank Germany Yes Yes 1,590,546 
6 Groupe BPCE France Yes No 1,235,240 
7 HSBC UK Yes Yes 2,257,345 
8 ING Bank Netherlands Yes No 843,919 
9 Nordea Sweden Yes Yes 613,778 
10 Royal Bank of Scotland UK Yes Yes 936,000 
11 Santander Spain Yes Yes 1,339,125 
12 Societe Generale France Yes Yes 1,382,241 
13 Standard Chartered UK Yes Yes 614,659 
14 UniCredit Italy Yes Yes 859,533 
15 ABN AMRO Netherlands No Yes 394,482 
16 Allied Irish Banks Ireland No Yes 95,622 
17 Alpha Bank Greece No Yes 64,872 
18 Argenta Spaarbank Belgium No No 36,156 
19 Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena 
Italy No Yes 153,178 
20 Banco BPI Group Portugal No Yes 38,727 
21 Banco Comercial Portugues 
Group 
Portugal No Yes 71,265 
22 Banco Popolare Group Italy No Yes 117,411 
23 Banco Popolare Espanol Spain No Yes 147,926 
24 Banco Sabadell Spain No Yes 212,508 
25 Bank fur Tirol und Vorarlberg 
(BTV) 
Austria No Yes 10,014 
26 Bank of Cyprus Cyprus No Yes 22,172 
27 Bank of Ireland Ireland No Yes 123,129 
28 Bankia SA Spain No Yes 190,167 
29 Bankinter Spain No Yes 67,182 
30 Bayerische Landesbank Germany No No 212,150 
31 Belfius Bank Belgium No No 176,721 
32 BKS Bank Austria No Yes 7,581 
33 CaixaBank Group Spain No Yes 347,927 
34 Caixa Geral de Depositos Portugal No No 93,547 
*BBVA was classified as a GSIB for all years in the sample period except 2016. 
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Table 2.2: Primary sample composition (continued) 
Panel A: Primary sample composition by firm – EU banks (continued) 
 Firm Country GSIB Listed Total Assets (€m) 
35 CIC France No Yes 269,316 
36 Commerzbank Germany No Yes 480,450 
37 Credit Agricole SA France No Yes 1,524,232 
38 Credit Mutuel Group France No No 793,522 
39 Credit Suisse International UK No No 315,875 
40 Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) UK No No 113,046 
41 Danske Bank Denmark No Yes 468,515 
42 DekaBank Germany No No 85,955 
43 DZ Bank Germany No No 509,447 
44 Erste Group Austria No Yes 208,227 
45 Eurobank Ergasis Greece No Yes 66,393 
46 Gruppo UBI Banca Italy No Yes 112,384 
47 HSH Nordbank Germany No No 84,365 
48 Intesa Sanpaolo Italy No Yes 725,100 
49 Investec Bank UK No No 21,537 
50 Jyske Bank Denmark No Yes 78,905 
51 KBC Bank Belgium No No 239,333 
52 La Banque Postale France No No 229,577 
53 Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg Germany No No 243,620 
54 Landesbank Hessen-Thuringen Germany No No 165,164 
55 Lloyds Banking Group UK No Yes 958,428 
56 National Bank of Greece Greece No Yes 78,531 
57 Nationwide Building Society UK No No 258,567 
58 Natixis France No Yes 527,859 
59 NORD/LB Norddeutsche 
Landesbank 
Germany No No 174,797 
60 Nykredit Realkredit Group Denmark No No 188,366 
61 Oberbank Austria No Yes 19,159 
62 Piraeus Bank Group Greece No Yes 81,501 
63 Rabobank Netherlands No No 662,593 
64 Raiffeisen Bank International Austria No Yes 111,864 
65 Skandinaviska Enkilda Banken 
(SEB) 
Sweden No Yes 273,462 
66 Svenska Handelsbanken Sweden No Yes 274,185 
67 Swedbank Sweden No Yes 224,789 
68 Sydbank Denmark No Yes 19,728 
69 UBS Limited UK No No 47,656 
70 Van Lanschot Netherlands No Yes 14,877 
71 Volkswagen Financial Services Germany No No 130,148 
72 Wustenrot & Wurttembergische Germany No Yes 72,276 
     31,062,283 
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Table 2.2: Primary sample composition (continued) 
Panel B: Primary sample composition by country – EU banks 
Country Firms % GSIBs % Listed % Total 
Assets 
(€m)  
% 
         
Austria 5 6.9% 0 0.0% 5 10.4% 356,844 1.1% 
Belgium 3 4.2% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 452,210 1.5% 
Cyprus 1 1.4% 0 0.0% 1 2.1% 22,172 0.1% 
Denmark 4 5.6% 0 0.0% 3 6.3% 755,514 2.4% 
France 9 12.5% 4 28.6% 5 10.4% 9,761,795 31.4% 
Germany 11 15.3% 1 7.1% 3 6.3% 3,748,917 12.1% 
Greece 4 5.6% 0 0.0% 4 8.3% 291,297 0.9% 
Ireland 2 2.8% 0 0.0% 2 4.2% 218,751 0.7% 
Italy 5 6.9% 1 7.1% 5 10.4% 1,967,606 6.3% 
Netherlands 4 5.6% 1 7.1% 2 4.2% 1,915,871 6.2% 
Portugal  3 4.2% 0 0.0% 2 4.2% 203,540 0.7% 
Spain 7 9.7% 2 14.3% 7 14.6% 3,036,692 9.8% 
Sweden 4 5.6% 1 7.1% 4 8.3% 1,386,214 4.5% 
UK 10 13.9% 4 28.6% 5 10.4% 6,944,859 22.3% 
Total 72 100.0% 14 100.0% 48 100.0% 31,062,283 100.0% 
 
Panel C: Total assets by firm type – EU banks (2016 fiscal year) 
Firm type Mean (€m) Median (€m) Min (€m) Max (€m) 
GSIB 1,258,985 1,287,183 613,778 2,257,345 
Non-GSIB 231,664 150,552 7,581 1,524,232 
Listed 468,294 210,367 7,581 2,257,345 
Unlisted 357,673 200,258 21,537 1,722,849 
All firms 431,421 210,189 7,581 2,257,345 
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Table 2.3: Control sample composition – EU insurers 
This table presents an overview of the control sample.  Panel A lists the firms in alphabetical order.  Total assets 
are measured as at the end of the 2016 fiscal year (31 December 2016 for all firms).  Total assets reported in local 
currency are converted to Euros using the foreign exchange rate at fiscal year end.  Panel B presents the sample 
composition by country.  Panel C presents the split of total assets by firm type. 
Panel A: Control sample composition by firm - EU insurers 
 Firm Country Listed Total Assets (€m) 
1 Achmea Netherlands N 91,015 
2 ACHP UK Y 28 
3 Admiral Group UK Y 4,367 
4 Aegon Netherlands Y 414,640 
5 Ageas Belgium Y 103,459 
6 Allianz Germany Y 864,489 
7 Amlin UK Y 11,615 
8 APRILl France Y 1,420 
9 Assicurazioni Generali Italy Y 513,611 
10 Aviva UK Y 506,784 
11 AXA France Y 876,378 
12 Beazley UK Y 5,622 
13 BUPA UK N 15,833 
14 Cattolica Ass Italy Y 22,987 
15 Chesnara UK Y 6,799 
16 CNP Assurances France Y 395,081 
17 Delta Lloyd Netherlands Y 75,401 
18 Euler Hermes France Y 5,180 
19 Groupama France N 90,484 
20 Grupo Catalana Spain Y 12,921 
21 Hannover Re Germany Y 60,277 
22 Jardine Lloyd Thompson UK Y 2,994 
23 Legal & General UK Y 542,039 
24 MAPFRE Spain Y 63,612 
25 Munich Re Germany Y 256,336 
26 Novae Group UK Y 2,323 
27 Old Mutual UK Y 197,309 
28 Phoenix Group UK Y 96,150 
29 Prudential UK Y 546,352 
30 RSA Insurance Group UK Y 21,819 
31 SCOR France Y 41,248 
32 St James’s Place UK Y 87,595 
33 Standard Life UK Y 216,893 
34 Talanx Germany Y 148,036 
35 Tryg Denmark Y 6,432 
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Table 2.3: Control sample composition – EU insurers (continued) 
Panel A: Control sample composition by firm - EU insurers (continued) 
 Firm Country Listed Total Assets (€m) 
36 Unipol Gruppo Italy Y 89,911 
37 UNIQA Insurance  Austria Y 32,990 
38 Vienna Insurance Austria Y 48,885 
39 Vittoria Assicurazioni Italy Y 3,582 
    6,484,878 
 
Panel B: Control sample composition by country – EU insurers 
Country Firms % Listed % Total 
Assets 
(€m)  
% 
       
Austria 2 5.1% 2 5.6% 81,875 1.3% 
Belgium 1 2.6% 1 2.8% 103,459 1.6% 
Denmark 1 2.6% 1 2.8% 6,432 0.1% 
France 6 15.3% 5 13.8% 1,409,791 21.7% 
Germany 4 10.3% 4 11.1% 1,329,138 20.5% 
Italy 4 10.3% 4 11.1% 630,091 9.7% 
Netherlands 3 7.7% 2 5.6% 583,056 9.0% 
Spain 2 5.1% 2 5.6% 76,533 1.2% 
UK 16 41.0% 
4 
28.6% 
15 41.6% 2,264,502 34.9% 
Total 39 100.0% 36 100.0% 6,484,878 100.0% 
 
Panel C: Total assets by firm type – EU insurers (2016 fiscal year) 
Firm type Mean (€m) Median (€m) Min (€m) Max (€m) 
All firms 166,279 63,612 28 876,378 
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis.  Data for THAV_TO, THAV_PBT, and THAV_ENT is only available for 2013-2016.  All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  Significant differences in the means and medians are based on two-sided t-tests and Wilcoxon median tests, respectively.  ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  All variables are defined in Appendix D. 
 Full sample (111 firms) EU Banks (72 firms) EU Insurers (39 firms) 
 Obs. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median 
CETR 777 0.228 0.235 0.025 0.188 0.315 504 0.202 0.156 273 0.275*** 0.238*** 
BETR 777 0.242 0.229 0.067 0.215 0.313 504 0.222 0.197 273 0.278*** 0.249*** 
THAV_TO 269 0.051 0.079 0.001 0.019 0.071 269 0.051 0.019 - - -*** 
THAV_PBT 228 0.073 0.222 0.000 0.012 0.088 228 0.073 0.012 - - -*** 
THAV_ENT 288 0.175 0.158 0.065 0.142 0.239 288 0.175 0.142 - - -*** 
POST 777 0.429 0.495 0.000 0.000 1.000 504 0.429 0.495 273 0.429*** 0.496*** 
SIZE 777 18.581 1.750 17.612 18.832 19.822 504 19.168 19.175 273 17.497*** 17.767*** 
ROA 777 0.008 0.021 0.002 0.005 0.009 504 0.001 0.003 273 0.020*** 0.010*** 
LEV 777 0.913 0.083 0.910 0.939 0.956 504 0.940 0.945 273 0.863*** 0.909*** 
INTANG 777 0.018 0.039 0.002 0.006 0.017 504 0.006 0.004 273 0.040*** 0.020*** 
CAPINT 777 0.010 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.010 504 0.006 0.005 273 0.017*** 0.006*** 
REVGRTH 777 0.022 0.303 -0.085 -0.013 0.062 504 -0.028 -0.037 273 0.114*** 0.034*** 
∆TLCF 777 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 504 0.000 0.000 273 -0.000*** 0.000*** 
TLCF_DUM 777 0.837 0.370 1.000 1.000 1.000 504 0.851 1.000 273 0.810*** 1.000*** 
TAX_RATE 777 0.278 0.055 0.250 0.285 0.314 504 0.278 0.300 273 0.277*** 0.260*** 
TAX_ENF 777 4.496 1.612 3.380 4.560 5.940 504 4.484 4.530 273 4.519*** 4.830*** 
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Table 2.5: Correlations matrix 
This table presents the correlations between the variables.  Pearson correlation coefficients are shown below the diagonal while Spearman correlation coefficients are shown above the diagonal.  
Significant (p-value < 0.05) coefficients are reported in bold.  All variables are defined in Appendix D. 
Panel A: Tax avoidance and CBCR (n=777) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) CETR  0.632 0.015 0.067 0.316 -0.066 0.174 0.057 0.044 -0.053 -0.035 0.152 -0.018 
(2) BETR 0.615  -0.012 0.059 0.288 -0.051 0.183 0.086 0.081 -0.043 -0.092 0.188 -0.082 
(3) POST -0.023 -0.053  0.005 0.126 -0.157 -0.064 -0.008 -0.071 -0.070 -0.004 -0.104 0.155 
(4) SIZE 0.044 0.053 0.014  -0.332 0.551 -0.178 -0.221 -0.119 -0.049 0.229 0.211 0.010 
(5) ROA 0.145 0.125 0.054 -0.457  -0.514 0.321 0.185 0.329 -0.145 0.005 -0.011 0.098 
(6) LEV -0.076 -0.048 -0.051 0.643 -0.600  -0.500 -0.514 -0.159 -0.019 -0.053 0.092 0.077 
(7) INTANG 0.117 0.108 -0.018 -0.440 0.507 -0.671  0.405 0.214 0.017 0.063 0.070 -0.275 
(8) CAPINT 0.097 0.089 -0.004 -0.297 0.247 -0.461 0.483  0.094 0.036 0.115 0.109 -0.370 
(9) REVGRTH -0.083 0.014 -0.038 -0.086 0.102 -0.033 0.053 0.018  0.044 -0.016 0.045 -0.053 
(10) ∆TLCF -0.109 -0.005 -0.108 
 
-0.000 -0.180 0.025 0.011 0.008 0.008  -0.168 -0.012 -0.114 
(11) TLCF_DUM -0.029 -0.057 -0.004 0.207 0.028 -0.024 0.021 -0.004 -0.071 -0.048  -0.018 0.078 
(12) TAX_RATE 0.151 0.169 -0.094 0.197 0.073 0.011 0.005 -0.003 -0.048 -0.052 -0.040  -0.461 
(13) TAX_ENF -0.060 -0.089 0.140 0.007 0.110 0.059 -0.074 -0.170 0.003 -0.103 0.070 -0.426  
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Table 2.5: Correlations matrix (continued) 
This table presents the correlations between the variables.  Pearson correlation coefficients are shown below the diagonal while Spearman correlation coefficients are shown above the diagonal.  
Significant (p-value < 0.05) coefficients are reported in bold.  All variables are defined in Appendix D. 
Panel B: Tax haven use and CBCR (n=228) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) THAV_TO  0.650 0.581 -0.007 0.427 0.045 0.253 0.167 -0.207 0.126 0.057 0.119 0.096 0.136 
(2) THAV_PBT 0.601  0.297 -0.007 0.430 0.173 0.184 0.180 -0.106 0.081 0.005 0.097 0.156 0.115 
(3) THAV_ENT 0.566 0.258  -0.047 0.025 -0.085 0.074 -0.038 -0.146 0.050 0.055 0.120 -0.008 0.136 
(4) POST -0.018 -0.047 -0.015  -0.065 -0.049 -0.081 -0.098 -0.003 0.145 0.100 -0.058 0.057 -0.038 
(5) SIZE 0.215 0.215 0.001 0.014  -0.097 0.420 0.422 -0.125 0.136 -0.033 0.230 0.149 0.005 
(6) ROA 0.080 0.060 0.017 0.054 -0.457  -0.182 -0.032 -0.115 0.259 -0.086 -0.091 -0.151 0.306 
(7) LEV 0.082 0.077 0.093 -0.051 0.643 -0.600  -0.217 -0.481 0.047 0.084 -0.119 0.319 0.264 
(8) INTANG 0.037 0.013 -0.124 -0.018 -0.440 0.507 -0.671  0.243 0.050 -0.068 0.232 0.047 -0.296 
(9) CAPINT -0.105 -0.116 -0.187 -0.004 -0.297 0.247 -0.461 0.483  -0.099 -0.094 0.204 0.156 -0.574 
(10) REVGRTH 0.025 -0.038 0.051 -0.038 -0.086 0.102 -0.033 0.053 0.018  0.170 -0.028 0.088 0.006 
(11) ∆TLCF 0.021 0.013 0.013 -0.108 -0.000 -0.180 0.025 0.011 0.008 0.008  -0.241 0.109 -0.049 
(12) TLCF_DUM 0.036 0.003 -0.034 -0.004 0.207 0.028 -0.024 0.021 -0.004 -0.071 -0.048  0.071 -0.008 
(13) TAX_RATE 0.030 -0.009 -0.028 -0.094 0.197 0.073 0.011 0.005 -0.003 -0.048 -0.052 -0.040  -0.470 
(14) TAX_ENF 0.102 0.094 0.090 0.140 0.007 0.110 0.059 -0.074 -0.170 0.003 -0.103 0.070 -0.426  
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Table 2.6: Tax haven activities disclosed in CBCRs 
This table reports the location of the key CBCR disclosure items.  Panel A reports the results for entities and Panel B reports the results for turnover, profit before tax, and employees. 
Panel A: Location of disclosed entities 
Year Obs. Countries 
total 
(1) 
Countries 
mean 
(2) 
Change 
2013 - 2016 
(3) 
Entities 
total 
(4) 
Entities 
mean 
(5) 
 
Change 
2013 - 2016 
(6) 
Tax haven 
entities 
(7) 
Tax haven 
entities mean 
(8) 
Change 
2013 - 2016 
(9) 
Tax haven 
entities (%) 
(10) 
            
2013 72 1,460 20.3  17,218 239.1  3,174 44.1  18.4% 
2014 72 1,461 20.3  16,867 234.3  3,077 42.7  18.2% 
2015 72 1,421 19.7  15,790 219.3  2,829 39.3  17.9% 
2016 72 1,389 20.7 2.2% 14,795 205.5 -14.1% 2,465 34.2 -22.3% 16.7% 
 288 5,731 19.9  64,670 224.5  11,545 40.1  17.9% 
            
Panel B: Location of disclosed turnover, profit before tax, and employees 
 Turnover Profit before tax (PBT) Employees 
Year Obs. Turnover 
(€m) 
(1) 
Tax haven 
turnover (€m) 
(2) 
Tax haven 
%  
(3) 
Obs. PBT  
(€m) 
(4) 
Tax haven 
PBT (€m) 
(5) 
Tax haven 
% 
(6) 
Obs. Employees 
 
(7) 
 
Tax haven 
employees 
(8) 
Tax haven 
% 
(9) 
             
2013 53 611,395 48,633 8.0% 14 18,618 -334 -1.8% 53 2,665,462 119,296 4.5% 
2014 72 656,449 48,810 7.4% 70 104,332 20,202 19.4% 72 2,842,961 129,607 4.6% 
2015 72 697,759 55,604 8.0% 72 122,156 23,894 19.6% 72 2,843,912 129,161 4.5% 
2016 72 664,509 52,704 7.9% 72 104,504 20,845 19.9% 72 2,739,855 126,473 4.6% 
 269 2,630,112 205,752 7.8% 228 349,611 64,608 18.5% 269 11,092,190 504,537 4.5% 
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Table 2.7: Corporate tax avoidance and the implementation of CBCR (Univariate results) 
This table reports the means and the difference in means for key tax avoidance related variables pre- and post the implementation of CBCR requirements.  The post period is defined as the years 
after the new requirements were implemented (2014-2016).  Panel A reports the results for all firms, Panel B (Panel C) for EU banks (EU insurers), and Panel D (Panel E) for listed EU banks 
(unlisted EU banks).  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-sided t-tests.  All variables are defined in Appendix D.  
 
Panel A: All sample firms Panel B: EU Banks Panel C: EU Insurers 
Variable Mean 
(Pre) 
Mean 
(Post) 
Difference p-value Mean 
(Pre) 
Mean 
(Post) 
Difference p-value Mean 
(Pre) 
Mean 
(Post) 
Difference p-value 
 n=444 n=333   n=288 n=216   n=156  n=117   
CETR 0.232 0.221 -0.011*** 0.524 0.213 0.187 -0.026*** 0.208 0.267 0.285 0.018*** 0.532 
BETR 0.252 0.228 -0.024*** 0.141 0.243 0.194 -0.049*** 0.016 0.269 0.291 0.022*** 0.434 
TAX_RATE 0.282 0.272 -0.010*** 0.009 0.281 0.275 -0.006*** 0.281 0.285 0.265 -0.020*** 0.003 
TAX_ENF 4.301 4.756 0.455*** 0.000 4.298 4.732 0.434*** 0.004 4.307 4.801 0.493*** 0.006 
              
 
Panel D: Listed EU Banks Panel E: Unlisted EU Banks 
Variable Mean 
(Pre) 
Mean 
(Post) 
Difference p-value Mean 
(Pre) 
Mean 
(Post) 
Difference p-value 
 n=192  n=144   n=96 n=72   
CETR 0.192 0.186 -0.006* 0.823 0.255 0.188 -0.067*** 0.056 
BETR 0.238 0.195 -0.043* 0.103 0.253 0.191 -0.062*** 0.050 
TAX_RATE 0.271 0.268 -0.003* 0.598 0.300 0.290 -0.010*** 0.209 
TAX_ENF 4.090 4.432 0.342* 0.082 4.715 5.331 0.616*** 0.002 
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Table 2.8: Corporate tax avoidance and CBCR (EU banks) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (1) from 2010 to 2016 via OLS.  The dependent variable is 
CETR or BETR.  All variables are defined in Appendix D.  Coefficient estimates are presented with the p-values 
reported in parentheses.  p-values are computed based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
Dep. Var. CETR BETR 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
POST -0.044** -0.039* -0.044** -0.050** 
 (0.027) (0.089) (0.028) (0.019) 
SIZE 0.028*** 0.026** 0.017* 0.016 
 (0.006) (0.043) (0.085) (0.166) 
ROA 2.745*** 2.595* 4.296*** 4.314*** 
 (0.005) (0.054) (0.000) (0.001) 
LEV -0.183 -0.423 0.401 0.233 
 (0.739) (0.502) (0.412) (0.683) 
INTANG 2.347 4.204 6.846*** 6.848** 
 (0.347) (0.106) (0.004) (0.010) 
CAPINT 4.048 4.728 5.010** 3.862 
 (0.122) (0.153) (0.049) (0.230) 
REVGRTH -0.024 -0.048 -0.012 -0.036 
 (0.752) (0.515) (0.852) (0.547) 
∆TLCF -17.139** -15.811* 15.109 15.606 
 (0.027) (0.078) (0.155) (0.121) 
TLCF_DUM -0.030 -0.044 -0.055** -0.051* 
 (0.291) (0.118) (0.026) (0.060) 
TAX_RATE 0.483** -0.006 0.498** -0.619 
 (0.020) (0.993) (0.015) (0.267) 
TAX_ENF 0.017* -0.002 0.017* 0.011 
 (0.066) (0.912) (0.064) (0.386) 
Intercept -0.363 0.013 -0.706* -0.379 
 (0.419) (0.981) (0.079) (0.481) 
     
Country fixed effects N Y N Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 504 504 504 504 
Adj. R2 0.086 0.108 0.116 0.134 
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Table 2.9: Corporate tax avoidance and CBCR (EU banks vs. EU insurers) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (2) from 2010 to 2016 via OLS.  The dependent variable is 
CETR or BETR.  All variables are defined in Appendix D.  Coefficient estimates are presented with the p-values 
reported in parentheses.  p-values are computed based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
Dep. Var. CETR BETR 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
EU_BANK -0.066** -0.060** -0.026 -0.023 
 (0.013) (0.044) (0.317) (0.410) 
EU_BANK*POST -0.048 -0.041 -0.074** -0.062* 
 (0.145) (0.258) (0.026) (0.056) 
SIZE 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) 
ROA 1.296*** 1.057** 1.449*** 1.091** 
 (0.004) (0.044) (0.002) (0.032) 
LEV -0.034 -0.014 0.065 0.048 
 (0.832) (0.935) (0.691) (0.770) 
INTANG 0.282 0.280 0.363* 0.364* 
 (0.173) (0.200) (0.082) (0.097) 
CAPINT 0.647* 0.589* 0.608* 0.429 
 (0.053) (0.089) (0.077) (0.264) 
REVGRTH -0.096*** -0.099*** -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.691) (0.675) 
∆TLCF -14.842** -13.794** 2.595 3.396 
 (0.021) (0.037) (0.748) (0.661) 
TLCF_DUM -0.049** -0.038 -0.056** -0.038 
 (0.035) (0.120) (0.010) (0.106) 
TAX_RATE 0.354** -0.163 0.429** -0.308 
 (0.032) (0.759) (0.010) (0.510) 
TAX_ENF -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 0.000 
 (0.747) (0.753) (0.360) (0.990) 
Intercept -0.276* -0.200 -0.327** -0.228 
 (0.058) (0.270) (0.020) (0.190) 
     
     
Country fixed effects N Y N Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 777 777 777 777 
Adj. R2 0.085 0.093 0.070 0.084 
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Table 2.10: Corporate tax avoidance and CBCR (Firm fixed effects) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equations (1) and (2) from 2010 to 2016 via OLS.  The dependent 
variable is CETR or BETR.  Panel A (Panel B) reports the results from estimating Equation (1) (Equation (2)).  All 
variables are defined in Appendix D.  Coefficient estimates are presented with the p-values reported in parentheses.  
p-values are computed based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Panel A: Equation (1) – EU Banks 
Dep. Var. CETR BETR 
Variables (1) (2) 
   
POST -0.032 -0.036 
 (0.186) (0.138) 
Intercept -2.110 -2.185 
 (0.121) (0.180) 
Controls Y Y 
Firm fixed effects Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y 
Observations 504 504 
Adj. R2 0.166 0.184 
      
 
Panel B: Equation (2) – EU Banks vs. EU Insurers 
Dep. Var. CETR BETR 
Variables (1) (2) 
   
EU_BANK*POST -0.032 -0.045 
 (0.346) (0.218) 
Intercept -0.932 -1.616 
 (0.446) (0.214) 
Controls Y Y 
Firm fixed effects Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y 
Observations 777 777 
Adj. R2 0.218 0.188 
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Table 2.11: Changes in corporate tax avoidance and CBCR 
This table reports the results from estimating Equations (3) and (4) from 2010 to 2016 via OLS.  The dependent 
variable is ∆CETR or ∆BETR.  Panel A (Panel B) reports the results from estimating Equation (3) (Equation (4)).  
All variables are defined in Appendix D.  Coefficient estimates are presented with the p-values reported in 
parentheses.  p-values are computed based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Panel A: Equation (3) – EU Banks 
Dep. Var. ∆CETR ∆BETR 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
POST -0.010 -0.009 -0.014 -0.012 
 (0.724) (0.753) (0.613) (0.650) 
Intercept 0.012 -0.019 0.008 0.042 
 (0.531) (0.734) (0.679) (0.554) 
∆Controls Y Y Y Y 
Country fixed effects N Y N Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 503 503 503 503 
Adj. R2 0.026 0.004 0.043 0.021 
      
Panel B: Equation (4) – EU Banks vs. EU Insurers 
Dep. Var. ∆CETR ∆BETR 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU_BANK -0.022 -0.020 0.007 0.007 
 (0.483) (0.565) (0.812) (0.833) 
EU_BANK*POST 0.012 0.012 -0.034 -0.033 
 (0.786) (0.782) (0.414) (0.423) 
Intercept 0.075* 0.028 -0.007 0.003 
 (0.099) (0.673) (0.881) (0.968) 
∆Controls Y Y Y Y 
Country fixed effects N Y N Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 775 775 775 775 
Adj. R2 0.045 0.032 0.015 0.002 
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Table 2.12: Tax haven use after the implementation of CBCR 
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (5) from 2013 to 2016 via OLS.  All variables are defined in Appendix D.  Panel A (Panel B) reports the results for all EU banks (EU banks 
that use tax havens).  Coefficient estimates are presented with the p-values reported in parentheses.  p-values are computed based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Panel A: All EU banks 
Dep. Var.  THAV_TO THAV_PBT THAV_ENT 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
POST_2014 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.030 -0.033 -0.023 -0.009 -0.009 -0.012 
 (0.909) (0.821) (0.916) (0.322) (0.301) (0.436) (0.624) (0.501) (0.345) 
Intercept 0.051*** 0.000 0.098 0.093*** 0.015 -0.765 0.180*** 0.019** 0.418 
 (0.000) (0.997) (0.590) (0.001) (0.572) (0.248) (0.000) (0.019) (0.210) 
Controls N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Country fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 269 269 269 228 228 228 288 288 288 
Adj. R2 0.000 0.197 0.207 0.000 0.039 0.048 0.000 0.426 0.419 
          
Panel B: EU banks using tax havens (THAV≠ 0) 
Dep. Var. THAV_TO THAV_PBT THAV_ENT 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
POST_2014 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.037 -0.035 -0.022 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012 
 (0.963) (0.843) (0.713) (0.342) (0.404) (0.605) (0.614) (0.497) (0.367) 
Intercept 0.063*** -0.000 -0.011 0.116*** 0.017 -0.988 0.190*** 0.019** 0.493 
 (0.000) (0.987) (0.962) (0.000) (0.624) (0.282) (0.000) (0.031) (0.159) 
Controls N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Country fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 216 216 216 180 180 180 272 272 272 
Adj. R2 0.000 0.120 0.122 0.000 0.008 0.022 0.000 0.404 0.398 
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Table 2.13: Tax haven use after the implementation of CBCR 
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (6) from 2013 to 2016 via OLS.  All variables are defined in Appendix D.  Coefficient estimates are presented with the p-values reported in 
parentheses.  p-values are computed based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
Dep. Var.  THAV_TO THAV_PBT THAV_ENT 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
YEAR_2014 0.005 0.005 -0.005 -0.027 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.718) (0.788) (0.954) (0.834) (0.887) (0.883) 
YEAR_2015 0.005 0.006 -0.047 -0.079 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.707) (0.744) (0.602) (0.559) (0.754) (0.776) 
YEAR_2016 0.004 0.009 -0.004 -0.012 -0.021 -0.022 
 (0.767) (0.635) (0.964) (0.929) (0.328) (0.315) 
Intercept 0.079 -0.033 -0.834 -0.969 0.451 0.529 
 (0.691) (0.901) (0.229) (0.319) (0.188) (0.146) 
       
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Conditional on tax haven use N Y N Y N Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 269 216 228 180 288 272 
Adj. R2 0.201 0.113 0.045 0.021 0.415 0.395 
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Table 2.14: Corporate tax avoidance and CBCR (Listed vs. unlisted EU banks) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (1) from 2013 to 2016 via OLS.  All variables are defined in Appendix D.  Panel A (Panel B) reports the results when CETR (BETR) is the 
dependent variable.  Coefficient estimates are presented with the p-values reported in parentheses.  p-values are computed based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Panel A: CETR 
Variables  Listed EU banks Unlisted EU banks 
POST -0.034 -0.029 -0.028 -0.079** -0.058 -0.042 
 (0.179) (0.289) (0.395) (0.028) (0.124) (0.395) 
Intercept -0.518 -0.143 -2.965 -0.731 -0.262 -0.847 
 (0.282) (0.830) (0.144) (0.486) (0.822) (0.778) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country fixed effects N Y N N Y N 
Firm fixed effects N N Y N N Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 336 336 336 168 168 168 
Adj. R2 0.104 0.095 0.162 0.085 0.134 0.168 
         
 
Panel B: BETR 
Variables  Listed EU banks Unlisted EU banks 
POST -0.034 -0.044 -0.032 -0.085*** -0.068** -0.076* 
 (0.194) (0.122) (0.317) (0.004) (0.032) (0.077) 
Intercept -1.121*** -0.875 -2.989 0.574 1.124 1.217 
 (0.007) (0.130) (0.218) (0.585) (0.253) (0.530) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country fixed effects N Y N N Y N 
Firm fixed effects N N Y N N Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 336 336 336 168 168 168 
Adj. R2 0.124 0.128 0.198 0.160 0.211 0.210 
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Table 2.15: Additional analysis 
Panel A and Panel B report the results from estimating Equations (7) and (8) from 2013 to 2016 via OLS, 
respectively.  In Panel A, the dependent variable is THAV_PBT or ∆THAV_PBT.  In Panel B, the dependent 
variable is NUM_TH_ENTS or ∆NUM_TH_ENTS.  All variables are defined in Appendix D.  Coefficient 
estimates are presented with the p-values reported in parentheses.  p-values are computed based on bootstrapped 
standard errors.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using 
two-tailed tests. 
Panel A: Disconnect between the location of tax haven profits and real operations 
Dep. Var THAV_PBT ∆THAV_PBT 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
THAV_TO / ∆THAV_TO 1.779*** 1.736*** 2.192 2.466 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.149) (0.134) 
THAV_EMP / ∆THAV_EMP -0.343 -0.294 4.003 3.523 
 (0.359) (0.488) (0.294) (0.378) 
Intercept -0.888 -1.204 0.014 0.046 
 (0.142) (0.177) (0.941) (0.886) 
Controls / ∆Controls Y Y Y Y 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Conditional on tax haven use N Y N Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 227 170 155 115 
Adj. R2 0.348 0.314 0.000 0.000 
     
 
Panel B: Changes in tax haven entities 
Dep. Var. NUM_TH_ENTS ∆NUM_TH_ENTS 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
NUM_ENTS / ∆NUM_ENTS 0.176*** 0.172*** 0.181*** 0.182*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept -14.884 -70.308 -10.797* -10.884 
 (0.853) (0.397) (0.092) (0.104) 
Controls / ∆Controls Y Y Y Y 
Country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Conditional on tax haven use N Y N Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 288 272 216 204 
Adj. R2 0.787 0.785 0.509 0.506 
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Table 2.16: Abnormal returns around adoption of CRD IV 
 
Panel A: Market-adjusted mean abnormal returns (AR) (daily) 
Panel A presents t-tests on whether daily ARs are different from 0.  AR is calculated per Equation (9).  Event day 
‘0’ represents the day of public disclosure of the event.  N is the number of observations.  ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
   Local Index EU Index 
Event Event 
day 
N AR p-
value 
# neg 
AR 
% neg 
AR 
AR p-
value 
# neg 
AR 
% neg 
AR 
1 -1 49  0.23% 0.650 24 49.0%  0.45% 0.368 22 44.9% 
1  0 49  0.10% 0.761 24 49.0% -0.05% 0.879 28 57.1% 
1  1 49 -0.48% 0.168 34 69.4% -0.70%** 0.052 31 63.3% 
1  2 49 -0.97%*** 0.003 33 67.3% -1.04%*** 0.007 26 53.1% 
1  3 49 -0.50%* 0.099 27 55.1% -0.61%* 0.074 27 55.1% 
2 -1 49 -0.18% 0.779 18 38.8% -0.33% 0.629 25 51.0% 
2  0 49 -1.47%** 0.019 38 77.6% -1.46%** 0.026 33 67.3% 
2  1 49 -0.22% 0.390 25 51.0% -0.09% 0.776 27 55.1% 
2  2 49 -0.39% 0.203 27 57.1% -0.29% 0.374 28 57.1% 
2  3 49 -0.05% 0.916 29 59.2% -0.26% 0.621 27 55.1% 
           
Panel B: Significance tests on market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
Panel B presents t-tests of CARs being different from 0.  CAR is calculated per Equation (10).  Event window 
represents the days around the day of public disclosure of the event.  N is the number of observations.  ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
   Local Index EU Index 
Event Event window N CAR p-value CAR p-value 
1 -1 to 1 49 -0.15% 0.809 -0.31% 0.620 
1 -1 to 2 49   -1.12%* 0.072     1.35%** 0.043 
1 -1 to 3 49       -1.62%*** 0.009     -1.95%*** 0.004 
1  0 to 1 49 -0.38% 0.319 -0.76%* 0.062 
1  0 to 2 49       -1.35%*** 0.003     -1.79%*** 0.002 
1  0 to 3 49       -1.84%*** 0.000     -2.40%*** 0.001 
2 -1 to 1 49    -1.87%** 0.036   -1.89%** 0.038 
2 -1 to 2 49     -2.27%** 0.024   -2.18%** 0.035 
2 -1 to 3 49      -2.32%** 0.049 -2.44%* 0.057 
2  0 to 1 49      -1.69%*** 0.005     -1.56%*** 0.009 
2  0 to 2 49      -2.09%*** 0.005    -1.84%** 0.010 
2  0 to 3 49    -2.14%** 0.031   -2.10%** 0.038 
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Table 2.16: Abnormal returns around adoption of CRD IV (continued) 
 
Panel C: Combined market-adjusted mean abnormal returns (AR) (daily) 
Panel C presents t-tests on whether combined daily ARs are different from 0.  AR is calculated per Equation (9).  
Event day ‘0’ represents the day of public disclosure of the event.  N is the number of observations.  ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
   Local Index EU Index 
Event Event 
day 
N AR p-
value 
# neg 
AR 
% neg 
AR 
AR p-
value 
# neg 
AR 
% neg 
AR 
1 & 2 -1 98  0.02% 0.951 42 42.9%  0.06% 0.892 47 48.0% 
1 & 2  0 98 -0.68%* 0.055 62 63.3% -0.76%** 0.041 61 62.2% 
1 & 2  1 98 -0.35% 0.103 59 60.2% -0.40% 0.103 58 59.2% 
1 & 2  2 98 -0.68%*** 0.002 60 61.2% -0.66%*** 0.008 54 55.1% 
1 & 2  3 98 -0.27% 0.330 56 57.1% -0.43% 0.161 54 55.1% 
           
Panel D: Significance tests on combined market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) 
Panel D presents t-tests of combined CARs being different from 0.  CAR is calculated per Equation (10).  Event 
window represents the days around the day of public disclosure of the event.  N is the number of observations.  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
   Local Index EU Index 
Event Event window N CAR p-value CAR p-value 
1 & 2 -1 to 1 98 -1.01%* 0.064   -1.10%** 0.045 
1 & 2 -1 to 2 98     -1.69%*** 0.004     -1.76%*** 0.004 
1 & 2 -1 to 3 98      -1.97%*** 0.003     -2.19%*** 0.002 
1 & 2  0 to 1 98      -1.04%*** 0.004     -1.16%*** 0.001 
1 & 2  0 to 2 98      -1.72%*** 0.000     -1.82%*** 0.000 
1 & 2  0 to 3 98    -1.99%** 0.000     -2.25%*** 0.000 
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Table 2.17: Abnormal returns around press articles on CBCR 
Panel A: Market-adjusted mean abnormal returns (AR) (daily) 
Panel A presents t-tests on whether daily ARs are different from 0.  AR is calculated per Equation (9).  Event day 
‘0’ represents the day of public disclosure of the event.  N is the number of observations.  ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
  Local Index EU Index 
Event 
day 
N AR p-value # neg 
AR 
% neg 
AR 
AR p-value # neg 
AR 
% neg 
AR 
          
-1 22 -0.17% 0.442 15 68.2% -0.22% 0.912 13 59.1% 
 0 22 -0.39%** 0.046 13 59.1% -0.40%** 0.047 12 54.5% 
 1 22  0.75%** 0.018 6 27.3%  0.78%** 0.022 6 27.3% 
 2 22 -0.26% 0.211 15 68.2% -0.31% 0.173 15 68.2% 
           
Panel B: Significance tests on market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
Panel B presents t-tests of CARs being different from 0.  CAR is calculated per Equation (10).  Event window 
represents the days around the day of public disclosure of the event.  N is the number of observations.  ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
  Local Index EU Index 
Event window N CAR p-value CAR p-value 
      
-1 to 1 22 0.18% 0.686 0.35% 0.475 
-1 to 2 22 -0.07% 0.859 0.04% 0.922 
 0 to 1 22 0.36% 0.348 0.38% 0.390 
 0 to 2 22 0.10%  0.777 0.07% 0.866 
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2.10 Appendix A: Example CBCR 
The CBCR presented below is taken from the 2016 Annual Report of Groupe BPCE. 
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2.11 Appendix B: List of tax havens 
This Appendix lists the tax havens per Dyreng et al. (2015).  † denotes jurisdictions considered ‘dot’ tax havens in 
robustness tests.  The ‘Big 12’ jurisdictions (populations > 1.6m) not considered to be tax havens in the robustness 
tests are: Botswana, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Ireland, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Netherlands, Panama, Singapore, 
Switzerland and Uruguay. 
 Jurisdiction  Jurisdiction  Jurisdiction 
1. Andorra † 19. Gibraltar † 37. Montserrat † 
2. Anguilla † 20. Grenada † 38. Nauru † 
3. Antigua and Barbuda † 21. Guernsey † 39. Netherlands 
4. Aruba † 22. Hong Kong 40. Netherlands Antilles † 
5. Bahamas † 23. Ireland 41. Niue † 
6. Bahrain † 24. Isle of Man † 42. Palau † 
7. Barbados† 25. Jersey † 43. Panama 
8. Belize † 26. Latvia 44. Samoa † 
9. Bermuda † 27. Lebanon 45. San Marino † 
10. Botswana 28. Liberia 46. Seychelles † 
11. British Virgin Islands † 29. Liechtenstein † 47. Singapore 
12. Brunei † 30. Luxembourg† 48. St. Kitts and Nevis † 
13. Cape Verde † 31. Macao † 49. St. Lucia † 
14. Cayman Islands † 32. Maldives † 50. St. Vincent and Grenadines † 
15. Cooks Islands † 33. Malta † 51. Switzerland 
16. Costa Rica 34. Marshall Islands † 52. U.S. Virgin Islands † 
17. Cyrus † 35. Mauritius † 53. Uruguay 
18. Dominica † 36. Monaco † 54. Vanuatu † 
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2.12 Appendix C: Chronology of events surrounding the adoption of CRD IV 
This Appendix outlines the chronology of events surrounding the implementation of the CRD IV requirements for CBCR.  Events 1 and 2 are the events used 
in the market returns analysis in Section 2.6.5. 
Event Date Details 
 2009 EU Commission begins work on the CRD IV package to implement Basel III into EU law 
 December 2010 Basel III agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.  The Committee issues detailed rules of 
new global regulatory standards on bank capital adequacy and liquidity (known collectively as Basel III). 
Event 1 28 February 2013 Political agreement between the European Parliament and European Council for the inclusion of CBCR into CRD IV 
 20 June 2013 CRD IV agreed by the European Council 
 26 June 2013 Directive 2013/36/EU finalised 
Event 2 27 June 2013 Directive 2013/36/EU published in the Official Journal of the European Union 
 16 July 2013 European Commission Daily News Press Release - Memo/13/690 notifies that CRD IV enters into force on 17 July 2013 
 17 July 2013 CRD IV enters into force 
 31 December 2013 Deadline for Member States to transpose CRD IV into domestic law 
 1 January 2014 New CBCR requirements apply in part 
 1 January 2015 New CBCR requirements apply in full 
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2.13 Appendix D: Variable definitions 
Variable name Mnemonic Definition 
   
Cash effective tax 
rate 
CETR Income tax paid from the cash flow statement in year t 
divided by pre-tax income in year t 
 
Book effective tax 
rate (current) 
BETR Current income tax expense in year t divided by pre-tax 
income in year t 
 
Total tax avoidance TAX_AVOID Income tax paid from the cash flow statement in year t 
divided by total assets in year t-1 
   
Tax haven turnover THAV_TO Ratio of turnover disclosed in tax havens to total 
turnover 
 
Tax haven profits THAV_PBT Ratio of profit before tax disclosed in tax havens to 
total profit before tax 
 
Tax haven entities THAV_ENT Ratio of entities (subsidiaries and branches) located in 
tax havens to total number of entities 
 
Tax haven 
employees 
THAV_EMP Ratio of employees disclosed in tax havens to total 
employees 
 
Number of entities 
disclosed 
NUM_ENTS Total number of entities (subsidiaries and branches) 
disclosed by the firm 
 
Number of tax 
haven entities 
NUM_TH_ENTS Total number of tax haven entities (subsidiaries and 
branches) disclosed by the firm 
 
Treatment and 
control firms 
EU_BANK Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is an 
EU bank, and 0 if an EU insurer 
   
Period after 
implementation of 
CBCR requirements 
POST Dummy variable for the period after the 
implementation of CBCR requirements; equals 1 for 
fiscal years after 2013, and 0 otherwise 
 
Period after 
implementation of 
CBCR requirements 
(Robustness tests) 
POST_2012 Dummy variable; equals 1 for fiscal years after 2012, 
and 0 otherwise 
 
   
Period after full 
implementation of 
CBCR requirements 
POST_2014 
 
Dummy variable for the period after the full 
implementation of CBCR requirements; equals 1 for 
fiscal years after 2014, and 0 otherwise 
   
Firm size SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets after conversion 
to Euros 
 
Profitability ROA Pre-tax income scaled by total assets 
 
Leverage LEV Total liabilities scaled by total assets 
 
Intangible assets INTANG Net intangible assets scaled by total assets 
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Variable name Mnemonic Definition 
   
Capital intensity CAPINT Net property, plant and equipment scaled by total 
assets 
   
Revenue growth REV_GRTH Change in total revenues from year t-1 to year t 
scaled by total revenues in year t-1 
 
   
Change in tax 
losses carried 
forward 
∆TLCF Change in the tax loss carried forward from year t-
1 to year t scaled by total assets 
 
   
Tax losses carried 
forward 
TLCF_DUM Dummy variable for tax losses carried forward; 
equals 1 if the tax loss carried forward is positive 
as at the beginning of the year, and 0 otherwise 
 
Tax rate TAX_RATE Statutory corporate tax rate prevailing in year t for 
the firm’s residence country (includes central 
government corporate income tax rate and the 
average effects of sub-central government income 
tax rates) 
 
Tax enforcement TAX_ENF Annual tax evasion scores on a scale from 0 to 10 
with higher scores indicating lower tax evasion 
(higher perceived enforcement) 
 
Abnormal return AR Return minus market return 
 
Cumulative 
abnormal return 
 
CAR Summation of AR over the event period 
Return Return Share price (cum div), P, of firm i at time t minus 
the share price of firm i at time t-1 as follows: 
 
Returni,j,t  =  [
𝑃𝑖,𝑡− 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
] 
 
Where j is the country of primary listing 
 
Market return Market return Value of the major equity index (including 
dividends), X, of country j, in which firm i is listed 
at time t minus the value of X at time t-1 as 
follows: 
 
Market Return  =  [
𝑋𝑖,𝑡− 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
] 
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Chapter 3 
The interplay between mandatory public 
country-by-country tax disclosures, geographic 
segment reporting, and tax havens: Evidence 
from the European Union 
 
3.1 Introduction 
We exploit an exogenous shock effective in 2013 where a new requirement 
included in the EU Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV), requires EU credit 
institutions and investment firms to annually publish tax-related financial information 
on a country-by-country basis.1  Country-by-country reporting (CBCR) stipulates the 
public disclosure of turnover, profits, taxes, employee numbers, and subsidiaries and 
branches (entities), for each country in which the firm operates.2  We utilise this newly 
available country-level information to document the location of EU financial firms’ 
operations and more pertinently, the extent to which they operate in tax havens.  Then, 
we investigate whether they adjust their geographic segment disclosures when 
compelled to provide new tax-related information on a disaggregated geographic 
basis.  An attractive feature of this setting is that CBCR provides enhanced visibility 
of tax haven involvement.  We also examine the relationship between tax haven 
activities and geographic segment disclosure aggregation.  Moreover, by focusing on 
two separate but related geographic disclosures within the same period, we gain a 
better understanding of managers’ overall disclosure strategy (Beyer et al. 2010). 
In recent years, multinational corporations (MNCs) have been accused of 
aggressive tax avoidance and not paying their ‘fair share’ of taxes.3  Tax avoidance 
                                                          
1 The Directive applies to EU headquartered credit institutions and investment firms and subsidiaries 
established inside the EU of credit institutions and investment firms that are headquartered outside the 
EU.  For brevity, we use the terms ‘EU banks’ or ‘EU financial firms’ to describe these firms. 
2 CBCR is expected to lead to firms paying corporate taxes that better reflect their economic presence 
in each country (Murphy 2016). 
3 We follow Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and broadly define tax avoidance as all activities undertaken 
by a firm that reduces its explicit cash taxes. 
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brings tax system integrity into question and adds strain to national budgets.4  Since 
many financial MNCs received large taxpayer-funded government subsidies during 
the financial crisis, they have been subject to added criticism from international media, 
civil society campaigners, and supranational bodies including the G20 and OECD.5  
There are two primary concerns.  The first is the use of tax havens, and the second is 
the potential misalignment between the economic substance of transactions and the 
country in which they are reported for tax purposes.6  In a report for Oxfam and Fair 
Finance Guide International, Aubry and Dauphin (2017) find that in 2015, the EU’s 
20 biggest banks recognised over a quarter of their profits in tax havens, well out of 
proportion to underlying real economic activity based on turnover and employees. 
In response to growing public and political condemnation, global initiatives have 
been introduced to combat aggressive tax avoidance including the OECD’s wide-
ranging Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) reforms (OECD 2015).  These 
reforms provide countries with better tools to increase the likelihood that profits are 
taxed where the economic activities generating those profits take place and where 
value is created.  However, prior to the final BEPS package, the European Commission 
(EC) introduced the CBCR requirements for EU banks in 2013.  CBCR was a late and 
unanticipated inclusion within the broad CRD IV adopted by the EU to implement the 
Basel III banking reforms.  The stated objective of CBCR is to restore public trust in 
the financial services sector in the wake of the financial crisis.  In this study, we are 
interested in financial firms’ geographic segment disclosures in the presence of 
contemporaneous CBCR disclosures.  In addition to addressing tax avoidance 
concerns, understanding geographic disclosures is increasingly important as foreign 
operations represent a growing proportion of many MNC’s businesses. 
                                                          
4 Corporate income tax revenue for the 28 EU Member States averaged 2.5% of GDP in 2013 (Eurostat 
2015).  According to a study prepared for the European Parliament, the EU loses €50-70 billion in 
revenues each year due to corporate tax avoidance (Dover et al. 2015). 
5 In the UK, banks have been criticised for not paying an equitable amount of tax since the financial 
crisis.  Losses incurred during the financial crisis generated large tax credits which banks have been 
able to offset against profits recognised in recent years (Bowers 2015). 
6 Prior literature lacks a clear definition of what constitutes a tax haven and no universally agreed upon 
list of tax havens exists (Hines and Rice 1994; Dharmapala and Hines 2009).  However, the OECD 
(1998) defined the features of tax havens as low or no taxes, lack of effective information exchange and 
transparency, and no requirement for substantial real operating activity.  Section 3.3.3 discusses our 
delineation of tax havens for the purposes of this study.  Some tax havens are not countries (e.g., Isle 
of Man is a British Crown Dependency).  However, the terms ‘country’ and ‘jurisdiction’ are used 
interchangeably throughout this chapter. 
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CBCR disclosure requirements surpass the financial reporting requirements of the 
relevant accounting standards.7  EU Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU requires EU 
public interest entities (listed companies, banks, and insurers) to report their 
consolidated financial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS).  The disclosure of current and future tax payments and tax-related 
assets and liabilities is mandated by International Accounting Standard 12 Income 
Taxes.  However, the requirements of IFRS 8 Operating Segments, means this 
information is usually only available at the consolidated level, not at the country level.  
IFRS 8 mandates the ‘management approach’ thereby allowing managers discretion 
in determining the basis for defining operating segments and what information is 
disclosed in segment reports.  Operating segments may be based on product or service 
lines, geography, legal entity, customer type, or any combination of these, provided it 
is consistent with the firm’s internal operating structure.  In contrast, CBCR 
necessitates country-level disclosure of tax-related financial information irrespective 
of the geographic disclosures provided under IFRS 8. 
Managers have discretion when disclosing geographic segments because IFRS 8 
requires firms to report segment information consistent with their internal reporting 
structure.  Prior studies demonstrate that managers have incentives to report fewer 
segments to minimise agency and proprietary costs (Berger and Hann 2003, 2007; 
Botosan and Stanford 2005).  However, the adoption of IFRS 8 has led to an increase 
in the average number of segments reported, but a decrease in the average number of 
line items (Crawford et al. 2012; Nichols et al. 2012; Bugeja et al. 2015; Leung and 
Verriest 2015).  Recent studies show that managerial incentives to avoid taxes also 
play an important role in segment disclosure decisions.  Hope et al. (2013) find a 
negative association between firms’ voluntary choice to disclose geographic earnings 
and tax avoidance.  Akamah et al. (2018) find that firms with subsidiaries in tax havens 
have more aggregated geographic disclosures consistent with them attempting to avoid 
scrutiny by obfuscating tax haven involvement.  Hence, the contemporaneous 
publication of CBCR and segment reporting may alter the cost-benefit equilibrium of 
geographic segment disclosures. 
                                                          
7 Bushman (2014) notes the tension created by the differing objectives of accounting standard setting 
versus bank regulation. 
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Motivated by the increased scrutiny of EU financial firms’ tax arrangements, we 
rely on the unexpected introduction of public CBCR to examine several research 
questions.  First, we exploit CBCR data to document the location of EU banks’ 
operations, especially the extent to which they operate in tax havens.8  This new data 
enables us to test whether EU banks enjoy financial benefits from establishing tax 
haven operations or recognising profits in these jurisdictions.  Second, we investigate 
whether EU banks change their geographic segment reporting in response to the 
CBCR disclosure requirements.  Specifically, we test whether the adoption of CBCR 
results in a change in the number of geographic segments, country segments, or 
geographic segment line items disclosed.  Third, we utilise the CBCR data to develop 
new measures of tax haven activity based on the proportion of a firm’s profit/loss 
before tax or turnover disclosed in tax havens.  We then examine whether the intensity 
of tax haven involvement is associated with geographic segment disclosure 
aggregation.  These tests advance the research design in Akamah et al. (2018) where 
the proxy for tax haven involvement is limited to the location of tax haven subsidiaries. 
We have four main findings using our hand-collected sample of 70 EU banks.  
First, we find that banks operating in tax havens enjoy significantly higher profit 
margins, turnover per employee, and profit per employee; and significantly lower 
book effective tax rates (ETRs), in these countries relative to their non-tax haven 
operations.  Second, using a difference-in-differences research design, we find no 
significant change in the number of geographic segments, country segments, or line 
items per geographic segment, disclosed in segment reporting notes after the 
introduction of CBCR relative to a control sample of 39 multinational EU insurers.  
Third, consistent with the results in Akamah et al. (2018), we find evidence of a 
positive association between the intensity of tax haven involvement and geographic 
segment aggregation.  Finally, we document several instances of possible non-
compliance with CBCR and IFRS requirements uncovered during our investigation. 
This study makes several contributions.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first investigation of the relationship between mandatory public CBCR and operating 
                                                          
8 Prior research could only gauge firms’ geographic footprint imperfectly via geographic segment 
disclosures or from subsidiary-level data available from certain databases (e.g., Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis 
database).  Alternatively, studies of US firms rely on the disclosure of subsidiary location in Exhibit 21 
of Form 10-K.  However, subsidiaries may operate in multiple countries thereby impeding analysis of 
country-level operations. 
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segment disclosures.  Therefore, the findings expand our understanding of the 
relationship between mandatory disaggregated geographic tax disclosures and 
financial reporting behaviour.  Second, we exploit the granular nature of CBCR data 
and develop new proxies of tax haven intensity based on country-level profits and 
turnover.  Prior studies rely on measures based purely on the disclosure of subsidiary 
location, whereas our measures provide a richer understanding of the extent to which 
EU financial firms’ use tax havens.  Third, we extend prior research exploring the 
association between geographic financial disclosures and corporate tax avoidance 
(Hope et al. 2013; Akamah et al. 2018).  Fourth, we add to the recent literature on how 
firms respond to an increase in transparency facilitated by the mandatory disclosure 
of certain elements of their tax arrangements (Dyreng et al. 2016).  Fifth, we provide 
evidence on the reporting behaviour of financial firms typically omitted in prior tax 
studies (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).  Sixth, we expand the literature examining tax 
avoidance behaviour of non-US firms (Markle and Shackelford 2012a, 2012b; 
Atwood et al. 2012; Dyreng et al. 2016). 
Finally, our findings should inform policy makers in two important ways.  First, 
EU policy makers and regulators should be interested in the results given they are 
currently deliberating the possible extension of public CBCR to firms in all industries.  
Second, global accounting standard setters may be interested in the results to improve 
their understanding of the interplay between IFRS 8 and other mandatory geographic 
disclosure requirements. 
3.2 Background and hypothesis development 
3.2.1 Geographic reporting requirements 
MNCs, by definition, have operations spanning numerous countries.  
Consequently, their consolidated financial statements report accounting information 
that aggregates the results of multiple subsidiaries located in several countries.  
However, since 2013, detailed information regarding the geographic operations of an 
EU bank can be obtained from two sources – the segment reporting note in the 
consolidated financial statements, and the CBCR located in the annual report or on the 
firm’s website. 
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3.2.1.1 Segment reporting 
Segment reporting is the disaggregated disclosure of a firm’s financial statements 
into operating segments designed to provide more decision-useful information about 
a company’s operations and prospects.  Segment information is important to users of 
financial statements such as investors and financial analysts in assessing and 
predicting firm performance (Thomas 2000; Hope et al. 2009).  Segment disclosures 
for firms with diversified operations and/or geographic spread, provide information to 
capital market participants incremental to that provided in the consolidated financial 
statements and allows users to better evaluate the underlying sources of consolidated 
earnings.  In 2006, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) converged 
segment reporting under IFRS with US GAAP by issuing IFRS 8 Operating Segments, 
for reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2009.9,10 
Under the ‘management approach’ in IFRS 8, reportable segments must reflect 
the underlying business units that report directly to the firm’s ‘chief operating decision 
maker’ (CODM).  Specifically, key financial data must be disclosed for the business 
areas or segments in which the firm is divided for commercial reasons.  Effectively, 
the approach aligns external segment reporting with the firm’s internal organisation 
for operating decision purposes.  Under IFRS 8, information must be disclosed in the 
financial statement notes for all ‘reportable segments’ (operating segments or 
aggregations of operating segments that contribute 10% or more of total sales, profits 
or assets).11  Operating segments are defined as components of an entity: (i) that 
engage in business activities earnings revenues and incurring expenses; (ii) whose 
operating results are regularly reviewed by the CODM; and (iii) for which discrete 
financial information is available.12 
                                                          
9 The equivalent requirement for publicly-listed US firms is contained in ASC 280 Segment Reporting 
(previously SFAS 131 Disclosures about segments of an enterprise and related information). 
10 IFRS 8 replaced International Accounting Standard 14 Revised (IAS 14R). 
11 Reportable segments are operating segments, or aggregations of operating segments, that meet 
specified criteria (IFRS 8.13): (i) its reported revenue is 10 % or more of the combined revenue of all 
operating segments; or (ii) the absolute measure of its reported profit or loss is 10% or more of the 
greater, in absolute amount, of (a) the combined reported profit of all operating segments that did not 
report a loss, and (b) the combined reported loss of all operating segments that reported a loss; or (iii) 
its assets are 10% or more of the combined assets of all operating segments. 
12 IAS 14R mandated a two-tier approach that required disclosure of primary segments and secondary 
segments.  Managers could choose between line of business and geographic regions as the basis for 
disclosure.  If primary segments were based on line of business (geography), then secondary segments 
were based on geography (line of business).  For primary (secondary) segments, firms were required to 
133 
Interestingly, IFRS 8.23 only mandates disclosure of segment profitability and 
assets.  Revenues, income tax expense, depreciation, capital expenditure, and 
liabilities, are required to be disclosed only if this information is regularly provided to 
the CODM.  Central to this study, IFRS 8.33 prescribes certain entity-wide disclosures 
irrespective of the basis used to identify operating segments.  Specifically, it requires 
disclosure of revenues and non-current assets by geographic area.  However, if an 
individual foreign country is considered material, the firm is required to disclose this 
information at the country-level.  Surprisingly, IFRS 8 does not define ‘material’, nor 
does it provide clear guidance on the issue (Leung and Verriest 2015).13  Furthermore, 
segment line items are not required to be measured in accordance with IFRS, provided 
they are consistent with internal reporting practices, that is, as reported to the CODM.  
Nichols et al. (2012) argue that because IFRS 8 does not define segment revenue, 
result, assets or liabilities, entities have more discretion in determining what is 
disclosed in segment reports. 
The IASB anticipates several improvements in financial reporting following IFRS 
8 adoption (IASB 2013).  The IASB expects increased consistency among various 
elements of the annual report such as between the management discussion and analysis 
section and the financial statements.  Furthermore, the IASB believes investors will 
be able to predict future cash flows more reliably because they are now able to see the 
business through management’s eyes.  However, IFRS 8 falls short of requiring the 
type and level of information the CBCR requirements demand of EU banks (discussed 
in Section 3.2.1.2 below).  Notwithstanding, some proponents of greater financial 
transparency propose that the IASB should consider CBCR, possibly through an 
extension of IFRS 8 (Devereux 2011).  Still, others maintain that consolidated 
financial accounts are not an appropriate platform to provide CBCR and thus CBCR 
cannot be embedded in IFRS 8 (Evers et al. 2014). 
Concerns voiced about IFRS 8 include the failure to define segment revenue, 
result, assets or liabilities; reduced comparability due to the ability to report non-IFRS 
                                                          
disclose revenue, result, assets, liabilities, capital expenditures, depreciation, basis of inter-segment 
pricing, non-cash expenses, equity method income, and a reconciliation to the consolidated accounts 
(revenue, assets, capital expenditures).  See Nichols et al. (2012, 2013) for a detailed discussion of the 
previous requirements under IAS 14R. 
13 Also, IFRS 8 does not require any geographic information to be disclosed if this is not prepared for 
internal use, nor is it required as entity-wide disclosures if the cost of preparing this information is 
deemed excessive. 
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measures; omission of key information because it is not regularly reported to the 
CODM; and unavailability of geographic information for key items (European 
Parliament 2007; IASB 2013; Moldovan 2014).  Accordingly, while the European 
Parliament supports the EC’s endorsement of IFRS 8, as a condition of its support, it 
requires the EC to closely monitor the application of the standard, paying specific 
attention to geographic reporting, segment profit/loss, and use of non-IFRS measures 
(European Parliament 2007).  On 29 March 2017, the IASB published the Exposure 
Draft ‘Improvements to IFRS 8’ for public consultation.14  The proposed amendments 
include requiring firms to provide information in the financial statement notes if 
segments in the financial statements differ from segments reported elsewhere in the 
annual report (e.g., management commentary) or in accompanying materials (e.g., 
other financial presentations).  CBCR disclosures may be a source of difference 
between geographic classifications in the annual reporting package. 
3.2.1.2 Country-by-country reporting (CBCR)15 
The idea that MNCs should publish in their annual financial report, certain 
financial information for every jurisdiction in which they operate, was first proposed 
by Murphy (2003).16  Subsequent CBCR proposals (PWYP 2005; Murphy and TJN 
2010, 2012), were submitted to the IASB and EC during public consultations on 
segment reporting standards and CBCR, respectively.17  The IASB submissions were 
made prior to the adoption of IFRS 8 and were largely disregarded (Wojcik 2015), 
while the EC submissions added to the ongoing debate regarding CBCR for EU 
firms.18  However, the financial crisis proved to be a catalyst that led to calls for an 
internationally coordinated response to the abusive exploitation of tax law loopholes.  
                                                          
14 The proposed amendments follow the Post-Implementation Review of IFRS 8 finalised in July 2013.  
Available at: http://www.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/PIR/clarifications-to-IFRS-8-
arising-from-the-post-implementation-review/Pages/Exposure-Draft-and-Comment-letters.aspx. 
15 See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the CBCR chronology, EITI, BEPS project, and CRD IV. 
16 However, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was created in 2002 although it 
differs in its purpose and requirements and has only risen to prominence in recent years with US (2012) 
and EU adoption (2013).  The EITI is a global standard to improve transparency and accountability of 
revenues from natural resources (production of oil, natural gas and minerals).  See http://eiti.org. 
17 Publish-What-You-Pay (PWYP) is an international coalition of civil society organisations that 
advocates for financial transparency in the extractive industry.  The Tax Justice Network (TJN) is an 
international non-profit organisation dedicated to promoting tax reform concerning tax avoidance, 
especially in poorer countries. 
18 In a December 2012 report, the IASB postponed CBCR deliberations to a future unspecified date 
(http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3133003/IASB-rejects-new-accounting-standard-for-
income-taxes-and-country-by-country-reporting.html) 
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This culminated in the development of the OECD’s BEPS project in 2013 (OECD 
2013a, 2013b).  Final recommendations were delivered in 2015 (OECD 2015) 
including the requirement that MNCs submit a CBCR to tax authorities.  This form of 
CBCR will not be publicly disclosed.  Rather, it is designed a risk management tool 
for tax authorities and data will only be shared between tax administrations. 
In parallel with the OECD’s BEPS project, the EU adopted CBCR within the 
broader CRD IV in July 2013.  The stated objective of the CBCR requirements (Recital 
52), is ‘restoring the trust of EU citizens in the financial services sector in the wake of 
the global financial crisis’.  Article 89 of CRD IV requires that EU banks publicly 
disclose the following data on a country-by-country basis: (i) name(s), nature of 
activities and geographic location; (ii) turnover; (iii) number of employees on a full-
time equivalent basis; (iv) profit or loss before tax; (v) corporation tax paid; and (vi) 
public subsidies received.19,20  CBCR disclosures may be prepared on a consolidated 
basis and can be published in firms’ annual financial statements or on their website, 
provided the data is easily accessible.21  Disclosures are required to be audited from 
2015 (i.e., the auditing requirement commences for 2014 data).  Interestingly, on 12 
April 2016, the EC proposed an amendment to Accounting Directive 2013/34/EU to 
require the public disclosure of CBCRs by firms in all industries.22  Firms within the 
scope of these proposed amendments include those with consolidated turnover 
exceeding €750 million operating in the EU.  The disclosures are the same as those 
currently required of EU banks under Article 89 of CRD IV. 
 
                                                          
19 Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs) had to report items (i) to (vi) by 1 July 2014 (based 
on 2013 data).  Items (i) to (iii) had to be publicly disclosed and items (iv) to (vi) privately disclosed to 
the EC.  All other EU financial firms were required to publicly disclose all six items in 2015 (based on 
2014 data), but had to publicly disclose items (i) to (iii) for 2013 by 1 July 2014.  EU GSIBs are: 
Barclays, BNP Paribas, BBVA, Deutsche Bank, Groupe BPCE, Group Credit Agricole, HSBC, ING 
Bank, Nordea, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, Societe Generale, Standard Chartered, UniCredit.  
BBVA was not classified as a GSIB in 2016. 
20 A general assessment of the potential economic consequences of the Article 89 requirements 
concluded that CBCR was unlikely to have a significant negative economic impact and that 
stakeholders expect the new regulations to increase the transparency of, and public confidence in, the 
financial sector (PwC 2014). 
21 In approximately 70% of firm-years, CBCRs are provided in the annual report.  The timing of CBCR 
publication for the remaining 30% ranges from the same time as the annual report to several months 
afterwards. 
22 Available at: http//ec.europa.eu/finance/company-reporting/docs/country-by-country-
reporting/160412-proposal_en.pdf. 
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3.2.1.3 Example of segment reporting and CBCR 
For comparative purposes, an example of a segment reporting note and CBCR is 
provided in Appendix A.  These have been taken from the 2016 annual report of 
Santander.  The segment reporting note (Panel A) splits the income statement by 
geographic segment, while the CBCR (Panel B) disaggregates turnover, employees, 
gross profit or loss before tax, and tax on profit or loss, by country.23  The total amounts 
for turnover (€44,232m) and gross profit or loss before tax (€10,768m) in the CBCR 
reconcile to the corresponding totals in the segment note.24,25  Motivating this study is 
the difference in the level of geographic aggregation between the two disclosures.  In 
the segment reporting note, only two geographies are disclosed at the country-level 
(UK and US), with the remainder disclosed at an aggregated level (Continental Europe 
and Latin America).  Conversely, the information in the CBCR is disaggregated into 
38 countries.  However, there are more line items disclosed in the segment reporting 
note (20 items) compared to the CBCR (4 items). 
The results for the UK and US can be matched from the CBCR to the segment 
reporting note, whereas the remaining countries in the CBCR need to be grouped into 
the appropriate geographic segment to match with the segment reporting note.26  For 
example, in the CBCR, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Uruguay need to be combined to form the Latin 
America geographic segment in the segment reporting note.  Importantly, the 
increased geographic granularity in the CBCR reveals that Santander operates in 
several tax havens that are otherwise aggregated in the segment reporting note.27  
Finally, the CBCR highlights other issues regarding geographic aggregation.  For 
example, it is unclear which of the four geographic segments in the segment reporting 
note the results for Australia, Canada, China, and Singapore are included. 
                                                          
23 Santander defines its reportable segments according to geography. 
24 The total amount for tax on profit or loss before tax (€2,872m) reconciles to cash taxes paid in the 
cashflow statement (not provided). 
25 Some disclosures of turnover are negative (e.g., Cayman Islands and Jersey) because of the way 
turnover is defined.  Turnover comprises income from equity instruments, share of results of entities 
accounted for using the equity method, net fee and commission income (expense), other income, and 
other operating income (expense).  Any of these items may be negative for a particular jurisdiction. 
26 Small differences exist between the reported amounts of turnover and profit/loss before tax in the 
CBCR and segment note for the UK and US.  These are likely due to amounts in the corporate centre 
segment being allocated across countries in the CBCR. 
27 The tax havens are: The Bahamas, Ireland, Isle of Man, Cayman Islands, Jersey, Luxembourg, Malta, 
The Netherlands, Panama, Singapore, and Switzerland. 
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3.2.2 Hypothesis development 
3.2.2.1 Interaction between segment reporting and CBCR 
Given that economic and political risks vary region-by-region, disclosure of 
geographic information allows users to more accurately forecast future earnings and 
growth (Thomas 2000; Hope et al. 2009).  Yet, many question the usefulness of these 
financial reporting disclosures because of insufficient disaggregation, lack of 
comparability across firms, and management manipulation through transfer pricing 
(Hope et al. 2006; Moldovan 2014).28  Nonetheless, the introduction of mandatory 
public CBCR for EU banks renders firm performance more transparent.29  This may 
alter managers’ incentives to obfuscate segment information because more granular 
CBCR is published contemporaneously with segment reporting disclosures.  Thus, the 
cost-benefit trade-off regarding which geographic segments to report and the number 
of line items per geographic segment to disclose may change. 
Prior studies on the determinants of segment reporting show that managers have 
incentives to report fewer segments to minimise proprietary costs or agency costs.30  
The proprietary cost hypothesis posits that managers may want to conceal high-
performing segments through aggregation to protect abnormal profits in less 
competitive industries.  Hayes and Lundholm (1996) show analytically how a firm 
chooses an appropriate level of segment aggregation in the presence of potential 
competitors.  Consistent with the proprietary cost argument, they demonstrate that 
firms aggregate activities when the outcomes of each activity are dissimilar.  However, 
their model predicts firms disaggregate activities into separate segments to enjoy 
capital market benefits when the outcomes of each activity are sufficiently similar (i.e., 
competitors learn little). 
                                                          
28 Nichols et al. (2013) provide a recent review of the literature. 
29 Public CBCR for EU financial firms is a relatively new disclosure requirement and as such the 
literature examining its consequences is scarce.  Evers et al. (2014) and Fuest et al. (2013) argue that 
annual financial statements are not an appropriate platform to provide CBCR since they are prepared 
for financial reporting purposes, whereas tax avoidance hinges on the exploitation of tax law loopholes.  
Instead, consistent with Devereux (2011), they argue that legislators should focus on removing gaps in 
international tax law.  Wojcik (2015) suggests that tax avoidance may decrease in response to CBCR 
because of reduced information asymmetries between MNCs and tax authorities, and reputational 
concerns.  Longhorn et al. (2016) adopt a stakeholder theory perspective, and argue that CBCR can 
influence the decisions of all MNC stakeholders while simultaneously ensuring the firm’s 
accountability to them. 
30 Birt et al. (2006) and Bugeja et al. (2015) find support for both proprietary and agency cost reasons. 
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Studies of segment disaggregation for firms reporting under IAS/IFRS suggest 
that managers appear to conceal information from competitors.  Leuz (2004) examines 
the first-time adoption of segment reporting in Germany and shows that firms are less 
likely to provide segment information when product market related proprietary costs 
are high.  Nichols and Street (2007) find a negative association between above industry 
average return-on-assets and business segment disclosure for international firms under 
IAS 14R.  Andre et al. (2016) find that managers address proprietary concerns either 
by deviating from the suggested line item disclosure in IFRS 8, or by decreasing 
segment reporting quality.  Empirical results based on US data also support the 
proprietary cost hypothesis.  Harris (1998), Ettredge et al. (2002), and Botosan and 
Stanford (2005), find that firms in less competitive industries with high concentration 
ratios or dependent on a few major customers, aggregate more segments under SFAS 
14.31  Berger and Hahn (2003) compare segment disclosures under SFAS 14 and SFAS 
131 and find that firms who previously aggregated information under SFAS 14 had 
higher abnormal profitability.  Wang et al. (2011) show that that managers conceal 
segment earnings growth because of proprietary costs.  However, Botosan and Harris 
(2000) and Ettredge et al. (2006) find evidence that the proprietary costs of revealing 
additional or higher quality segment information are limited. 
In addition, managers may fail to disclose a segment or aggregate a segment for 
agency reasons if the segment is underperforming and the revelation of its results 
would highlight moral hazard problems.  The adoption of SFAS 131 meant that firms 
no longer had to disclose geographic earnings.  Hope and Thomas (2008) find that 
SFAS 131 adoption made it easier for managers to engage in foreign empire building 
because monitoring of foreign activities became harder for firms’ shareholders.  
Consistent with the agency cost hypothesis, Hope and Thomas (2008) report that non-
disclosure of geographic segment earnings after SFAS 131 adoption is associated with 
an increase in foreign operations but a significant decrease in foreign profit margins 
and lower firm value.  Berger and Hahn (2007) document that managers were more 
likely to hide segments with lower abnormal profits, rather than higher abnormal 
profits, before SFAS 131 took effect.  Their findings are consistent with the idea that 
                                                          
31 SFAS 14 was the predecessor of SFAS 131.  The Financial Accounting Standards Board replaced 
SFAS 14 with SFAS 131 (now ASC 280) in 1997 following pressure from financial analysts (Herrmann 
and Thomas 2000). 
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firms withhold segment information to prevent revealing agency problems and 
consequential increase in monitoring by shareholders.  Exploiting confidential US 
Census plant-level data, Bens et al. (2011) find that both agency and proprietary costs 
drive segment aggregation for multi-segment firms but that proprietary cost reasons 
dominate when the firm reports as a single segment. 
In summary, whether and by how much EU financial firms modify their segment 
reporting in response to increased transparency facilitated by mandatory public CBCR 
is ex-ante unclear.  Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that CBCR renders the 
proprietary cost and agency cost hypotheses defunct due to the concurrent disclosure 
of country-level information.  However, given the scant extant literature, whether 
these firms alter their behaviour is an empirical question.  To examine this question, 
we implement a difference-in-differences research design using multinational EU 
insurance firms as the control group.  As noted by Beatty and Liao (2014), control 
firms are difficult to find given that CBCR requirements apply to all banks operating 
in the EU.  However, we believe insurers are an appropriate control group because 
they are not subject to CBCR disclosure requirements yet operate in a similar financial 
services-based industry.  Furthermore, like EU banks, EU insurers are subject to a 
level of regulatory oversight and supervision over and above that experienced by firms 
in other industries.32  This leads to the following hypotheses: 
H1a: The number of reported geographic segments changes for EU banks 
relative to EU insurers after the introduction of mandatory public CBCR. 
H1b: The number of reported country segments changes for EU banks relative to 
EU insurers after the introduction of mandatory public CBCR. 
H1c: The number of reported line items per geographic segment changes for EU 
banks relative to EU insurers after the introduction of mandatory public 
CBCR. 
 
                                                          
32 The selection of multinational EU insurers as the control group is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
2. 
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3.2.2.2 Relationship between geographic segment disclosure and 
corporate tax avoidance 
Recent leaks of confidential documents such as the ‘Panama Papers’ and ‘Lux 
Leaks’ has led to further allegations of tax avoidance by MNCs.  These scandals added 
to the ongoing public debate that many MNCs pay little corporate income tax despite 
being highly profitable (Fuest et al. 2013).  In particular, MNCs are accused of shifting 
taxable profits to low tax countries or tax havens that impose zero tax (Gravelle 2009; 
Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Klassen and Laplante 2012).  In 2013, approximately 20% 
of US firms’ profits were recognised in tax havens, a tenfold increase since the 1980s 
(Zucman 2014). 
Public CBCR reveals more detail regarding EU banks’ tax arrangements which 
may intensify public scrutiny and negatively impact these firms through reputational 
costs, increased tax authority audit activity and enforcement actions, or increased 
proprietary costs.  Chapter 2 discusses the mixed results of the extant literature 
examining the consequences of increased transparency of tax avoidance.  In summary, 
on the one hand, studies document negative effects including adverse equity market 
reactions (Hanlon and Slemrod 2009; Dyreng et al. 2016), increased scrutiny from 
institutional investors (Ram 2016a, 2016b), and damaged relationship with 
governments (Mills et al. 2013).  On the other hand, tax avoidance can lead to 
increases in both accounting earnings and cash flows and new information about a 
firm’s commitment to tax avoidance may in fact be rewarded by the capital market 
(Bryant-Kutcher et al. 2012; Huesecken et al. 2017; Nesbitt et al. 2017).  However, 
Gallemore et al. (2014) find no evidence that firms or their top executives face 
significant reputational costs from tax shelter involvement. 
Several US studies demonstrate that managerial incentives to avoid taxes can also 
play an important role in segment disclosure decisions.  First, Hermann and Thomas 
(2000) show that most firms in their sample include the results of foreign operations 
in more aggregated geographic areas such as ‘Other Foreign’, despite ASC 280 
requiring firms to report the results of foreign operations by material country.  Second, 
Hope et al. (2013) document that managers attempt to obfuscate tax avoidance 
activities by not disclosing geographic earnings.  They find that following the adoption 
of SFAS 131 in 1998, the majority of firms in their sample voluntarily choose not to 
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disclose their geographic earnings and that this is associated with significantly lower 
ETRs (higher tax avoidance).33  Third, Krapat et al. (2016) find that during the 2007-
2012 period, many MNCs significantly reduce the number of foreign subsidiaries 
publicly disclosed in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-K.34  The authors find that these firms 
increase their tax aggressiveness relative to firms with little or no reduction in the 
reported number of foreign subsidiaries.  Finally, Akamah et al. (2018) show that firms 
with tax haven operations tend to aggregate their geographic segment disclosures 
consistent with them attempting to mask their tax haven involvement.  The authors 
conclude that public CBCR would better highlight tax avoidance. 
Taken together, the preceding discussion implies that managers have incentives 
to minimise or avoid criticisms stemming from having tax haven operations by making 
such activities less transparent via more aggregated geographic disclosures.  
Nevertheless, whether EU financial firms aggregate their geographic segments in the 
presence of increased transparency facilitated by mandatory public CBCR is ex-ante 
unclear.  This leads to the following hypothesis, stated in null form: 
H2: EU banks’ use of tax havens is not associated with geographic segment 
aggregation. 
3.3 Research design 
3.3.1 Measures of geographic segment reporting quantity 
We are initially interested in the influence, if any, of CBCR on geographic 
segment disclosures.  Two key aspects of geographic segment reporting are the 
reportable segments disclosed and the amount of information provided for each 
segment.  These elements are easily observable characteristics of segment disclosure 
(Andre et al. 2016).35  Hence, in our analysis of H1a-H1c, we follow recent studies 
(Bugeja et al. 2015; Leung and Verriest 2015) and focus on the quantity of geographic 
                                                          
33 However, the effects diminished with the introduction of Schedule M-3 in December 2004 which 
requires MNCs to provide a detailed reconciliation of book-tax differences in their tax return to the IRS 
including detailed information on each foreign entity (Hope et al. 2013). 
34 Exhibit 21 provides a list of the firm’s material subsidiaries, as required by the SEC.  The materiality 
benchmark is 10% of total assets, pre-tax income, or investment per individual subsidiary as well as on 
an aggregate basis.  Accordingly, all individually disclosed subsidiaries must constitute more than 90% 
of total assets, income, or investment (Item 601 of SEC Regulation S-K (§229.601)). 
35 The quality of segment reporting (e.g., whether the operating segments are properly defined), is less 
visible and harder to understand compared to quantity (Andre et al. 2016). 
142 
segment reporting information (SRI) using three proxies.36  First, we count the number 
of geographic segments reported in the segment reporting note (NUM_GEO_SEG).  
Second, within NUM_GEO_SEG, we separately identify the number of country 
geographic segments reported (NUM_CTRY_SEG).  Third, we tally the number of line 
item disclosed per geographic segment (NUMITEMS_GEO_SEG).37  Yet, as noted by 
Leung and Verriest (2015), a caveat is required for the NUMITEMS_GEO_SEG 
measure because under IFRS 8, firms that have identified business segments as 
reportable segments need only disclose revenues and non-current assets on a 
geographic basis in their entity-wide disclosures. 
3.3.2 Measures of geographic segment aggregation 
To test H2, we follow Akamah et al. (2018) and employ two measures that reflect 
the level of aggregation (AGG) in geographic segments.  The primary measure, 
NOMATCH, is the proportion of countries in which the firm operates, not disclosed at 
the country level in geographic segment disclosures.  However, there are two potential 
drawbacks of this AGG variable.  First, Akamah et al.’s (2018) NOMATCH variable 
is based on the Exhibit 21 list of countries in which material subsidiaries are located.  
Notably, US firms are not required to provide any financial information for these 
subsidiaries meaning the scope of geographic operations is indeterminable.38  Second, 
IFRS 8 only requires entity-wide disclosures for individual foreign countries if they 
are ‘material’, thus permitting immaterial countries to be aggregated.  Consequently, 
smaller countries are, on average, more likely to be aggregated and less likely to be 
disclosed as stand-alone geographic segments in the segment reporting note.  Hence, 
the NOMATCH variable may be an imprecise reflection of the mapping of countries 
into geographic segments.  In contrast, CBCR requires financial information to be 
reported at the country-level thereby allowing an assessment to be made of the scope 
and materiality of the firm’s geographic operations. 
                                                          
36 We follow Bugeja et al. (2015) and Leung and Verriest (2015) and disregard segments with titles 
such as ‘headquarters’ or ‘corporate’, or segments that are reconciliation segments, because these do 
not meet the definition of operating segment in IFRS 8. 
37 Using the example in Appendix A to illustrate, NUM_GEO_SEG equals 4, NUM_CTRY_SEG equals 
2, and NUM_ITEMS_GEO_SEG equals 20. 
38 Furthermore, Krapat et al. (2016) find that between 2010 and 2014, more than 250 US MNCs reduce 
the number of material foreign subsidiaries disclosed in their Exhibit 21 by more than 50% and that 
these firms become more tax aggressive after reducing the disclosure of these foreign subsidiaries. 
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The finer CBCR data enables the introduction of an important step prior to 
calculating the AGG measures.  First, we identify ‘material’ countries in firms’ 
CBCRs.  Recall that IFRS 8 mandates disclosures for all operating segments or 
aggregations of operating segments that contribute 10% or more of the total sales, or 
total profits, or total assets, of the firm.  Therefore, we select the 10% threshold 
embedded within IFRS 8 as a suitable benchmark for identifying ‘material’ countries.  
Although CBCRs do not include country-level information on assets, country-level 
information on turnover and profit/loss before tax is disclosed.  Thus, from disclosures 
made in the CBCR, a country is classified as material if the turnover or profit/loss of 
that country exceeds 10% of total firm turnover or profit/loss before tax, respectively.  
IFRS 8 does not define materiality, so to increase the likelihood that we identify all 
material countries, a 5% threshold is also used.39  One would expect the countries we 
identify as material to be disclosed as stand-alone geographic segments if the firm 
defines reportable segments by geography, or alternatively, as stand-alone countries 
within the entity-wide disclosures.  We believe that the introduction of this step 
provides greater comfort that the NOMATCH aggregation variable better reflects the 
mapping of material countries into geographic segments. 
After determining material countries in the CBCR, we then match these countries 
to their related geographic title in the geographic segment note.  Accordingly, 
NOMATCH_MAT is the proportion of material countries not disclosed at the country 
level in geographic segment disclosures.  The two versions of this variable 
(NOMATCH_MAT_10 and NOMATCH_MAT_5) are calculated using the 10% and 5% 
materiality thresholds, respectively.  In the example provided in Appendix A, total 
turnover (profit/loss before tax) per the CBCR is €44,232m (€10,768m), so the 
materiality threshold at the 10% (5%) level is €4,423m (€2,212m) or €1,077m 
                                                          
39 On 14 September 2017, the IASB published Practice Statement (PS) 2 Making Materiality 
Judgements as guidance to assist preparers in applying the concept of materiality to financial statements 
prepared in accordance with IFRS.  Firms are not required to comply with the PS unless specifically 
required by their jurisdiction.  While the PS states that applying materiality involves assessing 
qualitative and quantitative factors, numerical thresholds are not provided.  Rather, the assessment of 
whether information is material depends on its size and nature, judged in the particular circumstances 
of the entity (para. 41).  Nevertheless, International Standard on Auditing 320, Materiality in Planning 
and Performing an Audit, states that ‘Misstatements, including omissions, are considered to be material 
if they, individually or in the aggregate, could reasonably be expected to influence the economic 
decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements’ (Para. 2).  Paragraph 4 states that ‘the 
auditor’s determination of materiality is a matter of professional judgment, and is affected by the 
auditor’s perception of the financial information needs of users of the financial statements’. 
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(€538m), respectively.  Five countries (Brazil, Spain, US, Mexico, and UK) qualify as 
material countries at the 10% materiality level, while three more (Chile, Poland, and 
Portugal) are added to this list when the 5% materiality threshold is applied.  Only two 
countries (UK and US) are disclosed as stand-alone geographic segments in the 
segment reporting note.  Therefore, only these two countries can be matched leaving 
3 (6) countries unmatched at the 10% (5%) materiality levels.  Thus, 
NOMATCH_MAT_10 equals 0.60 (3/5) while NOMATCH_MAT_5 equals 0.75 (6/8). 
To calculate the second geographic aggregation score, LEVEL_MAT, we follow 
Akamah et al. (2018) and assign a geographic fineness score to each geographic title 
disclosed in the geographic segment note for each firm over the sample period.40  This 
score captures the level of disaggregation and ranges from 0 (when the firm reports at 
the country or within-country level) to 4 (when the firm reports results where the 
geographic region cannot be traced using terms like ‘other’, ‘international’, or ‘rest of 
world’).41  Then, each material country identified in the CBCR receives an aggregation 
score corresponding to its related geographic segment disclosure.  LEVEL is the 
average aggregation score of the material countries identified from the CBCR.  We 
employ two versions of LEVEL_MAT, one each using the 10% (LEVEL_MAT_10) and 
5% (LEVEL_MAT_5) materiality thresholds.  For the example provided in Appendix 
A, LEVEL_MAT_10 equals 0.90 (total aggregation score of 4.5 divided by 5 material 
countries) whereas LEVEL_MAT_5 equals 1.13 (total aggregation score of 9.0 divided 
by 8 material countries).42 
3.3.3 Measures of tax haven use 
The development of proxies for tax haven use is challenging because no widely-
accepted definition or list of tax havens exists.  Nonetheless, prior studies rely on tax 
haven lists developed over time primarily based on those created by Hines and Rice 
(1994) or the OECD (2000).43  The list created by Hines and Rice (1994) classified 
tax havens as small ‘dot’ havens (populations less than 1 million in 1982) or ‘Big 7’ 
havens (populations greater than 1 million).  Dot havens were deemed too small in 
                                                          
40 Leung and Verriest (2015) use a similar geographic fineness score. 
41 Appendix C describes the full scale used. 
42 The aggregation score is calculated in accordance with the scale provided in Appendix C. 
43 Both lists contain 41 jurisdictions but differ in terms of constituents e.g., the OECD list does not 
include Hong Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore, or Switzerland.  Surprisingly, the OECD has not 
updated its list since 2000. 
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terms of economic activity, workforce, or infrastructure to offer benefits other than tax 
minimisation.  This list has been used in subsequent studies (Desai et al. 2006; Dyreng 
et al. 2016) to compare results between the two groups of tax havens.  Nevertheless, 
the composition of the list used in our study is crucial because several jurisdictions 
deemed tax havens on some lists are relatively large European countries (e.g., Ireland, 
Netherlands) or global financial centres (e.g., Hong Kong, Switzerland, Singapore).  
Thus, our sample firms are more likely to have legitimate operations in these 
jurisdictions, especially those headquartered in Ireland and the Netherlands.  These 
firms are less likely to be concerned about disclosing activity in these tax havens and 
are more likely to disclose these jurisdictions as stand-alone geographic segments, 
unduly influencing our AGG measures. 
We begin with the most recent tax haven list used in the literature by Dyreng et 
al. (2015) who augment the list used by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) by adding Hong 
Kong and the Netherlands since these countries are widely viewed as tax havens (total 
of 54 tax havens).  Then, given the passage of time and worldwide population growth 
since 1982, we follow similar logic to that in Hines and Rice (1994) and split the tax 
havens into the ‘Big 12’, defined as tax havens with populations exceeding 1.6 million 
as at December 2015, and all others as ‘dots’.44  The resulting two lists of tax havens 
are provided in Appendix B.  We use List 1 in our primary analysis.  This list is similar 
to that used in Jaafar and Thornton’s (2015) study of the impact of tax haven use on 
publicly-listed and privately-held European firms.  In total, 52 countries are disclosed 
in the geographic segment disclosures giving 710 firm-year observations.  The ‘Big 
12’ tax havens account for 78 or 11.2% of these observations, providing support for 
our argument to exclude these jurisdictions from the primary list of tax havens. 
The variable (HAVEN) reflects the extent to which EU banks use tax havens to 
reduce their tax burden.  Prior studies (Markle and Shackelford 2012b; Dyreng et al. 
2016; Akamah et al. 2018) rely upon proxies for tax-haven intensity based on the 
disclosure of material subsidiaries in tax havens.  However, an advantage of CBCR is 
that it facilitates the development of new measures of tax haven activity not previously 
used in the literature.  Recall that EU banks must disclose the turnover, profit/loss 
                                                          
44 World population increased by 59.8% from 4.60bn in 1982 to 7.35bn in 2015 per UN statistics 
(available at: https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/). 
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before tax, and entities for every country they operate in.45  As our primary measure 
of HAVEN, we use THAV_PBT, calculated as the ratio of profit/loss before tax 
disclosed in tax haven countries to total profit/loss before tax, because this ratio more 
likely reflects the degree to which firms have shifted profits from non-tax havens to 
tax havens.  In robustness tests, we replace THAV_PBT with THAV_ENT (THAV_TO) 
calculated as the ratio of entities (turnover) disclosed in tax haven countries to total 
entities (turnover).  Thus, the country-level disclosures provided by CBCR enable us 
to use multiple measures of tax haven intensity to gain a deeper understanding of the 
link between firms’ tax haven involvement and their segment disclosures. 
Several reasons suggest that our measures likely understate the extent of firms’ 
involvement in tax havens.  First, home country activities of banks headquartered in 
Cyprus, Ireland, and the Netherlands, have been treated as non-tax haven activities to 
avoid skewing the results.  However, these firms possibly engage in some degree of 
profit-shifting back into their home country, though the extent to which they engage 
in such activity is unobservable.  Second, several banks aggregate tax havens into other 
countries in their CBCR.  For example, in 2013, HSBC included the results of the 
Channel Islands within the UK results.  Third, CBCR disclosures are only required at 
the country-level which may mask some tax haven activity within certain countries 
e.g., some firms have operations located in the US State of Delaware which is 
considered a tax haven by many.  Finally, some banks include tax havens within a 
‘Other’ category in their CBCR (discussed in Section 3.6.1). 
3.3.4 Multivariate tests 
3.3.4.1 Geographic segment reporting and the introduction of CBCR 
We examine whether EU banks change their segment reporting after CBCR is 
implemented.  Based on prior research (Leung and Verriest 2015; Bugeja et al. 2015) 
we initially estimate the following empirical model using OLS: 
SRIi,t =  β0 + β1POSTi,t + ∑ βkCONTROLSi,t + εi,t (1) 
                                                          
45 They must also disclose the name(s), nature of activities and geographic location of all subsidiaries 
and branches (entities).  However, they are not required to disclose financial information for individual 
entities and therefore information on the relative size of individual entities is unavailable. 
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The dependent variable (SRI) is one of the three proxies for the quantity of 
geographic segment information disclosed (NUM_GEO_SEG, NUM_CTRY_SEG, 
and NUMITEMS_GEO_SEG).  The coefficient on POST reflects any change in SRI in 
the years after CBCR is implemented in 2013 (i.e., 2014 onwards).  The model also 
controls for several firm-level characteristics that may influence segment reporting 
quantity.  Larger firms (SIZE) provide better disclosures, and increased profitability 
(ROA) alleviates agency problems potentially leading to enhanced disclosures, 
although more profitable firms may incur higher proprietary costs inducing fewer 
segment disclosures.  Firms that use more leverage (LEV) may increase disclosure 
quantity to ease agency costs with lenders, while firms with higher growth 
opportunities (REVGRTH) have incentives to disclose more segment information.46  
Firm complexity may result in more segments or more segment information being 
disclosed, so an additional control is included for the number of countries in which a 
firm discloses it has entities (NUM_CTRY_ENT).47  All variables are defined in 
Appendix C. 
Then, to implement our difference-in-differences research design, we augment 
Equation (1) by including an indicator variable called EU_BANK that takes the value 
of 1 if the firm is an EU bank and 0 if it is an EU insurer.  The interaction of EU_BANK 
and POST is also added to give Equation (2): 
SRIi,t =  β0 + β1EU_BANKi,t + β2EU_BANKi,t*POSTi,t                                 
+ ∑ βkCONTROLSi,t + εi,t (2) 
The coefficient β1 reflects the average difference in SRI between treatment and 
control firms in the pre-CBCR period.  To test all hypotheses, we examine β2, the 
coefficient on EU_BANK*POST which is the difference-in-differences estimate of the 
effect of CBCR on SRI.  A positive (negative) coefficient on this interaction variable 
indicates an increase (decrease) in the quantity of geographic segment information 
disclosed of EU financial firms relative to EU insurance firms. 
                                                          
46 We use REVGRTH instead of market-to-book because 25 sample firms (22.9%) are unlisted.  
47 Data for this variable is only available from 2013 so we use the 2013 values for 2012 because these 
values are very stable over the sample period.  In untabulated robustness tests, we drop the 2012 values 
and inferences remain unchanged. 
148 
Finally, given the relatively small sample size, we are concerned that the standard 
errors could be biased downwards because asymptotic inference may be unreliable in 
small samples (Imbens and Kolesar 2016).  To alleviate concerns regarding imprecise 
standard errors, we follow Dyreng et al. (2016) and use bootstrapped standard errors 
which are robust to different structures in the data.  We estimate bootstrapped standard 
errors using 1,000 iterations (with replacement) for each model. 
3.3.4.2 Tax haven use and geographic segment aggregation 
We examine the relationship between the intensity of tax haven involvement and 
geographic segment aggregation.  Following Akamah et al. (2018) we estimate the 
following empirical specification to test H2: 
AGGi,t =  β 0 + β1HAVENi,t + ∑ βkCONTROLSi,t + εi,t (3) 
The dependent variable (AGG) is one of the four geographic aggregation proxies 
discussed in Section 3.3.2 and HAVEN is one of the tax haven intensity variables 
discussed in Section 3.3.3.  The coefficient of interest is β1 which reflects the impact 
of HAVEN on AGG for all sample firms.  However, 22 EU banks or 31.4% of the 
primary sample are not publicly-listed so to capture any potential differences in 
financial reporting incentives between listed and unlisted firms, we augment Equation 
(2) by including a dummy variable (UNLISTED) for listing status along with the 
interaction between UNLISTED and HAVEN.  In Equation (4), the coefficients of 
interest are β1 and β1 + β3.  β1 captures the impact of HAVEN on AGG for listed firms, 
while β1 + β3 captures this relationship for unlisted firms. 
AGGi,t =  β 0 + β1HAVENi,t + β2UNLISTEDi,t + β3HAVENi,t*UNLISTEDi,t                              
+ ∑ βkCONTROLSi,t + εi,t (4) 
The models include the same control variables included in Equation (1) because 
prior studies show that these control variables influence disclosure levels.48  
Furthermore, following Akamah et al. (2018) we also control for firm characteristics 
previously shown in the literature to be related to tax avoidance or tax haven 
operations.  These include intangible assets (INTANG), capital intensity (CAPINT), 
                                                          
48 Prior papers also include a variable for audit quality (BIG4 dummy) however all sample firms are 
audited by Big 4 auditors during the sample period. 
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and tax loss carry forwards (∆TLCF and TLCF_DUM).  Because both NOMATCH 
variables are measured as proportions (between 0 and 1), the OLS estimators of the 
parameters may be inconsistent.  Therefore, we treat these variables as censored 
continuous variables and employ TOBIT regression (Stock and Watson 2012).  We 
use OLS regression when the dependent variable is either of the LEVEL variables. 
3.4 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
3.4.1 Sample selection 
The population for the primary sample comprises all EU banks since they all fall 
within the scope of the new CBCR rules.  We start with the European Banking 
Authority’s List of Institutions for Supervisory Reporting as at January 2016 (198 
firms).49  We then apply several data filters.  For example, only large banks and those 
who have operations in more than one country are included as they are more likely to 
be impacted by the CBCR requirements.50  Panel A of Table 3.1 outlines the sample 
selection process for the primary sample.  The final sample of banks contains 70 firms 
covering the period 2012-2016.51,52  Panel A of Table 3.2 reveals that these firms have 
combined total assets of €30,902bn as at 31 December 2016 which represents 92.5% 
of the €33,410bn in total assets of all EU credit institutions (ECB 2017a).  Panel B of 
Table 3.1 outlines the sample selection process for the control sample of 39 
multinational EU insurers.  Panel A of Table 3.3 shows that these firms have combined 
total assets of €6,485bn as at 31 December 2016 which represents 83.4% of the 
€7,775bn in total assets of all EU insurers (ECB 2017b).53 
We collected data from a variety of sources.  CBCR disclosure items (e.g., 
turnover, employees) were hand-collected from the annual CBCR of every firm.  Some 
                                                          
49 Consolidated Banking Data published by the European Central Bank (ECB) as at 31 December 2016 
reveals 349 banking groups operating in the EU but does not include a list of the firms (ECB 2017a). 
50 For example, Metro Bank and Virgin Money are excluded because they only operate in the UK. 
51 Our sample is identical to that used in Chapter 2 except for two firms that do not provide segment 
reporting notes in their annual report, namely Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) and UBS Limited. 
52 In the geographic segment reporting analysis, the sample size is 350 firm-year observations (70 firms 
across 5 years).  However, the sample size is reduced in the geographic segment aggregation analysis 
because CBCR data only becomes available from 2013.  Furthermore, the sample size varies depending 
on which proxy for tax haven involvement is used because most firms do not commence disclosing 
profit/loss before tax in their CBCR until 2014.  Thus, the sample size is 222 (261) firm-year 
observations when THAV_PBT (THAV_ENT) is used. 
53 Section 2.4.1 in Chapter 2 discusses the sample selection process in more detail. 
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firms provide a reference in their CBCR to the list of subsidiaries and branches in the 
financial statement notes.  In these cases, data was hand-collected from the relevant 
notes to the financial statements.54  Geographic segment information was hand-
collected from the segment reporting note in the financial statements.  For the publicly-
listed firms, data for the firm-level controls was obtained from Datastream, whereas 
for the unlisted entities, this data was hand-collected from annual reports.  Information 
on carried forward tax losses was hand-collected from the financial statement notes 
for all firms as this data item is not available on Datastream.  Finally, our sample size 
is relatively small and thus our empirical tests could be easily influenced by a few 
influential observations.  To mitigate this risk, we winsorize all continuous variables 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Appendix C provides formal definitions for all variables. 
Panel A of Table 3.2 lists the EU banks, their country of residence, GSIB and 
listing status, and total assets (measured in Euros) as at 31 December 2016.  The table 
reveals the dominance by a relatively small number of large firms.  The 14 GSIBs 
account for approximately 57% of total assets.  Furthermore, 48 or 68.6% of sample 
banks are publicly-listed.  Panel B displays the sample split by country.  The major 
EU countries France, Germany, Spain, and the UK, account for a relatively greater 
proportion of the 14 countries covered.  Panel C shows the asset size by firm-type.  
The mean (median) total assets of the primary sample is €441,451m (€212,329m).  
Table 3.3 presents details on the EU insurance firms.  Panel A shows that similar to 
EU banks, larger firms dominate the sample.  The 13 firms with total assets greater 
than €100,000m account for approximately 86% of total assets.  Panel B reveals that 
the sample selection process resulted in EU insurers from 9 of the 14 EU countries the 
banks are based in and that firms from France, Germany, and UK comprise the 
majority (77.1%) of total assets.  Panel C shows that, on average, the insurers are 
smaller than the banks.  The mean (median) total assets of the control sample is 
€166,279m (€63,612m). 
All sample firms consolidated financial statements are prepared in accordance 
with IFRS and are audited by Big 4 audit firms.  This alleviates any concern regarding 
divergence based on differences in financial statement preparation and presentation. 
                                                          
54 See Section 2.4.1 in Chapter 2 for a detailed description of the time-consuming process undertaken 
to obtain information for all subsidiaries of firms in certain countries. 
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3.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 3.4.  On average, reporting segments are 
based primarily on geography (GEO_SEG) in 20.4% of firm-years (includes matrix 
versions of geographic segmentation), and firms disclose around 14 line items across 
4 geographic segments.55  Furthermore, on average, the 4 geographic segments include 
approximately 2 stand-alone country segments.  However, interestingly, EU banks 
have significantly lower values of all four measures compared to EU insurers 
suggesting the latter provide more geographic segment information, on average.  The 
mean of NOMATCH_MAT_10 (NOMATCH_MAT_5) is 0.374 (0.481) which is lower 
than the mean value of NOMATCH (0.846) reported in Akamah et al. (2018), 
consistent with our expectations.  The means of the LEVEL variables lie between 1.0 
and 1.3 on average, which corresponds to aggregation at the subcontinent/continent 
levels in the segment reporting note.  The tax haven intensity variables (THAV) reveal 
that, on average, EU banks recognise 2.0% of total turnover, 4.3% of total profit/loss 
before tax, and have 10.2% of their entities, in tax havens (List 1).56  On average, 
relative to EU insurers, EU banks are significantly larger and more leveraged, but are 
significantly less profitable, have lower revenue growth, and use less tangible and 
intangible assets.  Approximately 85% of all sample firms recognise a deferred tax 
asset for carried forward tax losses.  Finally, EU banks (EU insurers) disclose entities 
in approximately 20 (23) countries, on average. 
The Pearson (below diagonal) and Spearman (above diagonal) correlations are 
presented in Table 3.5 with significant (p-value < 0.05) coefficients reported in bold.  
Panel A (Panel B) presents the results for the full sample for the changes in segment 
reporting tests (EU banks for the geographic segment aggregation tests).  In Panel A, 
all three segment reporting variables (NUM_GEO_SEG, NUM_CTRY_SEG, 
NUMITEMS_GEO_SEG) are significantly positively correlated, although none are 
significantly correlated with POST.  In Panel B, all four aggregation variables are 
significantly positively correlated with one another, suggesting each reflects the same 
underlying construct.57  However, only three of eight positive correlation coefficients 
                                                          
55 These results are similar to those found in Nichols et al. (2012) where 19% of their sample of EU 
firms determine reporting segments based primarily on geography and an average of 8.38 line items are 
reported across 4.19 reportable segments. 
56 This increases to 5.2% of turnover, 7.6% of profit/loss before tax, and 17.4% of entities, for List 2. 
57 Likewise, all versions of HAVEN are significantly positively correlated (untabulated). 
152 
between THAV_PBT and the aggregation variables is significant.  Some correlation 
coefficients between control variables are significantly large (e.g., between SIZE and 
NUM_CTRY_ENT).  Untabulated tests of collinearity result in a mean variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of 1.67 with a high of 3.24 for SIZE.  These are well below the 
generally accepted threshold of 10 alleviating concerns regarding multicollinearity. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Mandatory CBCR and profit shifting 
The introduction of mandatory CBCR facilitates a more extensive analysis of the 
geographic footprint of EU banks.  Specifically, the availability of new data at the 
country-level enables the identification of the countries where firms operate, and most 
importantly, the level of activity disclosed in tax havens.  In Action 11 of the final 
BEPS project recommendations, the OECD discussed the efficacy of various measures 
to monitor and evaluate potential profit shifting by MNCs (OECD 2015).58  In addition 
to ETRs (the ratio of taxes to pre-tax income), indicators that compare pre-tax profits 
to assets or employees are evaluated.  The use of ratios that link profits to measures of 
economic activity, recognises that BEPS is characterised by a disconnect between the 
jurisdictions where taxable profits are reported and the location of the underlying real 
economic activities generating those profits (OECD 2015). 
The financial data required to be disclosed under CBCR permits the determination 
of profit margin (PM), turnover per employee (TPE), profit per employee (PPE), book 
effective tax rate (BETR), and cash effective tax rate (CETR), at the individual country 
level.59  In line with the OECD’s recommendations, such measures may provide broad 
insights into the existence of profit shifting by EU banks.60  Specifically, higher levels 
of PM, TPE and PPE, may indicate that firms have shifted profits into those countries.  
Similarly, lower BETRs or CETRs may indicate that EU banks have paid lower taxes 
                                                          
58 The OECD concludes that the scale of BEPS and changes in BEPS over time are difficult to measure.  
Nevertheless, while the existence and scale of BEPS cannot be captured by one single indicator, a 
‘dashboard’ of indicators may provide broad insights (OECD 2015). 
59 All variables are defined in Appendix C.  Most firms report either income tax expense or cash taxes 
paid while a small number report both.  Firms disclose financial information in their CBCR in a variety 
of currencies.  Therefore, all data is converted to Euros using average exchange rates. 
60 Fuest et al. (2013) stress that the clear identification of profit shifting is difficult because true country-
level profit margins (i.e., profit margins before any tax avoidance strategy that affects actual profits is 
implemented) are not observable.  Similar logic applies to the TPE and PPE calculations. 
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in those jurisdictions by using tax minimisation strategies.  Overall, the extent to which 
a jurisdiction exhibits higher levels of PM, TPE, PPE and/or a lower BETR or CETR 
relative to other jurisdictions, likely indicates that EU banks find that jurisdiction more 
attractive as a profit shifting destination. 
The key profit shifting indicators are summarised in Table 3.6.  Panel A presents 
the results for the top 30 countries ranked by the frequency with which EU banks 
disclose turnover or profit/loss before tax in that country, and reveals that the UK, US, 
and Germany are the most common countries.61  However, Ireland, a tax haven, has 
the highest PM of 56.6%, second highest TPE of €60.6m, and highest PPE of €31.8m.  
Similarly, Luxembourg, despite being a relatively small EU country, has the second 
highest PM of 54.9%, fifth highest TPE of €50.1m, and second highest PPE of €25.5m.  
In contrast, the most commonly mentioned country, the UK, has a PM of 35.1%, TPE 
of €57.2m, and PPE of €12.9m.  In total, seven tax havens appear among the top 30 
jurisdictions including, in order of frequency, Luxembourg, Ireland, Switzerland, 
Singapore, Netherlands, Hong Kong, and the Channel Islands.62  Interestingly, only 
Luxembourg, Ireland, and the Channel Islands, have higher values of PM, TPE, and 
PPE, relative to other non-tax haven countries.  The results for Netherlands, Singapore, 
Switzerland, and Hong Kong, are broadly in line with those of non-tax havens.  This 
may reflect the fact that EU bank locate operations in these larger countries for 
legitimate operating reasons rather than for tax-minimisation (Hines and Rice 1994).63 
Panel A of Table 3.6 also reveals that some firms use a ‘Other’ category in their 
CBCR to aggregate countries not separately disclosed.  Surprisingly, this category 
ranks 17th in terms of frequency of firm-year observations of turnover or profit.  The 
use of this category is discussed in further detail in Section 3.6.1.  Panel B of Table 
3.6 reports the results for the remaining tax havens.  Notably, many tax havens often 
                                                          
61 Due to the existence of a small number of large outliers, median values of PM, TPE, and PPE are 
presented.  For example, in 2014 BNP Paribus reported turnover of €411m in Switzerland with a 
corresponding pre-tax loss of €2,900m, while in 2013 RBS disclosed turnover of £1,258m in Ireland 
with a pre-tax loss of £3,308m. 
62 This finding is similar to that of Dyreng et al. (2009) who also report Ireland, Singapore, Switzerland, 
Netherlands, and Hong Kong among the top 35 countries used by US firms as locations for material 
subsidiaries.  Luxembourg and the Channel Islands are absent from the list provided in Dyreng et al. 
(2009) although Barbados, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands appear on their list.  This may reflect a 
preference of US firms to use tax havens located closer to the US (e.g., those based in the Caribbean) 
over those havens located in Europe. 
63 For example, Akamah et al. (2018) note that firms have operations in Hong Kong to service their 
customers in China and East-Asia, and in Singapore to service their Southeast-Asia customers. 
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referred in the financial media (e.g., Panama), are not used extensively by our sample 
firms.  Panel C presents overall totals (including BETRs and CETRs) split by EU/non-
EU countries and tax haven/non-tax haven jurisdictions.  Regardless of the tax haven 
list used, tax havens have higher mean and median values of PM, TPE, and PPE, and 
lower mean and median values of BETR and CETR, relative to non-tax havens. 
Table 3.7 presents the distribution of key CBCR disclosure items for the 15 tax 
havens most commonly used by sample firms.  Together, the three most popular tax 
havens (Hong Kong, Luxembourg and Singapore) account for over two thirds of all 
turnover, profit/loss before tax, and employees, disclosed in tax havens.  For example, 
combined profits recognised in these tax havens totals €13,590m representing 84.1% 
of total profits of €16,160 recognised in tax havens.  These three tax havens also 
represent over 5.6% of turnover, 15.5% of pre-tax profits, and 3.0% of employees, of 
all countries disclosed in CBCRs.  In addition to tax incentives, the results for Hong 
Kong and Singapore may reflect their importance as global banking centres servicing 
the Asian market.  Furthermore, although Luxembourg has a relatively small 
population, its popularity may reflect that it is regarded as a leading banking and 
financial services market.64  For example, Luxembourg is the leading global centre 
and distribution hub for EU regulated UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investment 
in Transferable Securities) investment funds (EY 2017).65 
Table 3.8 reports the means for the profit shifting indicators calculated at the firm-
level, along with differences in means between tax havens and non-tax havens.  
Statistics are provided for unconditional means and means conditional upon tax haven 
use.  Panels A, B, and C reveal that EU banks report significantly higher PM, TPE, 
and PPE, for their operations in tax havens relative to their non-tax haven operations.  
For example, in Panel C, the unconditional mean of PPE for tax havens (List 1) equals 
24.3% compared to 5.4% for non-tax havens (difference of 18.9% with a p-value of 
0.000).  The results are consistent when tax havens from either List 1 or List 2 are 
used.  Panels D and E show that sample firms report significantly lower BETRs and 
CETRs in tax havens although results are stronger using unconditional means. 
                                                          
64 In fact, sample firms disclose more entities in Luxembourg (586) than any other tax haven. 
65 UCITS is a globally recognised brand for retail investment funds.  The regime covers products such 
as equity and bond funds, structured funds, and exchange traded funds.  Luxembourg’s UCITS assets 
of over US$2.5 trillion represent about three quarters of internationally distributed products (EY 2017). 
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Overall, these results provide empirical evidence of the significant financial 
benefits that accrue to EU banks operating in tax havens and provide prima facie 
evidence of profit shifting.  Furthermore, the findings indicate why some firms may 
aggregate geographic segments deemed tax havens to obfuscate activities in these 
politically sensitive jurisdictions. 
3.5.2 Segment reporting and the introduction of mandatory CBCR 
Table 3.9 reports the results from estimating Equations (1) and (2) when the 
dependent variable is NUM_GEO_SEG.  Equation (1) is estimated separately for EU 
banks and insurers (Models 1-4).  Models (1) and (3) exclude control variables, 
country fixed effects and year fixed effects while Models (2) and (4) include control 
variables and country fixed effects to control for differences across countries.  In all 
four specifications, the estimated coefficient on POST is not statistically significant.  
Equation (2) is estimated for the full sample in Model (5).  This model includes 
country and year fixed effects.66  The estimated coefficient on the variable of interest 
(EU_BANK*POST) is also insignificant (-0.140 and p-value = 0.814).  Hence, we find 
no support for H1a. 
The results from estimating Equations (1) and (2) when NUM_CTRY_SEG is the 
dependent variable are presented in Table 3.10.  Similar to the results in Table 3.9, all 
estimated coefficients on POST are not statistically significant.  Furthermore, in Model 
(5) the coefficient on EU_BANK*POST is 0.087 (p-value = 0.865).  Therefore, we find 
no support for H1b.  Table 3.11 reports the results from estimating Equations (1) and 
(2) when NUMITEMS_GEO_SEG is the dependent variable.  Again, all estimated 
coefficients on POST are insignificant.  The coefficient on EU_BANK*POST is -1.172 
(p-value = 0.731).  Thus, we find no support for H1c.  Overall, based on the results in 
Tables 3.9-3.11, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the number of disclosed 
geographic segments, country segments, or geographic line items, does not change for 
EU banks relative to EU insurers after the introduction of public CBCR. 
In additional cross-sectional tests (untabulated), we split the primary sample into 
listed and unlisted firms because 22 (31.4%) of the EU banks are unlisted.  We then 
re-estimate Equation (1).  The results are qualitatively similar to those found above 
                                                          
66 Results are similar if we include POST as a stand-alone variable and exclude the year fixed effects. 
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with one exception.  The coefficient on POST corresponding to Model (4) in Table 
3.11 (dependent variable = NUMITEMS_GEO_SEG) is -4.385 (p-value = 0.002).  This 
provides evidence of a significant reduction in the number of line items per geographic 
segment since the commencement of CBCR for unlisted EU financial firms.  These 
firms are subject to less scrutiny from capital market participants such as financial 
analysts and institutional investors.  Therefore, the reduction in geographic segment 
line item disclosure in the presence of CBCR may be the result of these firms treating 
the two sets of geographic disclosures as substitutes. 
3.5.3 Tax haven use and geographic segment aggregation 
Table 3.12 reports the results from estimating Equations (3) and (4) using TOBIT 
when NOMATCH_MAT_10 (Models 1 and 2) and NOMATCH_MAT_5 (Models 3 and 
4) are the dependent variable.67  Models (1) and (3) report the on-average aggregate 
results, while Models (2) and (4) separate the results between listed and unlisted firms.  
Toward the bottom of Models (2) and (4), the estimated coefficient on THAV_PBT + 
UNLISTED*THAV_PBT is presented along with the result of a χ2-test of whether it is 
statistically different from zero.  All models include year and country fixed effects to 
control for differences across time and countries.  The estimated coefficient on 
THAV_PBT is 1.233 (p-value = 0.028) in Model (1) and 0.840 (p-value = 0.011) in 
Model (3), suggesting that, on average, an increase in tax haven intensity is associated 
with an increase in geographic segment aggregation in the segment reporting note.  In 
Models (2) and (4), the coefficient on THAV_PBT is 1.492 (p-value = 0.054) and 1.007 
(p-value = 0.016) respectively, however the estimated coefficient on THAV_PBT + 
UNLISTED*THAV_PBT is not statistically significant.  These results suggest that the 
positive association exists for listed but not unlisted EU banks. 
The results from estimating Equations (3) and (4) using OLS when the dependent 
variable is LEVEL_MAT_10 (Models 1 and 2) and LEVEL_MAT_5 (Models 3 and 4) 
are presented in Table 3.13.  Consistent with the results in Table 3.12, we find a 
statistically significant positive coefficient on THAV_PBT in Models (1) and (3).  In 
Model (1) the estimated coefficient on THAV_PBT is 2.204 (p-value = 0.014) and in 
Model (3) is 1.995 (p-value = 0.015).  The positive coefficient on THAV_PBT in 
                                                          
67 In untabulated robustness tests, we estimate the models using OLS and inferences remain unchanged. 
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Models (2) and (4) is mildly significant at conventional levels (p-value = 0.110 and p-
value = 0.104, respectively).  Contrary to the results in Table 3.12, we also find 
positive and significant coefficients on THAV_PBT + UNLISTED*THAV_PBT.  The 
estimated coefficient on this term in Model (2) is 3.390 (p-value = 0.077) and in Model 
(4) is 3.120 (p-value = 0.065), both of which are greater in magnitude than the 
coefficients for listed firms.  Hence, these results suggest that the positive association 
between tax haven involvement and geographic segment aggregation is stronger for 
unlisted relative to listed EU banks. 
Some EU banks do not disclose any pre-tax profit/loss in tax havens during the 
sample period while others do so only in certain years.  That is, THAV_PBT = 0 for 72 
firm-year observations (32% of all firm-year observations).  If firms aggregate 
geographic segments in the segment reporting note to obfuscate tax haven 
involvement, then we would expect the positive association found in Tables 3.12 and 
3.13 to be stronger for firms who disclose pre-tax profit/loss in tax havens.  Therefore, 
we re-estimate Equations (3) and (4) conditional upon the firm disclosing pre-tax 
profit/loss in a tax haven (i.e., when THAV_PBT ≠ 0).  The results are presented in 
Table 3.14.  In line with our expectations, the estimated coefficient on THAV_PBT in 
Models (1) and (3) in both panels is greater than the corresponding coefficient reported 
in Tables 3.12 and 3.13.  However, the results change depending on listing status.  
Specifically, the estimated coefficient on THAV_PBT in Models (2) and (4) of both 
panels is smaller than in Tables 3.12 and 3.13 and loses statistical significance, 
whereas the coefficient on THAV_PBT + UNLISTED*THAV_PBT is larger than those 
in Tables 3.12 and 3.13 and statistical significance increases.  Thus, these results 
suggest that, conditional upon the firm disclosing a pre-tax profit/loss in a tax haven, 
the positive association between tax haven involvement and geographic segment 
aggregation is stronger for unlisted relative to listed EU banks. 
Similarly, we expect the positive association between tax haven involvement and 
geographic segment aggregation to be greater for firms who have a higher intensity of 
tax haven use relative to those who have a lower intensity of use.  Accordingly, we 
partition the sample into two groups, firms with a tax haven intensity above the annual 
median and firms with a tax haven intensity equal to or below the annual median.  We 
re-estimate Equation (3) and present the results in Table 3.15.  The results confirm our 
expectation.  Specifically, the estimated coefficient on THAV_PBT in all four models 
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for firms with an above median level of THAV_PBT are positive with three of the four 
coefficients significant at the 5% level.  The coefficient of 1.335 in Model (1) of Panel 
A is mildly significant (p-value = 0.105).  Conversely, all estimated coefficients on 
THAV_PBT for firms with below median tax haven intensity are negative and 
statistically insignificant. 
Overall, the evidence presented in Tables 3.12 - 3.15 supports the rejection of H2. 
3.6 Additional analysis 
This section investigates several anomalies uncovered during the study regarding 
compliance with both the CBCR and IFRS 8 requirements. 
3.6.1 Analysis of ‘Other’ category used in CBCRs 
Article 89 (Para. 1) of Directive 2013/36/EU requires each firm to publish the 
disclosure items (e.g., turnover, profit, employees) by Member State and by third 
country in which it has an establishment.  Despite this, 25 EU banks (84 firm-year 
observations) provide an incomplete picture of their geographic footprint in their 
CBCR by aggregating several countries in a category called ‘Other’ for at least one 
disclosure item.68  However, these firms may be relying on materiality benchmarks 
contained in the auditing standards.69  Indeed, two of the UK banks provide materiality 
guidelines they use to determine which countries are included in the ‘Other’ category.  
The first firm aggregates countries who each have less than £15m in turnover, while 
the second discloses that ‘Other’ includes countries with less than £10m in turnover 
in 2016 (£20m in 2015, and £50m in 2014 and 2013).70 
                                                          
68 The results are not clustered by country.  The 25 firms are headquartered in: Germany (5), Spain (4), 
Netherlands (3), Sweden (3), UK (3), Austria (2), Greece (2), Portugal (2), and Ireland (1).  
Furthermore, the ‘Other’ category is used consistently across years with 20, 21, 22, and 20 firm-year 
observations in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 respectively. 
69 Paragraph 4 of Article 89 of Directive 2013/36/EU states that the information referred to in Paragraph 
1 shall be audited in accordance with Directive 2006/43/EC from 1 January 2015 (i.e., the auditing 
requirement commences for 2014 CBCR data).  Directive 2006/43/EC (17 May 2006) covers statutory 
audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts.  Paragraph 13 requires that ‘all statutory audits be 
carried out on the basis of international auditing standards’.  Footnote 37 discusses International 
Auditing Standard 320 and the IASB guidance on materiality. 
70 Across 2013-2016, €12,425m of turnover, €339m of pre-tax profit/loss, and 68,695 employees were 
categorised as ‘Other’ representing 0.47%, 0.10%, and 0.62% of total turnover, pre-tax profit/loss, and 
employees, respectively. 
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The amounts included in ‘Other’ for each disclosure item are compared to the 
total amount for that respective disclosure item and the results are presented in Panel 
A of Table 3.16.  Overall, the mean (median) of ‘Other’ as a proportion of the total is 
-2.2% (0.4%).  This lends support to the use of the ‘Other’ category based on 
materiality.  However, in untabulated results, we find that the value of ‘Other’ 
exceeded the value of the amount for the smallest stand-alone country in 52.4% of 
firm-year-disclosure item observations.71  Furthermore, some firms reveal the 
countries constituting the ‘Other’ category.  A total of 42 countries were disclosed 
equating to 108 country observations.  Panel B of Table 3.16 presents the countries 
disclosed most often.  Luxembourg, a popular tax haven, is the country most often 
included in ‘Other’.  Other tax havens aggregated in ‘Other’ include the British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Hong Kong.72 
Since tax havens are often aggregated in ‘Other’, one may expect that firms 
utilising this generic category may be attempting to conceal their level of tax haven 
involvement.  However, these firms do not appear to differ from other sample firms 
regarding tax haven intensity.  Panel C of Table 3.14 reports the differences in means 
and medians of the variables measuring tax haven intensity for those firms using 
‘Other’ and those that do not.  Interestingly, firms that use a ‘Other’ category have a 
statistically significant lower presence in tax havens in terms of turnover.  The 
difference in mean (median) of THAV_TO is -0.008 (-0.011) significant at the 5% 
(1%) level.  Yet, the difference between intensity of tax haven use when measured 
using profit before tax or entities is statistically insignificant.  Overall, these results 
reveal that EU banks disclose tax haven activity in a ‘Other’ category in their CBCR 
but that they may do so for reasons other than to obfuscate tax haven involvement. 
3.6.2 Material countries in CBCRs not disclosed in geographic 
segment reporting 
One challenge in assessing the possibility firms withhold disclosure of geographic 
information required by IFRS 8, is that we only observe what has been disclosed in 
financial statements.  What should have been disclosed is generally unobservable.  
                                                          
71 Only country values greater than zero are counted (some are negative e.g., a pre-tax loss is reported). 
72 The remaining countries included in ‘Other’ disclosed by firms (untabulated) include Cyprus, 
Gibraltar, Liberia, Panama, and the Channel Islands (all tax havens). 
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However, public CBCR helps overcome this obstacle by providing an alternative 
source of geographic disclosure that can be used to evaluate whether geographic 
disclosures made in the segment reporting note are complete.73 
Utilising the newly available CBCR data, we first apply the materiality thresholds 
described in Section 3.3.2 to CBCR disclosures and discover several instances where 
countries deemed material are not disclosed as stand-alone geographic segments in the 
segment reporting note or as countries within entity-wide disclosures.  The five most 
prevalent non-disclosed countries at the 10% (5%) materiality threshold are the US, 
UK, Luxembourg, Italy, and Austria (US, UK, Luxembourg, Italy, and Germany).74  
Interestingly, Luxembourg ranks as the third most common material country not to be 
disclosed as a distinct geographic segment using either materiality threshold.75  Next, 
we calculate the annual firm-level ratio of the number of country geographic segments 
in the segment reporting note to the number of material countries extracted from the 
CBCR.  The mean ratio at the 10% materiality level is 1.02 which suggests geographic 
disaggregation at the segment reporting level broadly aligns with CBCR country-level 
information.  However, at the 5% materiality level, the mean ratio is 0.63, consistent 
with higher geographic aggregation at the segment reporting level. 
While these findings are prima facie evidence of potential non-compliance with 
IFRS 8, several mitigating factors require consideration.  First, IFRS 8 does not define 
‘material’ nor does it provide clear guidance on this matter allowing discretion over 
what geographic segments are disclosed.  Second, IFRS 8 does not require disclosure 
of any geographic information if it is not prepared for internal use.  Third, and more 
importantly, IFRS 8.19 posits that there may be a practical limit to the number of 
reportable segments an entity separately discloses beyond which segment information 
may become too detailed.  It states that while no precise limit has been determined, as 
the number of reportable segments increases above 10, the entity should consider 
                                                          
73 Dyreng et al. (2018) compare private Internal Revenue Service data to public disclosures of foreign 
subsidiary locations of US MNCs to explore whether firms fail to publicly disclose subsidiaries in some 
countries, even when the subsidiaries are significant and should be disclosed per Security and Exchange 
Commission rules.  They find that the propensity to omit significant subsidiaries is especially strong 
when subsidiaries are in tax havens. 
74 At the 10% (5%) materiality threshold we find 37 (62) firm-year observations for the US, 34 (56) for 
the UK, 22 (42) for Luxembourg, 18 (23) for Italy, 12 (13) for Austria, and 6 (21) for Germany. 
75 Other material countries identified at the 5% level not reported as separate geographic segments 
include the following tax havens (firm-years): Ireland (13), Singapore (8), Channel Islands (7), 
Netherlands (7), Mauritius (5), Switzerland (5), Hong Kong (4), Cayman Islands (3), and Cyprus (3). 
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whether a practical limit has been reached.  Finally, a potential concern with the 
preceding ratio is that it fails to account for ‘mismatched’ countries.  Mismatched 
countries are countries disclosed as a stand-alone geographic segment in the segment 
reporting note despite not being identified as a material country in the CBCR.76 
3.6.3 Non-disclosure of home country geographic segment or entity-
wide disclosures 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1.1, IFRS 8 mandates entity-wide disclosures of 
revenues and non-current assets for the firm’s home country and foreign countries (in 
total) irrespective of the basis used to identify operating segments.  If an individual 
foreign country is ‘material’, then country-level disclosure is required.  Surprisingly, 
in 22.9% of firm-years (80 firm-years relating to 20 sample firms) the country of 
domicile is not disclosed as a stand-alone geographic segment or as a stand-alone 
country within entity-wide disclosures.  Only 2 of the non-disclosing firms define their 
segments according to geography meaning the remaining 18 non-disclosing firms 
should, prima facie, provide entity-wide disclosures.  However, of the 18 non-
disclosing firms, 7 firms do not provide any entity-wide disclosures nor any 
explanation as to why not, while another 6 firms state that the immateriality of foreign 
operations validates the non-provision of entity-wide disclosures.  The remaining 5 
firms only disclose aggregated (non-country level) geographic segments.  This 
evidence highlights potential non-compliance with IFRS 8 although a caveat is that 
IFRS 8 does not require any geographic information to be disclosed as entity-wide 
disclosures if preparation costs are deemed excessive by the firm. 
Overall, the seemingly inconsistent disclosures for geographic segment reporting 
purposes discussed in this section and the preceding section, is puzzling.  On the one 
hand, the irregularities identified could indicate instances of possible non-compliance 
with IFRS 8 requirements.  On the other hand, they may simply be the outcome of 
                                                          
76 For example, in each year of the sample period, Credit Agricole Group discloses information for 
Japan despite the corresponding CBCR showing that at no stage Japan accounts for more 1.9% of total 
turnover or pre-tax profits.  In aggregate, at the 10% materiality level, 78 firm-years are identified where 
there is at least one country mismatch, though this decreases to 54 firm-years when the 5% materiality 
level is applied.  Interestingly, tax havens account for 28 of the 54 firm-years meaning some firms 
disclose these jurisdictions in their segment reporting note despite them being labelled as tax havens 
and not meeting materiality benchmarks.  The mismatched tax havens are (observations): Luxembourg 
(9), Latvia (5), Ireland (4), Netherlands (4), Cyprus (3), Singapore (2), and Switzerland (1). 
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compliant strategic disclosure decisions taken by firms.  Indeed, IFRS 8 affords 
managers discretion to define and report information about operating segments to best 
align external reporting with the firm’s internal organisation.  Moreover, unless 
disclosed by the firm, reasons for the inclusion or omission of certain countries from 
geographic segment reporting is unobservable. 
3.7 Robustness tests 
3.7.1 Alternative measures of geographic segment aggregation 
We follow Akamah et al. (2018) and employ alternative geographic segment 
aggregation measures that do not rely upon materiality thresholds.  Specifically, we 
re-estimate Equations (3) and (4) using versions of NOMATCH and LEVEL based 
upon the disclosure of turnover or entities in the CBCR.  First, we match countries in 
the CBCR where turnover or entities are disclosed to their related geographic title in 
the segment reporting note.  NOMATCH is the proportion of countries in the CBCR 
not disclosed as stand-alone countries in geographic segment disclosures.  Using the 
example in Appendix A, only 2 of 36 countries where turnover is reported in the 
CBCR (UK and US) can be matched to geographic segment disclosures in the segment 
note.  Thus, NOMATCH_TO equals 0.944 (34/36).  In untabulated aggregate results, 
when NOMATCH_TO (NOMATCH_ENT) is the dependent variable, the estimated 
coefficient on THAV_PBT is 0.302 (0.181) with a p-value of 0.113 (0.124). 
Second, LEVEL is the average aggregation score of all countries in the CBCR.  
Again, we employ two versions of LEVEL, one each using turnover and entities.  For 
the example in Appendix A, LEVEL_TO equals 1.903 (the total aggregation score of 
68.5 divided by 36 countries where turnover is reported).77  We also employ a 
weighted measure of LEVEL (LEVEL_WT) that weights each country’s aggregation 
score by the proportion of its turnover or entities to total turnover or entities.  This 
ensures that the aggregation level of larger countries in terms of relative turnover and 
entities is more heavily weighted in the firm’s overall aggregation score.  When 
LEVEL_TO, LEVEL_ENT, LEVEL_TO_WT, or LEVEL_ENT_WT are the dependent 
variable, we find significant positive coefficients on the variables of interest in the 
                                                          
77 The aggregation score is calculated in accordance with the scale provided in Appendix C. 
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majority of the models estimated consistent with the results in Section 3.5.3.  Overall, 
our inferences remain unchanged when we use these alternative measures of 
geographic segment aggregation. 
3.7.2 Alternative measures of tax haven intensity 
Prior studies of firm involvement in tax havens (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2016; Akamah 
et al. 2018) rely upon proxies based on the percentage of material subsidiaries located 
in tax havens.  CBCR disclosures include data on the number and location of all firm 
entities (subsidiaries and branches).  Hence, we replace THAV_PBT with THAV_ENT 
calculated as the ratio of entities disclosed in tax haven countries to total entities.  We 
re-estimate Equations (3) and (4) and report the results in Tables 3.17, 3.18, and 3.19.  
The results support the primary findings in Section 3.5.3.  In additional tests 
(untabulated), we employ THAV_TO as the tax haven intensity variable, based on 
turnover disclosed in CBCRs.  Inferences remain unchanged when using this proxy. 
3.7.3 Alternative list of tax havens 
In the primary analysis, we rely on the list of smaller ‘dot’ tax havens (List 1).  
We re-run the analysis defining tax havens per List 2.  We expect the results to differ 
from the those found in the primary analysis due to EU banks having substantial 
operations in several of these larger tax havens (e.g., Hong Kong, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Singapore, and Switzerland) and often disclosing them as stand-alone countries in 
their segment reporting note.  In line with our expectations, we fail to find an 
association between intensity of tax haven involvement and geographic segment 
aggregation.  This result is consistent with EU banks not attempting to obfuscate 
operations in larger tax havens that offer benefits over and above tax minimisation. 
3.7.4 Changes analysis 
Despite the models including controls found in prior studies to be determinants of 
variation in levels of segment disclosure and tax haven use, concerns remain that we 
have not controlled for unobservable firm characteristics.  To mitigate concerns 
regarding correlated omitted variables, we re-estimate Equations (3) and (4) in first 
differences (Stock and Watson 2012).  However, the feasibility of the changes 
specifications is reduced because our small sample size likely impacts the power of 
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our empirical tests to detect an association.  In untabulated results, we find 
insignificant coefficients on ∆THAV_PBT and ∆THAV_ENT when both versions of 
∆NOMATCH_MAT and ∆LEVEL_MAT are the dependent variables (e.g., the 
estimated coefficient on ∆THAV_PBT is 0.321 with a p-value of 0.209 when 
∆NOMATCH_MAT_10 is the dependent variable).  However, the coefficient on 
∆THAV_TO is 2.700 (4.142) with a p-value of 0.046 (0.075) when 
∆NOMATCH_MAT_10 (∆LEVEL_MAT_10) is the dependent variable. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This study examines a unique aspect of the EU institutional setting where, since 
2013, EU banks are required to provide two different forms of geographic reporting 
for the same period.  CBCR emanates from an EU Directive imposed on these firms 
while segment reporting is required by firms preparing their consolidated financial 
statements in accordance with IFRS.  Accordingly, we investigate several issues 
regarding the potential interplay between the two disclosure requirements.  First, our 
hand-collected CBCR data provides deeper insight into the location of EU banks’ 
businesses including the extent to which they operate in tax havens.  We document 
that, on average, EU banks with tax haven operations enjoy significantly higher profit 
margins, turnover per employee, and profit per employee, and lower effective tax 
rates, relative to non-tax havens.  These findings are consistent with the results of prior 
studies that show firms obtain financial benefits from operating in tax havens. 
We do not find any evidence of a change in the number of geographic segments, 
country segments, or number of line items per geographic segment, reported in 
segment notes after the introduction of CBCR.  These results are corroborated when 
we compare EU banks to EU insurers in a difference-in-differences research design.  
Overall, these results suggest CBCR has had little impact on geographic segment 
reporting.  Exploiting the granularity of the CBCR data, we apply materiality 
thresholds to identify material countries more likely to be disclosed as stand-alone 
geographic segments in the segment reporting note.  We then employ several 
aggregation measures and test the relationship between the intensity of tax haven 
involvement and geographic segment aggregation.  Consistent with the results of 
Akamah et al. (2018), we find evidence of a positive association, suggesting that EU 
banks operating in tax havens strategically aggregate geographic segments potentially 
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to obfuscate tax haven involvement.  The final part of our study, although primarily 
descriptive, provides insights into several irregularities uncovered regarding 
compliance with CBCR requirements and IFRS 8. 
Our findings are subject to several caveats.  First, CBCR has been in force for a 
relatively short period, so this study provides early empirical evidence.  Second, our 
study is restricted to one industry and therefore our sample is not representative of the 
population of firms operating in the EU.  Third, our sample size is relatively small, so 
we may lack statistical power to detect some effects.  Finally, although we exploit an 
exogenous shock to EU banks, we have been unable to provide convincing evidence 
to allay concerns regarding endogeneity and omitted correlated variables.  
Nevertheless, understanding the interplay between different forms of geographic 
reporting is informative to policy makers and standard setters. 
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3.9 Tables and figures 
Table 3.1: Sample selection procedure 
This table reports an overview of the sample selection process.  Panel A outlines the sample selection procedure for the main sample of EU banks.  Panel B outlines the sample selection procedure 
for the control sample of EU insurers. 
Panel A: EU banks 
Selection criteria Firms 
European Banking Authority (EBA) List of Institutions for Supervisory Reporting as at January 2016 198 
Less: Firms from Norway not subject to CBCR disclosure rules (3) 
Less: Subsidiaries of firms headquartered in other EU countries to avoid double-counting e.g., HSBC appears in France and Malta despite it being 
a UK headquartered firm 
(49) 
Less: Subsidiaries of firms headquartered in non-EU countries for which consolidated IFRS financial statements are not available e.g., Goldman 
Sachs Group UK Limited 
(22) 
Less: Purely domestic firms (only operate in one country) (36) 
Less: Firms for which English language financial statements could not be obtained (14) 
Less: Firms for which no CBCR could be found (4) 
Less: Firms not collected due to small size of total assets (7) 
Less: Firms who commence or cease business during the sample period (3) 
Add: Firms for which English language consolidated IFRS financial statement and CBCRs were readily found during the data collection process 
i.e., BKS Bank, BTV, CIC, Credit Agricole SA, Credit Suisse International Limited, Investec Bank, Natixis, Oberbank, Van Lanschot, Wustenrot 
& Wurttembergische 
10 
Final sample 70 
167 
Table 3.1: Sample selection procedure (continued) 
This table reports an overview of the sample selection process.  Panel A outlines the sample selection procedure for the main sample of EU banks.  Panel B outlines the sample selection procedure 
for the control sample of EU insurers. 
 
Panel B: EU insurers 
Selection criteria Firms 
  
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) List of Identified Insurance Groups for Supervision as at November 2015 102 
EU insurers downloaded from Datastream for the same 14 countries as the EU bank sample  106 
 208 
Less: Firms included in both lists (27) 
Less: Firms not reporting in all years due to business commencement, acquisition, or merger during the sample period (52) 
Less: Firms from EU countries not included in the primary sample of EU banks e.g., Finland, Poland (6) 
Less: Firms who are subsidiaries of EU banks (23) 
Less: Firms whose financial statements are not prepared in accordance with IFRS accounting standards (23) 
Less: Firms for which English language financial statements could not be obtained (9) 
Less: Firms from non-EU countries e.g., Norway, Switzerland, Bermuda (XL Group switched its domicile from Ireland to Bermuda during the 
sample period) 
(8) 
Less: Purely domestic firms (only operate in one country) (6) 
Less: Firms with missing data to calculate variables (15) 
Final sample 39 
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Table 3.2: Primary sample composition – EU banks 
This table presents an overview of the primary sample.  Panel A lists the firms in alphabetical order (with the 14 
GSIBs listed first).  Total assets are measured as at the end of the 2016 fiscal year (31 December 2016 for all firms 
except Investec Bank and Nationwide Building Society which have 31 March and 4 April year-ends respectively).  
Total assets reported in local currency are converted to Euros using the foreign exchange rate as at fiscal year-end.  
Panel B presents the sample composition by country.  Panel C presents the split of total assets for the 2016 fiscal 
year by firm type. 
Panel A: Primary sample composition by firm – EU banks 
 Firm Country GSIB Listed Total Assets (€m) 
1 Barclays UK Yes Yes 1,421,746 
2 BBVA  Spain Yes* Yes 731,856 
3 BNP Paribas France Yes Yes 2,076,959 
4 Credit Agricole Group France Yes No 1,722,849 
5 Deutsche Bank Germany Yes Yes 1,590,546 
6 Groupe BPCE France Yes No 1,235,240 
7 HSBC UK Yes Yes 2,257,345 
8 ING Bank Netherlands Yes No 843,919 
9 Nordea Sweden Yes Yes 613,778 
10 Royal Bank of Scotland UK Yes Yes 936,000 
11 Santander Spain Yes Yes 1,339,125 
12 Societe Generale France Yes Yes 1,382,241 
13 Standard Chartered UK Yes Yes 614,659 
14 UniCredit Italy Yes Yes 859,533 
15 ABN AMRO Netherlands No Yes 394,482 
16 Allied Irish Banks Ireland No Yes 95,622 
17 Alpha Bank Greece No Yes 64,872 
18 Argenta Spaarbank Belgium No No 36,156 
19 Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena 
Italy No Yes 153,178 
20 Banco BPI Group Portugal No Yes 38,727 
21 Banco Comercial Portugues 
Group 
Portugal No Yes 71,265 
22 Banco Popolare Group Italy No Yes 117,411 
23 Banco Popolare Espanol Spain No Yes 147,926 
24 Banco Sabadell Spain No Yes 212,508 
25 Bank fur Tirol und Vorarlberg 
(BTV) 
Austria No Yes 10,014 
26 Bank of Cyprus Cyprus No Yes 22,172 
27 Bank of Ireland Ireland No Yes 123,129 
28 Bankia SA Spain No Yes 190,167 
29 Bankinter Spain No Yes 67,182 
30 Bayerische Landesbank Germany No No 212,150 
31 Belfius Bank Belgium No No 176,721 
32 BKS Bank Austria No Yes 7,581 
*BBVA was classified as a GSIB for all years in the sample period except 2016. 
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Table 3.2: Primary sample composition (continued) 
Panel A: Primary sample composition by firm – EU banks (continued) 
 Firm Country GSIB Listed Total Assets (€m) 
33 CaixaBank Group Spain No Yes 347,927 
34 Caixa Geral de Depositos Portugal No No 93,547 
35 CIC France No Yes 269,316 
36 Commerzbank Germany No Yes 480,450 
37 Credit Agricole SA France No Yes 1,524,232 
38 Credit Mutuel Group France No No 793,522 
39 Credit Suisse International UK No No 315,875 
40 Danske Bank Denmark No Yes 468,515 
41 DekaBank Germany No No 85,955 
42 DZ Bank Germany No No 509,447 
43 Erste Group Austria No Yes 208,227 
44 Eurobank Ergasis Greece No Yes 66,393 
45 Gruppo UBI Banca Italy No Yes 112,384 
46 HSH Nordbank Germany No No 84,365 
47 Intesa Sanpaolo Italy No Yes 725,100 
48 Investec Bank UK No No 21,537 
49 Jyske Bank Denmark No Yes 78,905 
50 KBC Bank Belgium No No 239,333 
51 La Banque Postale France No No 229,577 
52 Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg Germany No No 243,620 
53 Landesbank Hessen-Thuringen Germany No No 165,164 
54 Lloyds Banking Group UK No Yes 958,428 
55 National Bank of Greece Greece No Yes 78,531 
56 Nationwide Building Society UK No No 258,567 
57 Natixis France No Yes 527,859 
58 NORD/LB Norddeutsche 
Landesbank 
Germany No No 174,797 
59 Nykredit Realkredit Group Denmark No No 188,366 
60 Oberbank Austria No Yes 19,159 
61 Piraeus Bank Group Greece No Yes 81,501 
62 Rabobank Netherlands No No 662,593 
63 Raiffeisen Bank International Austria No Yes 111,864 
64 Skandinaviska Enkilda Banken 
(SEB) 
Sweden No Yes 273,462 
65 Svenska Handelsbanken Sweden No Yes 274,185 
66 Swedbank Sweden No Yes 224,789 
67 Sydbank Denmark No Yes 19,728 
68 Van Lanschot Netherlands No Yes 14,877 
69 Volkswagen Financial Services Germany No No 130,148 
70 Wustenrot & Wurttembergische Germany No Yes 72,276 
     30,901,581 
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Table 3.2: Primary sample composition (continued) 
Panel B: Primary sample composition by country – EU banks 
Country Firms % GSIBs % Listed % Total 
Assets 
(€m)  
% 
         
Austria 5 7.1% 0 0.0% 5 10.4% 356,844 1.2% 
Belgium 3 4.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 452,210 1.5% 
Cyprus 1 1.5% 0 0.0% 1 2.1% 22,172 0.1% 
Denmark 4 5.7% 0 0.0% 3 6.3% 755,514 2.4% 
France 9 12.9% 4 28.6% 5 10.4% 9,761,795 31.6% 
Germany 11 15.7% 1 7.1% 3 6.3% 3,748,917 12.1% 
Greece 4 5.7% 0 0.0% 4 8.3% 291,297 0.9% 
Ireland 2 2.9% 0 0.0% 2 4.2% 218,751 0.7% 
Italy 5 7.1% 1 7.1% 5 10.4% 1,967,606 6.4% 
Netherlands 4 5.7% 1 7.1% 2 4.2% 1,915,871 6.2% 
Portugal  3 4.3% 0 0.0% 2 4.2% 203,540 0.7% 
Spain 7 10.0% 2 14.3% 7 14.6% 3,036,692 9.8% 
Sweden 4 5.7% 1 7.1% 4 8.3% 1,386,214 4.5% 
UK 8 11.4% 4 28.6% 5 10.4% 6,784,158 21.9% 
Total 70 100.0% 14 100.0% 48 100.0% 30,901,581 100.0% 
 
Panel C: Total assets by firm type – EU banks (2016 fiscal year) 
Firm type Mean (€m) Median (€m) Min (€m) Max (€m) 
GSIB 1,258,985 1,287,183 613,778 2,257,345 
Non-GSIB 237,068 159,171 7,581 1,524,232 
Listed 468,294 210,367 7,581 2,257,345 
Unlisted 382,884 220,864 21,537 1,772,849 
All firms 441,451 212,329 7,581 2,257,345 
171 
Table 3.3: Control sample composition – EU insurers 
This table presents an overview of the control sample.  Panel A lists the firms in alphabetical order.  Total assets 
are measured as at the end of the 2016 fiscal year (31 December 2016 for all firms).  Total assets reported in local 
currency are converted to Euros using the foreign exchange at fiscal year end.  Panel B presents the sample 
composition by country.  Panel C presents the split of total assets by firm type. 
Panel A: Control sample composition by firm - EU insurers 
 Firm Country Listed Total Assets (€m) 
1 Achmea Netherlands N 91,015 
2 ACHP UK Y 28 
3 Admiral Group UK Y 4,367 
4 Aegon Netherlands Y 414,640 
5 Ageas Belgium Y 103,459 
6 Allianz Germany Y 864,489 
7 Amlin UK Y 11,615 
8 APRIL France Y 1,420 
9 Assicurazioni Generali Italy Y 513,611 
10 Aviva UK Y 506,784 
11 AXA France Y 876,378 
12 Beazley UK Y 5,622 
13 BUPA UK N 15,833 
14 Cattolica Ass Italy Y 22,987 
15 Chesnara UK Y 6,799 
16 CNP Assurances France Y 395,081 
17 Delta Lloyd Netherlands Y 75,401 
18 Euler Hermes France Y 5,180 
19 Groupama France N 90,484 
20 Grupo Catalana Spain Y 12,921 
21 Hannover Re Germany Y 60,277 
22 Jardine Lloyd Thompson UK Y 2,994 
23 Legal & General UK Y 542,039 
24 MAPFRE Spain Y 63,612 
25 Munich Re Germany Y 256,336 
26 Novae Group UK Y 2,323 
27 Old Mutual UK Y 197,309 
28 Phoenix Group UK Y 96,150 
29 Prudential UK Y 546,352 
30 RSA Insurance Group UK Y 21,819 
31 SCOR France Y 41,248 
32 St James’s Place UK Y 87,595 
33 Standard Life UK Y 216,893 
34 Talanx Germany Y 148,036 
35 Tryg Denmark Y 6,432 
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Table 3.3: Control sample composition – EU insurers (continued) 
Panel A: Control sample composition by firm - EU insurers (continued) 
 Firm Country Listed Total Assets (€m) 
36 Unipol Gruppo Italy Y 89,911 
37 UNIQA Insurance  Austria Y 32,990 
38 Vienna Insurance Austria Y 48,885 
39 Vittoria Assicurazioni Italy Y 3,582 
    6,484,878 
 
Panel B: Control sample composition by country – EU insurers 
Country Firms % Listed % Total 
Assets 
(€m)  
% 
       
Austria 2 5.1% 2 5.6% 81,875 1.3% 
Belgium 1 2.6% 1 2.8% 103,459 1.6% 
Denmark 1 2.6% 1 2.8% 6,432 0.1% 
France 6 15.3% 5 13.8% 1,409,791 21.7% 
Germany 4 10.3% 4 11.1% 1,329,138 20.5% 
Italy 4 10.3% 4 11.1% 630,091 9.7% 
Netherlands 3 7.7% 2 5.6% 583,056 9.0% 
Spain 2 5.1% 2 5.6% 76,533 1.2% 
UK 16 41.0% 
4 
28.6% 
15 41.6% 2,264,502 34.9% 
Total 39 100.0% 36 100.0% 6,484,878 100.0% 
 
Panel C: Total assets by firm type – EU insurers (2016 fiscal year) 
Firm type Mean (€m) Median (€m) Min (€m) Max (€m) 
All firms 166,279 63,612 28 876,378 
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis.  The full sample comprises observations spanning 2012-2016 (2013-2016 for CBCR related variables).  All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  Significant differences in the means and medians are based on two-sided t-tests and Wilcoxon median tests, respectively.  ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 Full sample (109 firms) EU Banks (70 firms) EU Insurers (39 firms) 
 Obs. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median 
GEO_SEG 545 0.204 0.403 0.000 0.000 0.000 350 0.160 0.000 195 0.282*** 0.000*** 
NUM_GEO_SEG 545 4.404 3.636 2.000 4.000 7.000 350 4.037 4.000 195 5.062*** 4.000*** 
NUM_CTRY_SEG 545 2.319 2.954 1.000 1.000 3.000 350 1.994 1.000 195 2.903*** 2.000*** 
NUMITEMS_GEO_SEG 545 14.202 19.004 1.000 5.000 23.000 350 11.863 3.000 195 18.400*** 8.000*** 
NOMATCH_MAT_10 261 0.374 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.750 261 0.374 0.415 - - - 
NOMATCH_MAT_5 261 0.481 0.398 0.000 0.500 0.830 261 0.481 0.398 - - - 
LEVEL_MAT_10 261 1.082 1.488 0.000 0.000 1.417 261 1.082 1.488 - - - 
LEVEL_MAT_5 261 1.296 1.434 0.000 0.750 1.833 261 1.296 1.434 - - - 
THAV_PBT 222 0.043 0.123 0.000 0.001 0.045 222 0.043 0.123 - - - 
THAV_TO 261 0.020 0.031 0.000 0.007 0.030 261 0.020 0.031 - - - 
THAV_ENT 280 0.102 0.114 0.031 0.062 0.134 280 0.102 0.114 - - - 
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics (continued) 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis.  The full sample comprises observations spanning 2012-2016 (2013-2016 for CBCR related variables).  All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  Significant differences in the means and medians are based on two-sided t-tests and Wilcoxon median tests, respectively.  ***, **, 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 Full sample (109 firms) EU Banks (70 firms) EU Insurers (39 firms) 
 Obs. Mean SD P25 P50 P75 Obs. Mean Median Obs. Mean Median 
UNLISTED 545 0.229 0.421 0.000 0.000 0.000 350 0.314 0.000 195 0.077*** 0.000*** 
SIZE 545 18.597 1.748 17.612 18.847 19.885 350 19.180 19.176 195 17.550*** 17.899*** 
ROA 545 0.009 0.019 0.002 0.005 0.009 350 0.002 0.004 195 0.021*** 0.010*** 
LEV 545 0.910 0.083 0.905 0.937 0.954 350 0.936 0.942 195 0.863*** 0.909*** 
INTANG 545 0.018 0.040 0.002 0.006 0.016 350 0.006 0.004 195 0.040*** 0.018*** 
CAPINT 545 0.010 0.022 0.002 0.005 0.010 350 0.006 0.005 195 0.017*** 0.007*** 
REVGRTH 545 0.018 0.299 -0.086 -0.021 0.048 350 -0.038 -0.042 195 0.118*** 0.031*** 
∆TLCF 545 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 350 -0.000 -0.000 195 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
TLCF_DUM 545 0.851 0.356 1.000 1.000 1.000 350 0.863 1.000 195 0.831*** 1.000*** 
NUM_CTRY_ENT 545 21.457 19.331 7.000 14.000 34.000 350 20.183 12.000 195 23.744*** 18.000*** 
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Table 3.5: Correlations matrix 
This table presents the correlations between the variables used in the empirical analysis.  Panel A (Panel B) presents the results for the full sample (EU banks only).  Pearson (Spearman) correlation 
coefficients are shown below (above) the diagonal.  Significant (p-value < 0.05) coefficients are reported in bold.  All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
Panel A: Full sample (Changes in segment reporting tests) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) NUM_GEO_SEG  0.777 0.465 -0.032 0.280 0.132 -0.095 0.064 0.557 
(2) NUM_CTRY_SEG 0.840  0.508 -0.049 0.069 0.114 -0.101 -0.007 0.204 
(3) NUMITEMS_GEO_SEG 0.256 0.243  -0.003 -0.012 0.116 -0.130 0.019 0.248 
(4) POST -0.011 -0.007 0.019  0.006 0.114 -0.131 -0.046 -0.011 
(5) SIZE 0.197 0.070 0.002 0.012  -0.375 0.572 -0.069 0.529 
(6) ROA 0.084 0.003 0.025 0.028 -0.517  -0.503 0.349 0.058 
(7) LEV -0.076 0.015 -0.045 -0.045 0.642 -0.657  -0.105 -0.003 
(8 REVGRTH -0.081 -0.063 -0.012 -0.038 -0.030 0.093 0.053  0.130 
(9) NUM_CTRY_ENT 0.432 0.142 0.036 -0.009 0.464 0.094 -0.027 -0.006  
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Table 3.5: Correlations matrix (continued) 
This table presents the correlations between the variables used in the empirical analysis.  Panel A (Panel B) presents the results for the full sample (EU banks only).  Pearson (Spearman) correlation 
coefficients are shown below (above) the diagonal.  Significant (p-value < 0.05) coefficients are reported in bold.  All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
Panel B: EU banks only (Geographic segment aggregation tests) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) NOMATCH_MAT_10  0.921 0.976 0.870 0.124 0.104 0.048 -0.180 -0.053 0.041 0.201 0.024 0.036 -0.082 0.076 
(2) NOMATCH_MAT_5 0.888  0.896 0.959 0.154 0.163 0.113 -0.218 -0.029 0.050 0.244 0.058 0.013 -0.041 0.142 
(3) LEVEL_MAT_10 0.900 0.792  0.890 0.095 0.095 -0.003 -0.196 -0.085 0.032 0.224 0.015 0.030 -0.093 0.014 
(4) LEVEL_MAT_5 0.854 0.865 0.956  0.121 0.167 0.047 -0.228 -0.051 0.007 0.249 0.034 -0.009 -0.050 0.065 
(5) THAV_PBT 0.217 0.213 0.127 0.126  0.151 0.408 0.071 0.279 0.120 -0.201 0.102 0.052 0.062 0.366 
(6) UNLISTED 0.101 0.187 0.118 0.176 0.097  0.016 0.019 0.300 -0.311 -0.342 0.064 0.034 -0.136 -0.081 
(7) SIZE 0.009 0.141 -0.200 -0.156 0.184 0.046  -0.114 0.413 0.406 -0.170 0.164 -0.019 0.223 0.741 
(8) ROA -0.035 -0.082 -0.063 -0.092 0.023 0.136 0.040  -0.185 -0.070 -0.155 0.256 -0.063 -0.150 -0.160 
(9) LEV -0.094 -0.073 -0.121 -0.121 0.128 0.244 0.361 -0.128  -0.234 -0.511 0.067 0.095 -0.116 0.114 
(10) INTANG 0.090 0.127 0.056 0.057 -0.033 -0.260 0.219 -0.067 -0.216  0.180 0.068 -0.044 -0.184 0.395 
(11) CAPINT 0.202 0.218 0.232 0.239 -0.157 -0.368 -0.216 -0.220 -0.343 0.198  -0.092 -0.073 0.153 0.102 
(12) REVGRTH 0.040 0.070 0.005 0.011 -0.053 -0.049 0.088 0.224 0.050 0.071 0.011  0.178 -0.051 0.129 
(13) ∆TLCF -0.015 -0.014 0.001 -0.009 -0.022 -0.061 -0.051 -0.340 -0.010 0.092 0.137 0.077  -0.219 -0.027 
(14) TLCF_DUM -0.102 -0.018 -0.220 -0.177 0.071 -0.088 0.281 -0.133 -0.050 0.176 0.104 -0.087 -0.083  0.444 
(15) NUM_CTRY_ENT 0.105 0.220 -0.156 -0.115 0.208 -0.101 0.734 0.068 0.112 0.236 0.050 0.136 -0.057 0.320  
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Table 3.6: Country-level profit shifting indicators calculated from CBCR data 
This table presents a summary of key profit shifting indicators calculated from CBCR data.  Panel A presents the results for the top 30 countries ranked by frequency of firm-year-country 
observations of turnover or profit/loss before tax while Panel B presents the results for the remaining tax havens.  Panel C presents overall totals.  EU denotes those countries who are members of 
the European Union while TH_L1 (TH_L2) denotes tax havens included on List 1 (List 2).  Tax havens have been shaded in grey.  †Channel Islands includes Guernsey and Jersey. 
Panel A: Top 30 countries disclosed in CBCRs 
Country Rank Freq EU TH_L1 TH_L2 Employees Entities Profit margin 
Turnover 
per employee (€m) 
Profit 
per employee (€m) 
      Mean Rank Mean Rank Median Rank Median Rank Median Rank 
United Kingdom 1 174 Y N N 7,723 3 43.9 2 0.351 67 0.572 12 0.129 25 
United States 2 165 N N N 2,451 17 29.2 6 0.363 64 0.715 6 0.225 12 
Germany 3 156 Y N N 4,642 7 37.2 3 0.274 104 0.333 34 0.097 37 
Luxembourg 4 152 Y Y Y 426 88 11.1 12 0.549 19 0.501 14 0.255 11 
France 5 119 Y N N 16,767 1 66.0 1 0.237 115 0.294 40 0.079 40 
Ireland 6 118 Y N Y 926 57 14.3 11 0.566 14 0.606 9 0.318 7 
Switzerland 7 108 N N Y 369 92 3.0 66 0.125 132 0.344 31 0.047 71 
Singapore 8 106 N N Y 854 60 5.5 33 0.305 86 0.378 27 0.118 30 
Spain 9 104 Y N N 5,941 5 25.5 7 0.250 110 0.385 25 0.072 44 
Netherlands 10 101 Y N Y 3,538 10 17.6 9 0.437 38 0.371 28 0.134 22 
Poland 10 101 Y N N 3,393 12 5.7 32 0.324 78 0.102 101 0.030 98 
Italy 12 96 Y N N 8,675 2 14.3 10 0.185 125 0.275 44 0.059 62 
China 13 92 N N N 1,409 43 2.9 69 0.403 54 0.288 42 0.125 26 
Belgium  14 80 Y N N 2,419 20 7.1 26 0.325 77 0.324 36 0.109 31 
Brazil 15 77 N N N 3,550 9 5.3 34 0.302 87 0.338 32 0.105 34 
Czech Repub. 15 77 Y N N 1,856 30 6.7 28 0.425 42 0.167 63 0.074 41 
Other 17 76 - - - 1,010 51 1.5 101 0.274 105 0.261 47 0.031 96 
Austria 18 75 Y N N 1,579 35 33.1 4 0.326 76 0.280 43 0.069 47 
Romania 19 74 Y N N 1,852 31 6.3 30 0.103 135 0.073 122 0.007 130 
Russia 19 74 N N N 1,843 32 2.9 68 0.395 58 0.222 53 0.073 42 
Hong Kong 21 73 N N Y 2,435 18 8.7 18 0.287 91 0.388 24 0.107 32 
Portugal 21 73 Y N N 1,866 28 8.5 21 0.407 50 0.199 57 0.048 69 
Channel Islands† 23 72 N Y Y 343 95 10.9 13 0.488 29 0.395 23 0.175 17 
Australia 24 68 N N N 313 98 7.1 25 0.375 61 0.485 16 0.165 19 
Sweden 24 68 Y N N 1,866 29 8.6 19 0.348 69 0.415 19 0.174 18 
Japan 26 67 N N N 251 108 3.2 62 0.406 52 0.515 13 0.186 15 
Denmark 27 61 Y N N 1,713 34 6.6 29 0.278 102 0.428 18 0.134 21 
Hungary 28 59 Y N N 956 54 8.6 20 0.285 96 0.143 74 0.039 84 
India 29 57 N N N 6,146 4 4.1 48 0.469 34 0.052 136 0.015 121 
Turkey 29 57 N N N 3,454 11 3.1 64 0.321 80 0.111 91 0.034 90 
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Table 3.6: Country-level profit shifting indicators calculated from CBCR data (continued) 
Panel B: Tax havens not included in the top 30 countries disclosed in CBCRs 
Country* Rank Freq EU TH_L1 TH_L2 Employees Entities Profit margin 
Turnover 
per employee (€m) 
Profit 
per employee (€m) 
      Mean Rank Mean Rank Median Rank Median Rank Median Rank 
Cayman Islands 31 55 N Y Y 15 141 9.6 17 1.000 2 0.584 11 -0.005 136 
Monaco 45 37 N Y Y 196 113 2.0 82 0.394 59 0.327 35 0.130 23 
Latvia 48 31 Y N Y 551 75 1.4 109 0.214 118 0.133 80 0.033 93 
Mauritius 53 27 N Y Y 291 102 3.3 58 0.432 39 0.117 88 0.068 48 
Isle of Man 58 24 N Y Y 219 111 4.5 42 0.572 12 0.401 22 0.185 16 
Bermuda 61 20 N Y Y 305 99 2.6 72 1.000 2 2.345 2 0.124 29 
Cyprus 61 20 Y Y Y 946 56 24.0 8 0.148 129 0.218 54 -0.011 137 
Malta 63 19 Y Y Y 444 87 4.6 41 0.963 5 0.148 70 0.053 64 
Uruguay 68 16 N N Y 408 90 3.0 65 0.237 114 0.203 56 0.051 66 
Bahamas 74 14 N Y Y 28 133 2.7 71 0.283 98 0.353 30 0.220 14 
Bahrain 83 11 N Y Y 82 128 4.3 46 0.301 89 0.294 41 0.063 52 
Gibraltar 83 11 N Y Y 365 93 2.0 83 0.285 97 0.214 55 0.073 43 
Botswana 88 9 N N Y 147 119 1.8 94 0.313 84 0.145 72 0.068 49 
Lebanon 88 9 N N Y 842 62 3.6 56 0.300 90 0.098 106 0.026 105 
Brunei 100 7 N Y Y 291 103 1.9 91 0.333 75 0.084 114 0.028 101 
Macau 100 7 N Y Y 101 124 1.0 121 0.650 8 1.122 3 0.742 2 
Marshall Islands 110 4 N Y Y - - 31.2 5 1.075 1 - - - - 
Panama 110 4 N N Y 5 145 1.2 115 0.517 23 0.700 8 0.600 4 
Vanuatu 110 4 N Y Y 115 122 2.0 83 0.400 55 0.093 109 0.036 86 
Cape Verde 132 3 N Y Y 584 72 4.5 43 0.098 137 0.050 137 0.005 133 
Maldives 132 3 N Y Y 27 134 - - 0.852 6 0.748 5 0.655 3 
Dutch Antilles 140 2 N Y Y 7 144 1.0 121 - - 0.310 39 - - 
Liechtenstein 140 2 N Y Y 18 140 1.0 121 - - 0.227 51 - - 
Seychelles 140 2 N Y Y 196 114 1.3 113 0.489 28 0.142 76 0.069 46 
British Virgin Is. 146 1 N Y Y - - 4.4 45 1.000 2 - - - - 
Cook Islands 146 1 N Y Y - - 4.5 43 - - - - - - 
*Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Samoa, and US Virgin Islands had a frequency of 0 (no turnover or profit/loss before tax recorded in these jurisdictions).  However, some firms have 
entities located in these tax havens. 
  
179 
Table 3.6: Country-level profit shifting indicators calculated from CBCR data (continued) 
Panel C: Overall totals 
Totals  Freq. Employees Entities Profit margin 
Turnover per 
employee (€m) 
Profit per 
employee (€m) 
Book effective tax 
rate 
Cash effective tax 
rate 
   Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
                 
EU  2,034 2,866 498 14.0 3.6 0.546 0.332 0.669 0.264 0.401 0.086 0.131 0.188 0.189 0.137 
Non-EU  2,549 844 464 3.1 2.1 0.064 0.360 0.345 0.260 0.111 0.097 0.225 0.237 0.243 0.222 
  4,583               
                 
Tax havens List 1 (L1) 498 250 161 5.4 3.0 0.571 0.566 0.959 0.434 0.568 0.159 0.118 0.151 0.165 0.162 
Non-havens  4,085 1,392 520 5.0 2.0 0.092 0.320 0.319 0.233 0.111 0.085 0.208 0.231 0.239 0.207 
  4,583               
                 
Tax havens List 2 (L2) 1,073 502 186 5.4 2.9 0.187 0.487 0.808 0.401 0.463 0.156 0.150 0.164 0.186 0.164 
Non-havens  3,510 1,425 545 4.9 2.1 0.152 0.319 0.303 0.223 0.096 0.079 0.210 0.235 0.241 0.211 
  4,583               
                 
EU Non-tax havens 1,843 3,137 537 14.1 3.8 0.562 0.306 0.432 0.261 0.156 0.084 0.141 0.199 0.193 0.139 
 Tax havens (L1) 191 605 174 13.2 2.3 0.414 0.553 2.641 0.289 2.445 0.099 0.052 0.098 0.168 0.125 
  2,034               
                 
Non-EU Non-tax havens 2,242 995 516 2.8 1.8 -0.029 0.324 0.290 0.225 0.099 0.085 0.231 0.242 0.255 0.230 
 Tax havens (L1) 307 187 159 4.4 3.1 0.599 0.568 0.662 0.459 0.192 0.171 0.151 0.178 0.164 0.174 
  2,549               
                 
EU Non-tax havens  1,593 3,337 592 14.5 3.7 0.893 0.292 0.376 0.246 0.100 0.074 0.147 0.204 0.190 0.145 
 Tax havens (L2) 441 1,139 153 12.1 3.3 -0.724 0.479 1.744 0.330 1.506 0.130 0.074 0.129 0.187 0.109 
  2,034               
                 
Non-EU Non-tax havens 1,917 973 533 2.7 1.8 -0.029 0.326 0.285 0.218 0.095 0.080 0.229 0.245 0.259 0.233 
 Tax havens (L2) 632 343 194 4.2 2.9 0.415 0.489 0.574 0.419 0.179 0.163 0.195 0.184 0.186 0.183 
  2,549               
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Table 3.7: Distribution of key CBCR disclosure items by tax haven 
This table presents the distribution of key disclosure items by tax haven for the top 15 tax havens.  Amounts presented are averages over the 2013-2016 period.  The home country activities of 
banks headquartered in Cyprus, Ireland, and Netherlands have been treated as non-tax haven activities. 
 Bermuda 
Cayman 
Islands 
Channel 
Islands 
Cyprus Hong Kong Ireland Isle of Man Latvia Luxembourg 
Turnover €237m €45m €1,839m €311m €18,258m €3,971m €361m €460m €11,041m 
     % Tax havens 0.5% 0.1% 3.6% 0.6% 35.5% 7.7% 0.7% 0.9% 21.5% 
     % All countries 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 2.8% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 1.7% 
Profit/loss before tax €89m €213m €1,020m (€135m) €7,186m €811m €198m €180m €5,081m 
     % Tax havens 0.6% 1.3% 6.3% (0.8%) 44.5% 5.0% 1.2% 1.1% 31.4% 
     % All countries 0.1% 0.2% 1.2% (0.2%) 8.2% 0.9% 0.2% 0.2% 5.8% 
Employees 458 38 3,775 1,307 43,830 7,537 1,038 3,723 15,460 
     % Tax havens 0.4% 0.0% 3.0% 1.0% 34.8% 6.0% 0.8% 3.0% 12.3% 
     % All countries 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 1.6% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 0.6% 
Entities 33 283 317 84 210 456 47 12 586 
     % Tax havens 1.1% 9.8% 11.0% 2.9% 7.3% 15.8% 1.6% 0.4% 20.3% 
     % All countries 0.2% 1.8% 2.0% 0.5% 1.3% 2.8% 0.3% 0.1% 3.6% 
          
 
Malta Mauritius Monaco Netherlands Singapore Switzerland 
Other tax 
havens 
Total 
Tax havens 
Total 
All countries 
Turnover €230m €475m €643m €1,608m €7,174m €3,495m €1,271m €51,419m €655,297m 
     % Tax havens 0.4% 0.9% 1.3% 3.1% 14.0% 6.8% 2.5% 100.0% - 
     % All countries 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 1.1% 0.5% 0.2% 7.8% - 
Profit/loss before tax €129m €343m €191m (€29m) €1,323m (€816m) €375m €16,160m €87,451m 
     % Tax havens 0.8% 2.1% 1.2% (0.2%) 8.2% (5.0%) 2.3% 100.0% - 
     % All countries 0.1% 0.4% 0.2% (0.0%) 1.5% (0.9%) 0.4% 18.5% - 
Employees 998 1,892 1,717 4,029 23,285 9,599 7,4229 126,105 2,768,498 
     % Tax havens 0.8% 1.5% 1.4% 3.2% 18.5% 7.6% 5.9% 100.0% - 
     % All countries 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.8% 0.3% 0.3% 4.6% - 
Entities 37 37 19 265 142 99 256 2,881 16,131 
     % Tax havens 1.3% 1.3% 0.7% 9.2% 4.9% 3.4% 8.9% 100.0% - 
     % All countries 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 1.6% 0.9% 0.6% 1.6% 17.9% - 
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Table 3.8: Tests of profit shifting indicators between tax havens and non-tax havens 
This table reports the means of the profit shifting indicators and the difference in means between tax havens and non-tax havens.  Statistics are provided for unconditional means and means 
conditional upon tax haven use.  All variables are defined in Appendix C.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Profit margin Tax haven Obs. Total Tax haven Non-tax haven Difference t-stat p-value 
Unconditional means List 1 222 0.130 0.313 0.122 0.190*** 4.26 0.000 
 List 2 222 0.130 0.236 0.119 0.117*** 2.68 0.008 
Conditional means List 1 149 0.109 0.466 0.097 0.369*** 6.36 0.000 
 List 2 173 0.131 0.303 0.117 0.186*** 3.55 0.001 
 
Panel B: Turnover per employee Tax haven Obs. Total Tax haven Non-tax haven Difference t-stat p-value 
Unconditional means List 1 260 0.336 0.502 0.333 0.170*** 3.10 0.000 
 List 2 260 0.336 0.490 0.329 0.161*** 3.34 0.001 
Conditional means List 1 172 0.295 0.759 0.289 0.470*** 6.81 0.000 
 List 2 202 0.333 0.631 0.324 0.307*** 5.44 0.000 
 
Panel C: Profit per employee Tax haven Obs. Total Tax haven Non-tax haven Difference t-stat p-value 
Unconditional means List 1 221 0.057 0.243 0.054 0.189*** 4.85 0.000 
 List 2 221 0.057 0.242 0.051 0.191*** 3.90 0.000 
Conditional means List 1 142 0.057 0.379 0.052 0.326*** 5.70 0.000 
 List 2 166 0.061 0.322 0.053 0.269*** 4.21 0.000 
 
Panel D: Book effective tax rate Tax haven Obs. Total Tax haven Non-tax haven Difference t-stat p-value 
Unconditional means List 1 185 0.222 0.102 0.226 -0.124*** 4.48 0.000 
 List 2 185 0.222 0.129 0.228 -0.099*** 3.54 0.001 
Conditional means List 1 113 0.230 0.168 0.236 -0.068*** 1.74 0.085 
 List 2 134 0.225 0.178 0.232 -0.054*** 1.61 0.111 
 
Panel E: Cash effective rate Tax haven Obs. Total Tax haven Non-tax haven Difference t-stat p-value 
Unconditional means List 1 50 0.139 0.035 0.138 -0.104*** 1.94 0.058 
 List 2 50 0.139 0.084 0.176 -0.092*** 1.74 0.087 
Conditional means List 1 27 0.116 0.064 0.115 -0.051*** 0.77 0.451 
 List 2 36 0.108 0.117 0.159 -0.042*** 0.86 0.397 
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Table 3.9: Geographic segment reporting and the implementation of CBCR (Number of geographic segments) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equations (1) and (2) from 2012 to 2016 via OLS.  The dependent variable is NUM_GEO_SEG.  All variables are defined in Appendix C.  Coefficient 
estimates are presented with the p-values reported in parentheses.  p-values are based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Dep. Var.   NUM_GEO_SEG    
 EU Banks EU Insurers 
EU Banks vs. EU 
Insurers 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
POST -0.164 -0.100 0.060 -0.038 - 
 (0.607) (0.677) (0.925) (0.936) - 
EU_BANK - - - - -2.361*** 
 - - - - (0.000) 
EU_BANK*POST - - - - -0.140 
 - - - - (0.814) 
SIZE - 0.533** - 0.410* 0.526*** 
 - (0.018) - (0.096) (0.000) 
ROA - -6.652 - 3.959 -7.116 
 - (0.629) - (0.733) (0.313) 
LEV - -0.661 - -6.864** -8.673*** 
 - (0.880) - (0.024) (0.000) 
REVGRTH - -0.541 - -0.703* -0.781** 
 - (0.567) - (0.077) (0.041) 
NUM_CTRY_ENT - 0.090*** - 0.001 0.072*** 
 - (0.000) - (0.963) (0.000) 
Intercept 4.136*** -6.780* 5.026*** 1.737 2.930 
 (0.000) (0.097) (0.000) (0.657) (0.253) 
Country fixed effects N Y N Y Y 
Year fixed effects N N N N Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 350 350 195 195 545 
Adj. R2 0.000 0.518 0.000 0.477 0.382 
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Table 3.10: Geographic segment reporting and the implementation of CBCR (Number of country segments) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equations (1) and (2) from 2012 to 2016 via OLS.  The dependent variable is NUM_CTRY_SEG.  All variables are defined in Appendix C.  Coefficient 
estimates are presented with the p-values reported in parentheses.  p-values are based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Dep. Var.   NUM_CTRY_SEG    
 EU Banks EU Insurers 
EU Banks vs. EU 
Insurers 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
POST -0.057 0.000 -0.013 -0.088 - 
 (0.815) (0.999) (0.981) (0.839) - 
EU_BANK - - - - -2.707*** 
 - - - - (0.000) 
EU_BANK*POST - - - - 0.087 
 - - - - (0.865) 
SIZE - 0.180 - 0.178 0.312** 
 - (0.352) - (0.327) (0.013) 
ROA - 4.284 - -9.876 -14.092*** 
 - (0.730) - (0.118) (0.003 
LEV - 3.275 - -0.377 -2.106 
 - (0.278) - (0.841) (0.105) 
REVGRTH - -0.377 - -0.579* -0.725** 
 - (0.544) - (0.055) (0.017) 
NUM_CTRY_ENT - 0.040*** - -0.016 0.025** 
 - (0.001) - (0.376) (0.023) 
Intercept 2.029*** -4.639 2.910*** 1.189 -0.172 
 (0.000) (0.177) (0.000) (0.676) (0.930) 
Country fixed effects N Y N Y Y 
Year fixed effects N N N N Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 350 350 195 195 545 
Adj. R2 0.000 0.423 0.000 0.408 0.292 
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Table 3.11: Geographic segment reporting and the implementation of CBCR (Number of geographic line items) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equations (1) and (2) from 2012 to 2016 via OLS.  The dependent variable is NUMITEMS_GEO_SEG.  All variables are defined in Appendix C.  
Coefficient estimates are presented with the p-values reported in parentheses.  p-values are based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Dep. Var.   NUMITEMS_GEO_SEG    
 EU Banks EU Insurers 
EU Banks vs. EU 
Insurers 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
POST 0.236 -1.795 1.607 0.710 - 
 (0.883) (0.187) (0.640) (0.791) - 
EU_BANK - - - - -14.224*** 
 - - - - (0.000) 
EU_BANK*POST - - - - -1.172 
 - - - - (0.731) 
SIZE - -0.551 - 5.247*** 4.133*** 
 - (0.585) - (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA - 220.068*** - 51.403 2.106 
 - (0.010) - (0.362) (0.959) 
LEV - -131.349*** - -36.920*** -41.531*** 
 - (0.000) - (0.006) (0.000) 
REVGRTH - 0.632 - -3.101 -1.917 
 - (0.892) - (0.393) (0.541) 
NUM_CTRY_ENT - 0.178*** - -0.052 -0.046 
 - (0.004) - (0.548) (0.337) 
Intercept 11.721*** 164.164*** 17.436*** -47.479** 10.318 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.402) 
Country fixed effects N Y N Y Y 
Year fixed effects N N N N Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 350 350 195 195 545 
Adj. R2 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.367 0.278 
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Table 3.12: Geographic aggregation and tax haven intensity (NOMATCH_MAT) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equations (3) and (4) from 2013 to 2016 via TOBIT.  The dependent 
variable is NOMATCH_MAT_10 or NOMATCH_MAT_5.  All variables are defined in Appendix C.  Coefficient 
estimates are presented with the p-values reported in parentheses.  p-values are based on bootstrapped standard 
errors.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, using two-tailed tests. 
Dep. Var. NOMATCH_MAT_10 NOMATCH_MAT_5 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
THAV_PBT 1.233** 1.492* 0.840** 1.007** 
 (0.028) (0.054) (0.011) (0.016) 
UNLISTED - 0.503** - 0.456*** 
  (0.046)  (0.002) 
UNLISTED*THAV_PBT - -0.492 - -0.214 
  (0.807)  (0.835) 
SIZE -0.049 -0.131 0.047 -0.030 
 (0.702) (0.364) (0.571) (0.741) 
ROA -16.155 -14.993 -14.397* -13.378* 
 (0.201) (0.236) (0.053) (0.061) 
LEV -2.930 -1.430 -2.601 -1.226 
 (0.430) (0.696) (0.326) (0.589) 
INTANG -1.502 7.568 -8.801 -1.905 
 (0.943) (0.722) (0.528) (0.891) 
CAPINT 70.090*** 70.798*** 43.629*** 43.868*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) 
REVGRTH 0.875* 0.927* 0.482 0.553** 
 (0.089) (0.077) (0.137) (0.047) 
∆TLCF -82.593 -90.313 -45.425 -50.333 
 (0.278) (0.248) (0.320) (0.230) 
TLCF_DUM -0.605 -0.507 -0.206 -0.113 
 (0.102) (0.201) (0.338) (0.615) 
NUM_CTRY_ENT -0.005 0.001 -0.007* -0.002 
 (0.541) (0.950) (0.087) (0.616) 
Intercept 2.945 2.885 1.034 1.046 
 (0.345) (0.334) (0.656) (0.619) 
     
THAV_PBT + 
UNLISTED*THAV_PBT 
- 1.000 - 0.792 
 (0.582)  (0.388) 
χ2-test - 0.30 - 0.75 
     
Year & country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 222 222 222 222 
Pseudo R2 0.303 0.314 0.372 0.399 
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Table 3.13: Geographic aggregation and tax haven intensity (LEVEL_MAT) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equations (3) and (4) from 2013 to 2016 via OLS.  The dependent 
variable is LEVEL_MAT_10 or LEVEL_MAT_5.  All variables are defined in Appendix C.  Coefficient estimates 
are presented with the p-values reported in parentheses.  p-values are based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Dep. Var. LEVEL_MAT_10 LEVEL_MAT_5 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
THAV_PBT 2.204** 1.754 1.995** 1.644 
 (0.014) (0.110) (0.015) (0.104) 
UNLISTED - 0.386 - 0.653*** 
  (0.132)  (0.008) 
UNLISTED*THAV_PBT - 1.635 - 1.475 
  (0.473)  (0.458) 
SIZE -0.145 -0.191 -0.087 -0.177 
 (0.282) (0.230) (0.536) (0.253) 
ROA -14.574 -14.136 -19.111 -18.119 
 (0.258) (0.275) (0.148) (0.157) 
LEV -0.474 0.275 -1.949 -0.484 
 (0.918) (0.953) (0.658) (0.913) 
INTANG -9.170 -4.671 -19.753 -11.839 
 (0.712) (0.855) (0.430) (0.629) 
CAPINT 78.497*** 77.758*** 70.643*** 71.235*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
REVGRTH 0.804 0.959* 0.723 0.929* 
 (0.155) (0.091) (0.148) (0.067) 
∆TLCF -49.943 -54.672 -64.822 -72.726 
 (0.516) (0.480) (0.376) (0.317) 
TLCF_DUM -0.465 -0.392 -0.351 -0.232 
 (0.115) (0.204) (0.239) (0.411) 
NUM_CTRY_ENT -0.029*** -0.024** -0.028*** -0.021** 
 (0.002) (0.027) (0.001) (0.027) 
Intercept 3.838 3.942 4.023 4.187 
 (0.337) (0.295) (0.325) (0.293) 
     
THAV_PBT + 
UNLISTED*THAV_PBT 
- 3.390* - 3.120* 
 (0.077)  (0.065) 
χ2-test - 3.13 - 3.40 
     
Year & country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 222 222 222 222 
Adj. R2 0.454 0.462 0.432 0.455 
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Table 3.14: Geographic aggregation and tax haven intensity (THAV_PBT ≠ 0) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equations (3) and (4) from 2013 to 2016 via TOBIT (Panel A) and 
OLS (Panel B).  The dependent variable is NOMATCH_MAT_10 or NOMATCH_MAT_5 (Panel A) and 
LEVEL_MAT_10 or LEVEL_MAT_5 (Panel B).  All variables are defined in Appendix C.  Coefficient estimates 
are presented with the p-values reported in parentheses.  p-values are based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Panel A 
Dep. Var. NOMATCH_MAT_10 NOMATCH_MAT_5 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
THAV_PBT 1.454** 1.145 0.922*** 0.790** 
 (0.010) (0.121) (0.007) (0.035) 
UNLISTED - -0.092 - 0.134 
  (0.745)  (0.352) 
UNLISTED*THAV_PBT - 1.183 - 0.596 
  (0.470)  (0.530) 
Intercept -1.026 -1.453 -2.487 -2.683 
 (0.848) (0.812) (0.499) (0.491) 
THAV_PBT + 
UNLISTED*THAV_PBT 
- 2.328 - 1.385 
 (0.105)  (0.106) 
χ2-test - 2.62 - 2.62 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year & country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 150 150 150 150 
Pseudo R2 0.278 0.281 0.412 0.424 
      
Panel B 
Dep. Var. LEVEL_MAT_10 LEVEL_MAT_5 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
THAV_PBT 2.535*** 1.689 2.340** 1.613 
 (0.006) (0.123) (0.012) (0.143) 
UNLISTED - -0.007 - 0.356 
  (0.984)  (0.257) 
UNLISTED*THAV_PBT - 2.808 - 2.456 
  (0.228)  (0.248) 
Intercept -3.344 -4.226 -3.242 -4.039 
 (0.602) (0.537) (0.598) (0.557) 
THAV_PBT + 
UNLISTED*THAV_PBT 
- 4.497** - 4.069** 
 (0.027)  (0.018) 
χ2-test - 4.87 - 5.56 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year & country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 150 150 150 150 
Adj. R2 0.374 0.380 0.351 0.370 
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Table 3.15: Geographic aggregation & tax haven intensity (Above/below median) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equation (3) from 2013 to 2016 via TOBIT (Panel A) and OLS (Panel 
B).  The dependent variable is NOMATCH_MAT_10 or NOMATCH_MAT_5 (Panel A) and LEVEL_MAT_10 
or LEVEL_MAT_5 (Panel B).  All variables are defined in Appendix C.  Coefficient estimates are presented with 
the p-values reported in parentheses.  p-values are based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Panel A 
Dep. Var. NOMATCH_MAT_10 NOMATCH_MAT_5 
 
THAV_PBT THAV_PBT 
 >median <=median >median <=median 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
THAV_PBT 1.335 -1.545 0.922** -0.228 
 (0.105) (0.827) (0.023) (0.974) 
     
Intercept -4.083 10.907 -4.161 8.451 
 (0.600) (0.131) (0.451) (0.134) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year & country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 107 115 107 115 
Pseudo R2 0.360 0.387 0.566 0.412 
      
 
Panel B 
Dep. Var. LEVEL_MAT_10 LEVEL_MAT_5 
 
THAV_PBT THAV_PBT 
 >median <=median >median <=median 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
THAV_PBT 2.760** -3.239 2.673** -3.899 
 (0.020) (0.518) (0.017) (0.487) 
     
Intercept -5.814 15.322*** -4.990 15.256*** 
 (0.574) (0.001) (0.667) (0.004) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year & country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 107 115 107 115 
Adj. R2 0.442 0.577 0.415 0.554 
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Table 3.16: Analysis of ‘Other’ category in CBCRs 
This table reports analysis of the ‘Other’ category used by firms in CBCRs. Significant differences in the means and medians (Panel C) are based on two-sided t-tests and Wilcoxon median 
tests, respectively.  ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
Panel A: Proportion of ‘Other’ category to category total 
 Turnover Profit/loss before 
tax 
Income tax 
expense 
Income tax paid 
(cash) 
Employees Entities Total 
Mean 1.2% -13.4%* 1.6% 1.9% 1.1% 5.3%# -2.2% 
Median 0.2% 0.1% 0.7% 1.1% 0.3% 5.3%# 0.4% 
*Reduces to -1.3% if one observation is excluded (profit before tax recognised in ‘Other’ of (€195m) represented 850% of the total for 2014 of (€23m). 
#Reflects one observation where 2 entities of a total of 38 were classified as ‘Other’.  
        
Panel B: Countries included within the ‘Other’ category 
Rank Countries (Number of observations) 
1 Luxembourg (8) 
2 United Kingdom (6) 
=3 British Virgin Islands (5), Cayman Islands (5), China (5), Netherlands (5), Russia (5) 
=8 Finland (4), Ukraine (4), Denmark (4), Switzerland (4), Brazil (4), Hong Kong (4), Mozambique (4), and South Africa (4) 
  
Panel C: Use of ‘Other’ category in CBCR and intensity of tax haven use 
Tax haven intensity Firms using ‘Other’ category Firms not using ‘Other’ category Difference 
 Observations Mean Median Observations Mean Median Mean* Median*** 
THAV_TO 84 0.015 0.000 177 0.023 0.011 -0.008** -0.011*** 
THAV_PBT 72 0.045 0.000 150 0.042 0.009 0.002** -0.009*** 
THAV_ENT 84 0.105 0.079 196 0.101 0.061 0.004** 0.018*** 
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Table 3.17: Geographic aggregation and tax haven intensity (THAV_ENT) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equations (3) and (4) from 2013 to 2016 via TOBIT (Panel A) and 
OLS (Panel B).  The dependent variable is NOMATCH_MAT_10 or NOMATCH_MAT_5 (Panel A) and 
LEVEL_MAT_10 or LEVEL_MAT_5 (Panel B).  All variables are defined in Appendix C.  Coefficient estimates 
are presented with the p-values reported in parentheses.  p-values are based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Panel A 
Dep. Var. NOMATCH_MAT_10 NOMATCH_MAT_5 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
THAV_ENT 1.988** 2.191* 0.951* 1.290* 
 (0.013) (0.094) (0.050 (0.093) 
UNLISTED - 0.400 - 0.436** 
  (0.198)  (0.014) 
UNLISTED*THAV_ENT - -0.027 - -0.159 
  (0.988)  (0.874) 
Intercept -0.492 -0.548 -0.006 0.020 
 (0.887) (0.869) (0.998) (0.992) 
THAV_ENT + 
UNLISTED*THAV_ENT 
- 2.165** - 1.131* 
 (0.049)  (0.081) 
χ2-test - 3.88 - 3.05 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year & country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 261 261 261 261 
Pseudo R2 0.268 0.274 0.343 0.365 
      
Panel B 
Dep. Var. LEVEL_MAT_10 LEVEL_MAT_5 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
THAV_ENT 1.680** 1.367 1.353* 1.850* 
 (0.035) (0.238) (0.093) (0.097) 
UNLISTED - 0.310 - 0.721*** 
  (0.225)  (0.003) 
UNLISTED*THAV_ENT - 0.450 - -0.651 
  (0.763)  (0.653) 
Intercept -0.097 0.048 1.311 1.513 
 (0.979) (0.989) (0.734) (0.679) 
THAV_ENT + 
UNLISTED*THAV_ENT 
- 1.818* - 1.199 
 (0.085)  (0.234) 
χ2-test - 2.96 - 1.41 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year & country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 261 261 261 261 
Adj. R2 0.407 0.409 0.397 0.413 
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Table 3.18: Geographic aggregation and tax haven intensity (THAV_ENT ≠ 0) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equations (3) and (4) from 2013 to 2016 via TOBIT (Panel A) and 
OLS (Panel B).  The dependent variable is NOMATCH_MAT_10 or NOMATCH_MAT_5 (Panel A) and 
LEVEL_MAT_10 or LEVEL_MAT_5 (Panel B).  All variables are defined in Appendix C.  Coefficient estimates 
are presented with the p-values reported in parentheses.  p-values are based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Panel A 
Dep. Var. NOMATCH_MAT_10 NOMATCH_MAT_5 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
THAV_ENT 2.143*** 2.271* 1.034** 1.277** 
 (0.006) (0.063) (0.017) (0.049) 
UNLISTED - 0.373 - 0.402*** 
  (0.218)  (0.005) 
UNLISTED*THAV_ENT - 0.104 - -0.041 
  (0.947)  (0.963) 
Intercept -2.516 -2.7532 -1.502 -1.613 
 (0.497) (0.449) (0.489) (0.420) 
THAV_ENT + 
UNLISTED*THAV_ENT 
- 2.375** - 1.236* 
 (0.016)  (0.061) 
χ2-test - 5.78 - 3.51 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year & country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 238 238 238 238 
Pseudo R2 0.256 0.264 0.366 0.395 
      
Panel B 
Dep. Var. LEVEL_MAT_10 LEVEL_MAT_5 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
THAV_ENT 2.246*** 1.857 1.852** 2.247* 
 (0.007) (0.145) (0.028) (0.075) 
UNLISTED - 0.322 - 0.752*** 
  (0.242)  (0.003) 
UNLISTED*THAV_ENT - 0.512 - -0.579 
  (0.742)  (0.712) 
Intercept -4.548 -4.469 -2.725 -2.829 
 (0.296) (0.284) (0.532) (0.543) 
THAV_ENT + 
UNLISTED*THAV_ENT 
- 2.369** - 1.668* 
 (0.025)  (0.099) 
χ2-test - 5.01 - 2.72 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year & country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 238 238 238 238 
Adj. R2 0.395 0.398 0.398 0.420 
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Table 3.19: Geographic aggregation & tax haven intensity (Above/below median) 
This table reports the results from estimating Equations (3) and (4) from 2013 to 2016 via TOBIT (Panel A) and 
OLS (Panel B).  The dependent variable is NOMATCH_MAT_10 or NOMATCH_MAT_5 (Panel A) and 
LEVEL_MAT_10 or LEVEL_MAT_5 (Panel B).  All variables are defined in Appendix C.  Coefficient estimates 
are presented with the p-values reported in parentheses.  p-values are based on bootstrapped standard errors.  ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Panel A 
Dep. Var. NOMATCH_MAT_10 NOMATCH_MAT_5 
 THAV_ENT THAV_ENT 
 >median <=median >median <=median 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
THAV_ENT 2.998** -7.073 1.389** 1.961 
 (0.023) (0.459) (0.028) (0.661) 
     
Intercept -9.808 5.562 -9.690* 5.556 
 (0.331) (0.611) (0.088) (0.295) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year & country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 134 127 134 127 
Pseudo R2 0.331 0.398 0.528 0.375 
      
 
Panel B 
Dep. Var. LEVEL_MAT_10 LEVEL_MAT_5 
 
THAV_ENT THAV_ENT 
 >median <=median >median <=median 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
THAV_ENT 3.526*** -6.506 3.127*** -0.246 
 (0.007) (0.367) (0.008) (0.974) 
     
Intercept -15.748** 4.396 -15.594** 7.369 
 (0.043) (0.598) (0.042) (0.312) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Year & country fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Bootstrapped standard errors Y Y Y Y 
Observations 134 127 134 127 
Adj. R2 0.430 0.530 0.500 0.460 
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3.10 Appendix A: Example segment note & CBCR 
Panel A: Segment reporting note 
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Panel B: CBCR 
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3.11 Appendix B: List of tax havens 
List 1 includes 42 jurisdictions considered ‘dot’ tax havens.  List 2 includes 54 tax havens per Dyreng et al. (2015).  The ‘Big 12’ tax havens (populations > 1.6m) in List 2 are: Botswana, Costa 
Rica, Hong Kong, Ireland, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Netherlands, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland and Uruguay. 
Country List 1 List 2 Country List 1 List 2 Country List 1 List 2 Country List 1 List 2 
Andorra Y Y Cook Islands Y Y Liechtenstein Y Y Panama - Y 
Anguilla Y Y Costa Rica - Y Luxembourg Y Y Samoa Y Y 
Antigua and Barbuda Y Y Cyprus Y Y Macao Y Y San Marino Y Y 
Aruba Y Y Dominica Y Y Maldives Y Y Seychelles Y Y 
Bahamas Y Y Gibraltar Y Y Malta Y Y Singapore - Y 
Bahrain Y Y Grenada Y Y Marshall Islands Y Y St. Kitts and Nevis Y Y 
Barbados Y Y Guernsey Y Y Mauritius Y Y St. Lucia Y Y 
Belize Y Y Hong Kong - Y Monaco Y Y St. Vincent and Grenadines Y Y 
Bermuda Y Y Ireland - Y Montserrat Y Y Switzerland - Y 
Botswana - Y Isle of Man Y Y Nauru Y Y US Virgin Islands Y Y 
British Virgin Is Y Y Jersey Y Y Netherlands - Y Uruguay - Y 
Brunei Y Y Latvia - Y Neth. Antilles Y Y Vanuatu Y Y 
Cape Verde Y Y Lebanon - Y Niue Y Y    
Cayman Islands Y Y Liberia - Y Palau Y Y    
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3.12 Appendix C: Variable definitions 
Variable name Mnemonic Definition 
   
Geographic 
segments 
GEO_SEG Proportion of reporting segments based on 
geography 
   
Number of 
geographic 
segments 
NUM_GEO_SEG Number of geographic segments disclosed in the 
segment reporting note 
   
Number of country 
segments 
NUM_CTRY_SEG Number of country segments disclosed in the 
segment reporting note 
   
Number of line 
items 
NUMITEMS_GEO_SEG Number of segment line items disclosed for each 
geographic segment 
   
NOMATCH 
aggregation based 
on material 
countries 
NOMATCH_MAT Proportion of material countries in the CBCR not 
disclosed at the country level in geographic 
segment disclosures.  A country is defined as 
material if it has disclosed turnover (TO) or 
profit/loss before tax (PBT) greater than 10% 
(NOMATCH_MAT_10) or 5% 
(NOMATCH_MAT_5) of the total TO or PBT 
   
NOMATCH 
aggregation based 
on all countries 
NOMATCH Proportion of all countries in the CBCR not 
disclosed at the country level in geographic 
segment disclosures.  Based on the disclosure of 
turnover (NOMATCH_TO) and entities 
(NOMATCH_ENT) in the CBCR 
   
LEVEL 
aggregation based 
on material 
countries 
LEVEL_MAT Average aggregation score of material countries 
identified in the CBCR.  Each material country 
receives an aggregation score based on its related 
geographic segment disclosure.  A country is 
defined as material if it has disclosed TO or PBT 
greater than 10% or 5% of the total TO or PBT.  
Geographic segments are scored as follows: 
 
0.0 = Countries (e.g., Germany) 
0.5 = Aggregate countries (e.g., 
Germany/Austria) 
1.0 = Subcontinents or aggregate countries/other 
(e.g., Western Europe or 
Germany/Austria/Other) 
1.5 = Continents or aggregate subcontinents (e.g., 
Europe or Western Europe/Southeast 
Asia) 
2.0 = Aggregate continents (e.g., Europe/Asia) 
2.5 = Aggregate continents/other (e.g., 
Europe/Asia/Other) 
3.0 = Major geographic regions (e.g., Northern 
hemisphere) 
4.0 = All foreign/other (e.g., Foreign, Rest of 
World, International, Other) 
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Variable name Mnemonic Definition 
   
LEVEL aggregation 
based on all countries 
LEVEL Average aggregation score of all countries in the 
CBCR.  Each country receives an aggregation 
score based on its related geographic disclosure.  
Based on the disclosure of turnover (LEVEL_TO) 
and entities (LEVEL_ENT) 
   
Weighted LEVEL 
aggregation 
LEVEL_WT Weighted measure of LEVEL that weights each 
country’s aggregation score by the proportion of 
its turnover or entities to total turnover 
(LEVEL_TO_WT) or entities 
(LEVEL_ENT_WT) 
   
Tax haven intensity THAV Ratio of activity disclosed in tax havens to total 
activity.  Calculated based on turnover 
(THAV_TO), profit/loss before tax 
(THAV_PBT), and entities (THAV_ENT) 
   
Treatment and control 
firms 
EU_BANK Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is 
an EU bank, and 0 if an EU insurer 
   
Listing status UNLISTED Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm is 
not listed on a public stock exchange, and 0 
otherwise 
   
Period after CBCR 
requirements 
POST Dummy variable for the period after the 
implementation of CBCR requirements in full: 
equals 1 for fiscal years after 2013, and 0 
otherwise 
   
Firm size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets (after conversion 
to Euros using average exchange rates) 
   
Profitability ROA Pre-tax income scaled by total assets 
   
Leverage LEV Total liabilities scaled by total assets 
 
Intangible assets INTANG Net intangible assets scaled total assets 
 
Capital intensity CAPINT Net property, plant and equipment scaled by total 
assets 
 
Revenue growth REVGRTH Change in total revenues from year t-1 to year t 
scaled by total revenues in year t-1 
 
Change in tax losses 
carried forward 
∆TLCF Change in the tax loss carried forward from year 
t-1 to year t scaled by total assets 
 
Tax losses carried 
forward 
TLCF_DUM Dummy variable for tax losses carried forward; 
equals 1 if the tax loss carried forward is positive 
as at the beginning of the year, and 0 otherwise 
 
Number of countries  NUM_CTRY_ENT Total number of countries where the firm 
disclosed entities 
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Variable name Mnemonic Definition 
   
Profit margin PM Profit/loss before tax divided by turnover 
   
Turnover per employee TPE Turnover divided by number of employees 
   
Profit per employee PPE Profit/loss before tax divided by number of 
employees 
   
Book effective tax rate BETR Income tax expense divided by profit/loss before 
tax 
   
Cash effective tax rate CETR Cash taxes paid divided by profit/loss before tax 
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